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Summary 
Conflicts between local communities and park administrations can be extremely 
damaging both for local people’s livelihoods and the natural environment. There is an 
urgent need to better understand these conflicts and their causes, and also to define the 
most appropriate ways to constructively address them. There exists vast literature about 
co-management, which basically means that public and/or private stakeholders share 
management and responsibility over natural resources, but to date there is no consensus 
on its possible role in conflict prevention. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to address this knowledge gap by focusing on park-people 
conflicts and co-management in the complex case of Colombia′s National Protected Areas 
(NPAs). 
 
More specifically, this research project addresses the following research questions (RQ): 
RQ1. What specific park-people conflicts exist within Colombia’s NPAs? 
RQ2. What are the causal factors that underlie or trigger these park-people conflict 
manifestations?  
RQ3. Does socio-economic diversity, as expressed by gender, ethnicity, age and/or    
income level, play a role in who experiences park-people conflicts and if so, why?   
RQ4. What is the possible role of co-management in mitigating these conflicts?  
 
Both qualitative and quantitative data analyses are used to address the research questions. 
Overall, we had 601 in-depth interviews with people living within or very near 15 
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Colombian NPAs. A further 76 in-depth interviews were conducted with administrative 
officials and representatives from conservation organisations working in these areas, 
predominantly park officials.  
 
Below is our Impairment Framework reporting the main impairment or conflict categories 
and their principal sources (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Impairment framework (based on Yasmi et al., 2006) Black lines denote the 
most significant relations between source and impairment or conflict. 
 
The most important result of this research thesis is that co-management of NPAs can be 
successful in reducing conflict at a grassroots level, as long as some critical enabling 
conditions, such as trust and effective participation, are realised not only on paper, but 
also in practice (see Figure 2). This finding contradicts the increasingly widespread idea 
that co-management is not effective. Critics of co-management generally favour classic 
approaches to nature protection, like the Yellowstone model, which entails strict control 
of national parks and excludes local people. 
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Figure 2. Co-management framework. The relationship between local people′s 
experienced conflict and the number of fulfilled co-management conditions. 
Our results do not show that co-management is the silver bullet solution for resolving 
long-lasting park-people conflicts in Colombia. Rather, working towards effective 
resolution of park-people conflicts requires interventions at multiple levels.  
 
In 2017, Latin America’s longest-lasting armed conflict was terminated as a Peace 
Agreement was signed between the Colombian Government and the biggest guerrilla 
group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Within Colombia’s post 
conflict agenda, we suggest five priority areas of action. 
 
First, the Colombian environmental legislative body needs to be reformed. In this respect, 
NPA management in Colombia should move from top-down governance models towards 
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co-governance schemes. 
 
A second priority area of action is to empower central and local NPA administrations. 
Environmental regulations should not only be decreed, they must also be put into practice. 
This requires a strong and well-trained NPA administration. Failing to comply with laws 
and agreements on account of the park administration is a crucial part of the paper parks 
phenomenon in Colombia. These areas have been declared as being protected by the 
government but whose status was never fully implemented, leading to discontent among 
park residents. 
 
Third, in order to avoid and mitigate park-people conflicts, safety in park environments 
should be prioritized. Although a Peace Agreement was signed, violent environments in 
Colombia continue to strain relationships between park managers and local people. Such 
environments include armed conflicts and their associated processes of displacement, as 
well as the production and merchandising of illicit crops (mainly coca and marijuana).  
 
Fourth, Colombia’s central government needs to re-align its conservation policies with 
other interests, to avoid direct or unavoidable conflicts of interest. The government must 
ensure that regulations, interventions and investments are not in contradiction with 
resource extraction and other economic interests, such as mining or tourism. This will 
help to avoid destruction of natural areas for the financial or political benefit of private 
entities.  
 
Finally, more efforts are needed to overcome weaknesses in local organisations’ 
institutions and management capacities. At the local community level, there are  
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disagreements regarding mining, logging and fishing, and there are struggles for power 
within community leadership roles. These often place park-people relationships under 
strain.  
 
The major outcomes of this study may also be beneficial for conflict prevention in 
Protected Areas (PAs) of other developing tropical countries. 
 
A key future challenge for protected areas in the world will be to overcome the dichotomy 
between biocentric and anthropocentric approaches to nature conservation. We urge to 
develop a balanced ecocentric approach, where both biodiversity and humans are valued. 
It is perhaps a shortcoming of this research that we did not link conflict perception data 
directly to biodiversity protection outcomes. In this respect, we suggest that future 
research explores the extent to which the experience or escalation of conflict is associated 
with conservation aims on the ground, particularly when co-management agreements are 
in place.  
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Samenvatting 
Conflicten tussen parkbewoners en parkbesturen (park-people conflicts) kunnen zowel 
voor de parkbewoners alsook voor de natuur bijzonder schadelijk zijn. Tot op de dag van 
vandaag worden deze conflicten en hun oorzaken niet goed begrepen. Ook is het niet 
duidelijk welke maatregelen effectief helpen om deze conflicten te voorkomen of 
constructief op te lossen.   
 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is dit kennistekort aan te pakken. Derhalve focussen we 
hierbij op park-people conflicts en co-management in 15 Colombiaanse nationale 
natuurparken (NNPn). Men spreekt over co-management wanneer publieke en/of private 
stakeholders het beheer en de verantwoordelijkheid over natuurlijke hulpbronnen, zoals 
natuurparken, delen.  Tot op vandaag is er geen eensgezindheid over de mogelijke rol van 
co-management in conflictpreventie.     
 
Meer specifiek richt dit onderzoeksproject zich op de volgende onderzoeksvragen: 
1. Welke zijn de park-people conflicts in de Colombiaanse NNPn? 
2. Wat zijn de oorzaken die ten grondslag liggen aan of aanleiding geven tot deze park-
people conflicts?  
3. Speelt de socio-economische diversiteit, uitgedrukt in zaken zoals geslacht, etniciteit, 
leeftijd en/of inkomensniveau, een rol in wie park-people conflicts ervaart en zo ja, 
waarom?   
4. Wat is de mogelijke rol van co-management bij het beperken of oplossen van deze 
conflicten?  
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Zowel kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve data-analyses werden gebruikt om de 
onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden. In totaal hadden we 601 diepte-interviews met 
mensen die in of in de buurt van 15 Colombiaanse NNPn wonen. Daarnaast hielden we 
76 diepte-interviews met ambtenaren en vertegenwoordigers van de in deze gebieden 
werkzame natuurbeschermingsorganisaties, voornamelijk leden van Colombiaanse 
parkbesturen.  
 
Ons Conflictkader toont de vijf belangrijkste park-people conflicts en hun vijf 
belangrijkste oorzaken. (zie Figuur 1 hieronder).  
 
Figure 1. Conflictkader. Volle lijnen tonen de meest significante relaties tussen oorzaak 
en conflict.  
 
Het belangrijkste resultaat van dit proefschrift is dat co-management succesvol kan zijn 
in het verminderen van park-people conflicts, mits een aantal voorwaarden, zoals 
vertrouwen in het parkbestuur en effectieve participatie op terrein, worden gerealiseerd 
(zie Figuur 2). Deze bevinding is in tegenspraak met het voorlopig meer prominente idee 
dat co-management niet effectief is en moet worden afgeschaft. Critici van co-
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management geven doorgaans de voorkeur aan klassieke benaderingen van 
natuurbescherming, zoals het Yellowstone-model, met strikt beheerde nationale parken 
waar parkbewoners geen of weinig zeggenschap hebben. 
 
Figuur 2. Co-management kader. De relatie tussen het ervaren van conflict en het aantal 
vervulde voorwaarden voor co-management. 
 
Onze resultaten tonen niet aan dat co-management de enige of zaligmakende weg is voor 
het oplossen van langdurige park-people conflicts in Colombia. Wil men park-people 
conflicts effectief voorkomen, dan zijn interventies op verschillende niveaus vereist. 
 
 
Begin 2017 werd een vredesakkoord ondertekend tussen de Colombiaanse regering en de 
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grootste guerrillagroep, de Revolutionaire Strijdkrachten van Colombia (FARC). Dit 
vredesakkoord maakte officieel een einde aan het langst aanslepende gewapende conflict 
in Latijns-Amerika. In deze context van post-conflict stellen we vijf prioritaire 
actiegebieden voor. 
 
In de eerste plaats zou het Colombiaanse wetgevende kader op vlak van milieubeleid 
hervormd moeten worden teneinde meer legale mogelijkheden te bekomen om over te 
stappen van het Yellowstone-model  naar co-governanceschema's. 
 
Een tweede prioriteit is de versterking van de centrale en lokale parkbesturen. 
Milieuvoorschriften moeten niet alleen worden opgesteld op papier, maar ook in de 
praktijk worden geïmplementeerd of nageleefd. Daarvoor is een sterk en goed opgeleid 
parkbestuur nodig. Het niet naleven van wetten en afspraken vanwege de 
parkadministratie is een cruciaal onderdeel van het paper parks fenomeen in Colombia. 
Deze gebieden zijn op papier beschermd door de overheid, maar in de praktijk wordt er 
weinig gedaan om hun status te handhaven, hetgeen leidt tot heel wat ongenoegen bij 
parkbewoners. 
 
Ten derde, om park-people conflicts te voorkomen en te beperken, moet het veilig zijn 
binnenin en rond de parken. Hoewel een vredesakkoord werd ondertekend, blijft geweld 
en onveiligheid de relaties tussen parkmanagers en parkbewoners verstoren. Dit geweld 
omvat allerhande lokale gewapende conflicten en de daarmee samenhangende processen 
van ontheeming, alsook productie van en handel in illegale gewassen (voornamelijk coca 
en marihuana). In deze context is het niet evident om de aanwezige park-people conflicts 
doeltreffend aan te pakken 
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Ten vierde zou de colombiaanse overheid haar natuurbeschermingsbeleid moeten 
afstemmen op andere belangen om directe of onvermijdelijke belangenconflicten te 
voorkomen. De overheid zou ervoor moeten waken dat regelgeving, interventies en 
investeringen in natuurbeheer niet in strijd zijn met de ontginning van hulpbronnen en 
andere economische belangen, zoals mijnbouw of toerisme, en vice versa. Dit kan helpen 
voorkomen dat natuurgebieden worden verwoest ten voordele van financieel en/of 
politiek gewin. 
 
Ten slotte zijn er meer inspanningen nodig om tekortkomingen in de instellingen en 
(management) capaciteiten van lokale organisaties en gemeenschappen aan te pakken. Op 
het niveau van de lokale gemeenschap zijn er veelal meningsverschillen met betrekking 
tot mijnbouw, houtkap en visserij, en er is vaak strijd om de lokale macht. Dergelijke 
situaties hebben een negatieve impact op de relatie tussen parkbesturen en lokale groepen.  
 
De belangrijkste resultaten van deze studie zouden tot op zekere hoogte bruikbaar moeten 
zijn om aan conflictpreventie te doen in de natuurparken van andere tropische 
ontwikkelingslanden.  
 
Een grote uitdaging voor beschermde natuurgebieden in de wereld bestaat erin de 
opsplitsing tussen biocentrische en antropocentrische benaderingen voor natuurbehoud te 
overstijgen. We dringen aan op een ecocentrische benadering, waarbij zowel biodiversiteit 
als mensen centraal staan. Dit onderzoek heeft wellicht de tekortkoming dat er niet werd 
gezocht naar een rechtstreeks verband tussen conflict(preventie) enerzijds en behoud van 
natuur anderzijds. Toekomstig onderzoek kan hier een bijdrage leveren door te bepalen in 
vi 
 
welke mate de ervaring en/of escalatie van conflict geassocieerd kan worden met minder 
of meer behoud van biodiversiteit, in contexten waar co-management in verschillende 
gradaties aanwezig is. 
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Chapter 1. General Introduction and Thesis Overview 
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1.1. Research Background 
Natural resource-related conflicts can be extremely destructive and often go against 
environmental protection efforts (Adams et al., 2003; Castro and Nielsen, 2001). There 
exists an urgent need to better understand these conflicts and define the most appropriate 
ways to constructively resolve them. In this thesis, we address this knowledge gap by 
focusing on conflicts between park administrations and local communities, and defining 
the possible role of co-management in mitigating them, using Colombia as a case country. 
 
Protected Areas (PAs) are key to reducing vegetation degradation and biodiversity loss 
worldwide (Andam et al., 2008; Laurance et al., 2012). Recent evidence suggests that 
annual deforestation rates of PAs are lower and less variable when they are inhabited 
and/or co-managed by traditional societies that live in or near them (Porter-Bolland et al., 
2012; Vergara-Asenjo and Potvin, 2014). The fact that conservation efficiency of PAs is 
higher when local communities are involved does not mean that these areas are devoid of 
problems. PA management generally involves continuous dialogue and negotiation 
between indigenous and local communities on the one hand, and state and park authorities 
on the other. In this context, a major problem are park-people conflicts, which can be 
extremely destructive (Adams et al., 2003; Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Martinez-Alier, 
2001; Peluso and Watts, 2001). Since the 1990s, different strategies have been developed 
and implemented in effort to reconcile nature conservation objectives with local 
livelihood interests, poverty alleviation and peace building. Among these strategies, co-
management has received a lot of attention (Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Cundill et al., 2013; 
Kepe, 2008).  
The co-management concept was originally developed both as an inclusive approach for 
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proactive conflict prevention, and as a ‘last resort’ in peaceful conflict resolution, in the 
context of competing land and resource claims (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Castro and 
Nielsen, 2001; Cundill et al., 2013). In this thesis, co-management is defined as a set of 
participatory, problem-solving arrangements in which the management of a territory or a 
set of natural resources is shared between a state administration and a community of 
resource users (see page 25 for a broader conceptualization and better understanding; 
Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Cundill et al., 2013; Lockwood et al., 2006; Pomeroy and 
Berkes, 1997).  
 
Despite the valuable work that has been performed by other academics in this field, there 
are still knowledge gaps about the mechanisms that explain how park-people conflicts 
evolve and the (positive/negative) impacts of co-management on these conflicts. The 
specific factors that trigger and maintain park-people conflicts, and the role and 
effectiveness of co-management in solving these conflicts remain unclear.  
 
Colombia’s NPAs offer an interesting setting for generating knowledge on these topics. 
They present a range of NPA management conditions, resulting in a variety of park-people 
conflicts, in a context of variable degrees of co-management. 
1.1.1. Parks and People  – A Worldwide Perspective 
Protected area conservation is generally believed to be one of the most effective means of 
stemming and reducing global biodiversity loss (Eken et al., 2004). In recent decades, PAs 
have become the favourite means for trying to achieve various often conflicting 
conservation goals (Andam et al., 2008; Laurance et al., 2012; Rodrigues et al., 2004). 
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The importance of PAs has been recognised in the Convention of Biological Diversity 
(CBD, 1992), as they are considered to be capable of protecting biodiversity, and 
guarantee ecosystem integrity and ecosystem service provision (Carey et al., 2000). The 
latter includes mitigation of and adaptation to climate change, provision of drinking water 
and food, flood control and prevention of coastal erosion. Furthermore, PAs support local 
and regional economies through the benefits delivered by ecotourism. In many countries 
PAs are home to significant numbers of indigenous and local populations, providing them 
with a place where they can maintain their traditional lifestyles and livelihoods (García-
Frapolli et al., 2009; West et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2017). Recognising the importance of 
PA networks, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World 
Commission on PAs has developed a classification system, defining six PA management 
categories (see Table 1.1).  
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Table 1.1. The six (I – VI) global categories of PAs (terrestrial as well as marine areas) recognised by IUCN (Dudley 2008). The table was 
extracted from Salazar (2013).  
Number 
of sites 
Area (km2) 
 
PA management categories and their definitions 
5,453  998,415 Category Ia 
Strict nature reserve: PA managed mainly for science                                                                                                                       
Area of land or sea possessing some outstanding or representative ecosystems, geological or physiological features or species, available primarily for 
scientific research or environmental monitoring 
1,357  642,486 Category Ib 
Wilderness area: PA managed mainly for wilderness protection                                                                                                       
Large area of unmodified or slightly modified land, and/or sea, retaining its natural character and influence, without permanent or significant 
inhabitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural condition 
3,917  4,396,020 Category II 
National Park: PA managed mainly for ecosystem protection and recreation  
Natural area of land and/or sea, designated to: (i) protect the ecological integrity of one or more ecosystems for present and future generations, (ii) 
exclude exploitation or occupation inimical to the purposes of designation of the area, and (iii) provide a foundation for spiritual, scientific, educational, 
recreational and/or visitor opportunities, all of which must be environmentally and culturally compatible 
19,690 301,422 Category III 
Natural Monument: PA managed mainly for conservation of specific natural features                                                                
Area containing one or more, specific natural or natural/cultural features which is of outstanding or unique value because of its inherent rarity, 
representative or aesthetic qualities or cultural significance 
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26,420 3,252,074 Category IV 
Habitat/species management area: PA managed mainly for conservation through management intervention                                                                                                   
Area of land and/or sea subject to active intervention for management purposes so as to ensure the maintenance of habitats and/or to meet the 
requirements of specific species 
8,575 2,525,635 Category V 
Protected landscape/seascape: PA managed mainly for landscape/seascape conservation and recreation                                                                                                                       
Area of land, with coast and sea as appropriate, where the interaction of people and nature over time has produced an area of distinct character with 
significant aesthetic, ecological and/or cultural value, and often with high biological diversity. Safeguarding the integrity of this traditional interaction 
is vital to the protection, maintenance and evolution of such an area 
3,917 4,670,723 Category VI 
Managed resource PA: PA managed mainly for the sustainable use of natural ecosystems                                                                                                                          
Area containing predominantly unmodified natural systems, managed to ensure long-term protection and maintenance of biological diversity, while 
providing at the same time a sustainable flow of natural products and services to meet community needs 
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The number of PAs worldwide and the total surface area contained therein has tripled over 
the last 20 years. As of 2010, more than 108,000 terrestrial PAs had been developed, 
officially accounting for over 17 million km2, or 12.7% of the world’s land mass (Bertzky 
et al., 2012; Primack, 2014). However, many scholars argue that the development of PAs, 
especially in the tropics, often results in ‘paper parks’. These areas have been declared as 
being protected by a government, but have never been fully operationalized, and are 
considered largely ineffective (Carey et al., 2000; Lockwood et al., 2006; Salazar, 2013).  
 
Despite their importance, PAs suffer from loss of biodiversity and degradation of their 
ecosystems all over the world. Degradation of natural habitats and protected areas are 
exceedingly linked to increasing demographic pressures, mounting rural poverty, 
unsustainable extraction and use of natural resources, and (violent) conflicts (Carey et al., 
2000; Chape et al., 2008, 2005; Nolte, 2015; Stolton et al., 2003; Worboys et al., 2006). 
The detrimental impact of humans on conservation areas across the world has led to 
implementation of exclusionary conservation policies. These policies exclude people 
from conservation areas in order to achieve better environmental protection. As a result, 
park-people conflicts have surged around the world in recent years (e.g. Adams et al., 
2004; West et al., 2006). They are initiated by a variety of causal factors, including:  
 
(i) forced displacement (Adams et al., 2004; Agrawal and Redford, 2009; 
Brockington et al., 2006; Kabra, 2009; Lele et al., 2010; Lustig and 
Kingsbury, 2006; Peters, 1999; Schmidt-Soltau, 2009); 
(ii) social exclusion (Brockington and Schmidt-soltau, 2004; Brondo and 
Bown, 2011; Kelly, 2011; Lele et al., 2010; Torri, 2011; Vedeld et al., 
2012); 
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(iii) deficient community participation processes (Brondo and Bown, 2011; 
Lele et al., 2010); 
(iv) denial of ancestral territorial rights (Brondo and Bown, 2011; Cisneros and 
Mcbreen, 2010; Peters, 1999); 
(v) restrictions on community resource use priorities (Cisneros and Mcbreen, 
2010; Lele et al., 2010; Peters, 1999; Torri, 2011; Vedeld et al., 2012; West 
et al., 2006); 
(vi) negative impacts of conservation measures on community resources 
(Brockington et al., 2006; Brockington and Schmidt-soltau, 2004); and 
(vii) impoverishment accompanying all of the above (Adams et al., 2004; 
Brockington et al., 2006; Vedeld et al., 2012; West et al., 2006). 
 
A better understanding of the nature and dynamics of park-people conflicts is essential for 
developing appropriate, innovative policies that can address them in constructive ways, 
while at the same time contributing to achieving both biodiversity protection and 
livelihood goals (Campbell et al., 2001; Cisneros and Mcbreen, 2010).  
 
A lot of work has been done on the examination of socio-economic and geographical 
determinants, such as gender and ethnicity, that affect attitudes to protected areas. 
However, the role of social diversity on the experience of park-people conflicts has 
received considerably less attention. 
 
Local people are often regarded as part of the problem and as not contributing to the 
solution. However, this view is increasingly recognised as invalid when working toward 
prevention and resolution of conflicts. Considering local people simply as culprits is a 
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presupposition that fails to recognize conflicts within their respective historical, political, 
ecological and economical contexts. Furthermore, it misses the opportunity to develop 
participatory approaches to conflict resolution, which should build on local people’s 
perspectives about the genesis and manifestation of conflicts (Le Billon, 2001; Peluso and 
Watts, 2001) 
1.1.2. Parks and People – Colombia 
Colombia covers an area of 1.14 million km2
 
(Figure 1.1), and is the fourth largest country 
by land mass in continental South America. The population is currently estimated at 45.4 
million, with an average population density of 40.1 people per km2
 
 (DANE, 2016). The 
wide variations in elevation and latitude naturally lead to large climatic differences 
throughout the country. For instance, there are enormous variations in annual rainfall, 
ranging from 350 mm (Guajira peninsula) to 12,000 mm (Pacific lowlands). The country 
is divided into five geographical regions: Andean, Caribbean, Pacific, Orinoco and 
Amazon, each with a wide variety of bio-geographical characteristics.  
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Figure 1.1. Map of Colombia, showing the location and distribution of the NPAs. 
Extracted from UAESPNN (2016) 
 
Historically, most inhabitants (65%) have been concentrated in the Andean region 
(Colmenares, 1999). Rural population density in the country is around 30 inhabitants/km2, 
but can be as low as 5 in the Amazon, or as high as 74 in the Andes (Armenteras et al., 
2011). Colombia is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, comprising 
at least 85 different ethnic groups. Genetic research revealed that the average Colombian 
has a composition of European (65%), native Amerindian (22%) and African (13%) 
ancestral roots. However, these proportions vary widely from one region to another 
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(Armenteras et al., 2011). 
 
Colombia is a country with a mostly uninterrupted democratic tradition of more than 150 
years, yet its history has been marked by periodic outbursts of violence resulting in 
hundreds of thousands of deaths. Conflict dynamics have pervaded all segments of 
society, and all regions of the country. Several factors have resulted in chronic crises 
within Colombia’s main governance structures and identity. These include: (i) a highly 
corrupt and inefficient administration; (ii) an impotent judicial system; (iii) a highly 
deficient agrarian organisation structure; (iv) political parties that are ad hoc formations 
around a limited number of political figures, rather than stable well-structured 
organisations; and (v) unclear tenure regimes and rights (e.g. Fajardo, 2002; Posada, 
2009).   
 
There are also a multitude of non-state actors, including left-wing guerrillas fighting right-
wing paramilitary groups, each pursuing their own strategies and interests (e.g. Fajardo, 
2002; Posada, 2009). Non-state actors fight for territorial control and have been repeatedly 
associated with cultivating, processing and trafficking of illegal crops (mainly coca and 
marijuana plants), as well as the violation of local people’s human rights. Non-state actors 
operate a great deal in rural areas, including in and around PAs. (UAESPNN, 2012a). A 
clear illustration of Colombia’s structural crisis is that around 6.7 million people, or 13% 
of the population, have been internally displaced during the past five decades and are 
constantly seeking to escape violence and human rights violations. The Andean country 
has experienced the world’s biggest displacement situation after Syria (UNHCR, 2016a) 
In 2017, after nearly 50 years of conflict and five years of negotiation, the Colombian 
government signed a Peace Agreement with the country’s largest guerrilla group, the 
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Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The Agreement officially ended Latin 
America’s longest-lasting armed conflict. Although these peace talks are a positive step 
towards a more stable political situation, it remains unclear whether the agreement will 
stop the ongoing rights violations of Colombia’s marginalised populations, which include 
labourers, farmers, women, internally displaced persons, Afro-Colombians and 
indigenous people. For example, in the April-May 2016 period alone, 6,000 people, 
mainly Afro-Colombians and indigenous people, have fled their homes to escape armed 
clashes between illegal groups fighting for territorial control of the Choco area in the 
western part of the country (UNHCR, 2016b).  
 
Colombia possesses an extremely high level of habitat diversity and richness of plant and 
animal species unseen elsewhere. This is a result of the unique variations in its climate 
and geography (i.e. altitudes, soils, etc.). Colombia harbours close to 14% of the world's 
fauna and flora (Salazar, 2013). Globally, it accounts for the highest number of known 
bird species, and the second highest number of known plant and amphibian species (Etter 
et al., 2006; Vasquez and Serrano, 2009). With forests covering at least 0.58 million km2, 
or 52% of the national land area, it contains one of the largest continuous forested areas 
in the tropics (FAO, 2018; Salazar, 2013). As a result, conservation strategies enacted in 
Colombia are of great importance, both regionally and globally (Forero-Medina and 
Joppa, 2010).  
 
In Colombia, land use changes play a major role in vegetation degradation (Etter et al., 
2006). Since the 1950s, increased population density as well as amplified unsustainable 
economic activities have resulted in such degradation. This degradation specifically 
results from more intensive, monocrop agricultural practices and the expansion of 
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industrial and illicit crops and mining (Armenteras et al., 2011; Etter et al., 2006). Road 
network expansion aimed at economic growth has increased accessibility to forested 
areas, but has also fostered the process of forest cover change (Armenteras et al., 2011).  
 
Since the 1950s, Colombia has created PAs to combat vegetation degradation, protect 
biodiversity, and promote the conservation of its cultural and natural heritage. Colombia 
signed the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1994 (El Congreso de Colombia, 
1994). As such, Colombia endorsed the first global agreement on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity. Law 165 of 1994 includes the promotion of in situ 
conservation strategies by promulgating PAs at both local and national levels (CBD, 
1992). 
 
Currently, Colombia boasts a range of PA categories, including national, regional, and 
private (Vasquez and Serrano, 2009). NPAs cover more territory than all other categories 
combined and form the focus of this research project.  In 2017, the country had 59 NPAs, 
covering 11.27% of its continental territory and 1.48% of the marine area, with a total 
area of 14,268,224 hectares (UAESPNN, 2016). 
 
In line with IUCN guidelines, Colombia’s NPA system is divided into different 
management categories and correspond with IUCN categories (Table 1.2.; Vasquez and 
Serrano, 2009). According to Law 99 of 1993, the official authority for the declaration, 
formation or establishment of NPAs is the Ministry of Environment (now called Ministry 
of Environment and Sustainable Development; El Congreso de Colombia, 1993), whereas 
the Special Administrative National Parks Unit manages these areas (Anthony et al., 2004) 
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Table 1.2. IUCN PA categories and their equivalents in Colombia (see also Table 1.1 for 
definitions) 
 
The average annual budget assigned to each Colombian NPA, irrespective of surface 
area, is approximately $US 100,000 (UAESPNN, 2012b). Every dollar contributed by 
the Colombian Government is approximately matched by some form of external funding 
(as explained in pers. comm. with NPA administration). Nevertheless, government 
budgets remain insufficient to guarantee basic management activities, including 
ecological restoration, participative conservation, land buying and/or conflict resolution 
processes (UAESPNN, 2011a; pers. comm. with NPA administration). This lack of 
adequate funding is a worldwide problem. Very few PAs anywhere in the world turn 
profits, and the vast majority run at a considerable loss, requiring continuous external 
funding (Cundill et al., 2013). 
 
According to Colombian environmental legislation (MAVDT, 1977), NPAs cannot 
coincide with private land ownership, except in the case of legally established indigenous 
territories. As a consequence, people not formally recognized as indigenous are not 
allowed to formalise individual or communal land ownership rights in NPAs.  
 
IUCN Categories Equivalent Colombian category 
Strict nature reserve Not applicable 
Wilderness area Nature Reserve 
National Park National natural park 
Natural Monument Unique Natural Area 
Habitat/species management area Wildlife and Flora Sanctuary 
Protected landscape/seascape Road Park 
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In 2012, there were at least 22 NPAs that overlapped with legally established indigenous 
collective territories, for a total area of 3,520,692,7 ha. In 2012, Colombia’s central NPA 
administration estimated that some 35,500 indigenous people, 8,500 Afro-Colombians 
and 47,300 recently settled small scale farmers and fishermen known as colonos, were 
inhabiting the country’s NPAs (UAESPNN, 2012b). Many more live along NPA borders, 
but exact figures are unavailable. 
 
These people’s activities, such as agriculture, resource extraction and construction, 
infringe on NPA conservation goals (see also Nolte, 2015). More specifically, Colombia’s 
NPAs suffer from a range of anthropogenic pressures, such as the expansion of crop 
agriculture and cattle ranching (identified in 25 NPAs), logging (20 NPAs), hunting (19 
NPAs), armed conflict and illegal crop growing (mainly coca and cannabis plantations, 
16 NPAs) and mining (13 NPAs; UAESPNN, 2012c).  
 
Over the past few decades, park-people conflicts have emerged all over the country (e.g. 
Duran, 2009; Ojeda, 2012; UAESPNN, 2007; UAESPNN, 2012e). This is not surprising 
as until the beginning of this century, Colombia’s NPA administration set the concept of 
“parks without people” (parques sin gente in Spanish) as the conservation ideal. However, 
a shift in approach occurred in the early 21st century. In 2002, Colombia’s Ministry of 
Environment and Sustainable Development introduced the idea of “parks with people” 
(parques con gente). In doing so, the Ministry adopted a participatory conservation policy, 
emphasising dialogue with and participation of indigenous groups, Afro-Colombians and 
colonos. The stated objectives were to: (i) facilitate peaceful relations between NPA 
authorities and local groups, and (ii) increase sustainable development in the NPAs 
(UAESPNN, 2007).  
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As a result of this new approach, many Colombian policy makers and conservationists 
agree the country improved biodiversity conservation by implementing a balance between 
nature goals and local people’s needs (UAESPNN, 2007). It remains uncertain whether 
the concept of “parks with people”  really leads to effective changes and less park-people 
conflict. 
1.2. Theoretical Framework  
This section clarifies the main theoretical concepts that are used in this study and explains 
their relevance. The concepts of conflict and co-management are contested fields, and 
continue to divide social and political scientists. Therefore, any contribution to 
knowledge in these research areas demands a clear theoretical framework to guide its 
empirical and analytical techniques. Our research uses specific ideas from various 
research domains, such as rational institutionalism (Ostrom, 1990), political ecology (Le 
Billon, 2001; Peluso and Watts, 2001), and critical ethnography (Crang and Cook, 2007; 
Madison, 2005). These concepts will be detailed in the next pages. After, we present a 
conflict model that allows us to study conflict actions within NPAs. Finally, the 
conceptual aspects of NPA co-management are developed.  
1.2.1. Rational Institutionalism 
Scholars define a Common-Pool Resource (CPR) as a natural or man-made resource that 
is  ´non-exclusionary´ (i.e. it is difficult to exclude users) and ´rival´ (i.e. the consumption 
of resource units is rivalrous; Ostrom, 1990).  
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Furthermore, each person’s use of the available resources takes away benefits that others 
might enjoy. For example, a person using open air to breath does not subtract open air for 
another person’s use, but harvesting large amounts of timber in a certain area prevents 
other people from making similar use of it.  
 
Academics have defined how local institutions are best-suited for organising 
sustainable management of CPRs (Gautam and Shivakoti, 2005; Hardin, 1968, 1998; 
Larson and Bromley, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). Institutions are understood as the conventions, 
values and formally sanctioned rules of a society that largely determine individuals’ 
perceptions of the world and their behaviour in interacting with it (Ostrom, 1990). These 
sets of rules comprise laws, policies, regulations, organisational frameworks, tenurial 
arrangements, traditions and other culturally defined systems that organise relations 
between and amongst individuals, groups, formal organisations (such as government 
agencies, NGOs, civil associations) and the wider society (Ostrom, 1990). Institutional 
analysis studies how institutions behave and function. It analyses how individuals and 
groups construct institutions, how institutions function in practice, and the impact of 
institutions on one another, individuals and societies (Ostrom, 1990).  
 
Historically, government control and private sector management have been considered 
the most appropriate institutions to control overexploitation of CPRs (Hardin, 1968, 
Ostrom, 1990). This overexploitation hypothesis is fed by the assumption that individual 
users are predominantly concerned with personal gain, which will lead to overutilization 
and eventual scarcity of CPRs (Hardin, 1968). However, this argument has been 
repeatedly criticised in academic circles for its failure to acknowledge the ability of 
stakeholders to adapt their operational practices to specific situations or contexts, thus 
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avoiding overexploitation. A large body of empirical evidence supports the hypothesis 
that CPR users are able to create adequate institutional arrangements and organise 
themselves collectively. This capability should help them to achieve greater levels of 
sustainability and efficient resource use (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Gautam and 
Shivakoti, 2005; Gibson and Koontz, 1998; Ostrom, 1990).  
 
It is vital to develop appropriate institutions and management systems for achieving 
sustainable environmental, economic and social development (Ostrom, 1990). Although 
there is no ‘best’ institution that would always or ultimately bring about a sustainable 
utilisation of CPRs (Ostrom, 1990), there is evidence suggesting that top-down, 
centralised systems are less suitable for this challenging task (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; 
Carlsson and Sandström, 2008; Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004; Pomeroy et al., 2001). 
Top-down approaches exclude local participation, which is detrimental for building 
productive relationships and fostering sustainable use of resources. Co-management has 
been promoted as an appropriate institutional bottom-up arrangement to guarantee 
sustainable CPR systems. Co-management allows local users to participate in, and 
even influence, CPR decision-making, which has proven to enhance its 
sustainability. (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Carlsson and Sandström, 2008; Plummer 
and Fitzgibbon, 2004; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; 
Vergara-Asenjo and Potvin, 2014)  
 
The rational-institutionalism approach (Ostrom, 1990) recognises conflict resolution 
mechanisms as key principles to develop robust or successful institutions for natural 
resource management. Institutional analysts also argue that all resource management 
models are embedded in broader institutional contexts and that (co)-management models 
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can be understood as systems of governance, suggesting that setting up institutional 
arrangements is important for the management of park–people conflicts (Ostrom, 1990).   
1.2.2. Political Ecology 
Global biodiversity loss and degradation of natural habitats is strongly linked to increasing 
demographic pressures and poverty. Such losses are also associated with unsustainable 
extraction and use of natural resources, and (violent) conflicts (Carey et al., 2000; Chape 
et al., 2008; Nolte, 2015; Stolton et al., 2003; Worboys et al., 2006). The latter analyses 
view local people as the primary cause of nature degradation processes and associated 
conflicts, and not as part of any solution for them.  
 
Political ecologists contend that demonising local people in the context of conservation 
takes attention away from the fact that looking at the processes of conservation losses and 
natural resource-related conflicts requires a more complete, multidimensional perspective 
(Le Billon, 2001; Peluso and Watts, 2001; Bryant and Bailey, 1997). They argue that the 
rapid deterioration of the environment in NPAs and Natural Resource Related Conflict 
(NRRC) should be linked to a set of broader social, political, economical and institutional 
processes and specific historical contexts (Escobar, 1995; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Le 
Billon, 2001; Peluso and Watts, 2001; Etter et al., 2006). 
 
As an academic field, political ecology began in the 1970s in response to the increased 
politicisation of the environment, such as tying environmental problems to political 
responses (e.g. Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Peluso and Watts, 2001). Political ecologists 
start from the premise that environmental change, including soil and biodiversity 
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degradation, is not a neutral process that only requires technocratic solutions. Instead, 
ecological problems are brought about by political, and socio-economic conditions 
(Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Political ecology does not accept the notion that landscapes 
and their degradation are extrinsic to their respective political and economic contexts. 
Neumann states (2005) that the natural environment and how we acquire, disseminate, 
and legitimate knowledge about it, are highly politicised and contested, and reflect long-
standing power relations. To summarise, political ecologists view ecological problems 
as not merely technical or managerial in nature, but rather as strongly tied to socio-
economic and political conditions.  
 
Therefore, political ecologists contend that we need to respond to environmental problems 
and NRRCs not merely by initiating environmental improvements (e.g. more effective 
environmental management for enhanced conservation). Rather, they believe we need to 
address or change the socio-economic and political world (e.g. inequality, poverty, 
development planning or interventions, etc.) that affect environmental processes and 
human relationships (Escobar, 1995; Le Billon, 2001; Peluso and Watts, 2001). From this 
perspective, they argue that co-management of shared natural resources offers substantial 
promise for the peaceful resolution of natural resource-related conflicts (Carlsson and 
Berkes, 2005; Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Yasmi et al., 2006). 
1.2.3. Critical Ethnography 
Our approach to conflict and the capacity of co-management to prevent or mitigate it 
builds on the widely shared and applied Thomas and Thomas Theorem: “If men [sic] 
define situations as real, then they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas, 
1928). This view supports the notion that people’s perceptions are critical in their 
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experience of conflict.  
 
People’ s perceptions of conflicts and co-management are viewed as real, subjective 
experiences of events rather than so-called ‘objective’ facts as defined by outside 
observers. This belief explains why an ethnographic study approach is appropriate. 
Ethnography involves understanding the world as it is experienced and understood in the 
everyday lives of people (Crang and Cook, 2007). Ethnography is aimed at transcending 
the ‘objectivity’ of distanced, abstract, theoretical understandings of social, cultural, 
economic and other processes (Crang and Cook, 2007). Ethnography takes into account 
complexity, messiness, contradiction, ambiguity, ambivalence and inconsistency as real 
and important. This allows us to understand human thoughts and behaviour (Crang and 
Cook, 2007; Mason, 2002). An ability to engage with, rather than withdraw from, this 
‘real world’ messiness is seen as the most valuable contribution ethnographic research can 
make to science-based knowledge building (Crang and Cook, 2007). Doing ethnography 
means trying to reveal people’s truths or subjective understandings of social, cultural, 
economic and political processes. Therefore, people’s understandings or stories are not to 
be regarded as a clear mirror of the world, but as the means through which the world is 
constructed, understood and formatted (Crang and Cook, 2007). Society is not a given 
concept, but is instead constructed by people and the way they see it. As such, ethnography 
captures the world by giving attention to the subjective meanings and experiences of 
people (Brewer, 2000; Crang and Cook, 2007). Ethnography can play an important role 
in political ecology and in studying conflict by evidencing differing, and sometimes 
conflicting, perspectives on the environment, and environmental problems held by diverse 
stakeholders (Escobar, 1995; Neumann, 2005).  
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Influenced by Madison (2005), ethnography is understood as “critical theory in action''. It 
is critical ethnography because its inquiry and intent encompass a political purpose. 
Critical ethnography is aimed at making a positive contribution to the lives of those people 
who are at the margins of society, for example impoverished racial groups, by highlighting 
their experiences and opinions. As such, critical ethnography aims to unsettle neutrality 
and deep-seated assumptions about the socio-political world, and to reveal underpinning 
control frameworks (Madison, 2005).   
  
With respect to the latter, we already pointed out that local people are usually regarded as 
the major drivers of environmental degradation. In line of critical ethnography and 
political ecology, we argue this demonization to be deeply ingrained in the values and 
structures of the dominating centre of society. It refers to cultural imperialism, which is 
the creation and maintenance of unequal relationships between groups of people, 
favouring the more powerful civilization (Escobar, 1995).  
 
Eventually, through critical ethnography we aim at providing a reliable and well-founded 
understanding of the socio-economic world and influence on common sense, political 
processes and policy-making.  
1.2.4. Towards An Impairment Model For Conflict 
Leading scholars within the conflict studies domain have long struggled to find an 
adequate method of conflict analysis, and there is currently no widely accepted school of 
thought or analytical framework. A conflict is traditionally defined as “a difference in 
goal, perception or interest” (Coser, 1957; Miller et al., 2002; Pruitt et al., 2003).  
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According to this classic view, differences should be adequately addressed to reach 
effective conflict management. The defining of conflict as ‘differences’ has been applied 
in many contexts including in conflict situations dealing with common pool resources, 
such as those concerning fishing grounds and PAs. However, scholars have increasingly 
argued that this traditional view fails to bring lasting solutions to various natural resource-
related conflicts (Buckles, 1999; Yasmi et al., 2006). It fails to do so because the classic 
approach does not distinguish an actual conflict situation from its underlying causes (Bude 
et al., 2015; Marfo and Schanz, 2009; Yasmi et al., 2006). Conceptualising conflict as 
mere “differences” distracts attention from the fact that non-conflict situations also exist, 
since “differences” are inherent to almost all social encounters.  
 
Our research approaches the conflict concept through the more specific notion of 
‘impairment’. The impairment model defines conflict as a situation in which an actor 
perceives impairment from the behaviour of another actor (Glasl, 1999). According to this 
approach, conflict consists of three distinctive features. First, the core of the conflict is 
attributed to two actor settings: the actions of one actor cause impairment in another 
actor’s eyes, i.e. the “opponent” and the “proponent” (Marfo and Schanz, 2009; Yasmi et 
al., 2006). Second, the experience of an actor’s behaviour or action as impairment is the 
only defining element for conflict manifestation, thereby providing a single criterion to 
distinguish conflict from non-conflict situations (Glasl, 1999; Marfo and Schanz, 2009; 
Yasmi et al., 2006). Third, factors or conditions that lead to these impairments should not 
be confused with the actual conflicts or actual experience of impairments.  They are the 
sources of conflict or the sources of impairment. As stated above, the separation of conflict 
sources and conflict manifestations sets the classic and impairment approaches apart. The 
latter approach facilitates our study of both conflicts and their sources. 
24 
 
 
Previous research showed that impairment plays a pivotal role not only in social conflict 
(Glasl, 1999), but also in NRRCs (Marfo and Schanz, 2009; Yasmi et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, the impairment approach takes into account the dynamic nature of NRRCs, 
whereby numbers and degrees of impairments can increase or decrease according to each 
actor. This is an important and more realistic approach for the NPA context, as the 
perception of impairment can change over time in response to political context, 
demographic situation and availability of resources (Yasmi et al., 2006). 
 
Other studies that used the impairment approach have analysed conflict from a community 
perspective. These studies assume that the state and the local community are homogenous 
entities composed of stakeholders with the same experience of conflict (Marfo and 
Schanz, 2009; Yasmi et al., 2006). However, neither the state nor the respective 
communities are homogenous entities (De Pourcq et al., 2015, 2009; Leach et al., 1999). 
There is evidence that individual community members have different perceptions of 
resource management (problems) and experience conflict differently (Leach et al., 1999; 
Soneryd and Uggla, 2000). A better understanding of conflict and its mitigation requires 
acknowledgment of the different perceptions and experiences within a particular group or 
community. To address this knowledge gap, we will analyse perceptions of NRRCs, and 
its causal factors, at the level of individual respondents. 
 
Nolte (2015) undertook an interesting study in Colombia, showing that current 
enforcement efforts are insufficient to deter priority threats for conservation. Throughout 
his paper, he gives a concise overview of the many problems Colombian parks face, 
including poor management, lack of funding, ambiguous legal frameworks, unsafe 
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working conditions for park staff, weaknesses in the enforcement regime and land tenure 
conflicts. The author’s main conclusion is that enforcement strategies are unlikely to yield 
positive results for reducing priority threats in Colombia’s natural parks unless they are 
accompanied by resolution of land tenure, clarification of use rights, improved patrolling 
strategies and protection of park guards. Our study complements Nolte´s work by 
including the perspectives of central players, such as local park inhabitants, on these 
matters. 
1.2.5. Current Theories of Co-management  
Since the 1990s, co-management schemes have been an important strategy for reducing 
NRRCs worldwide (Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Cundill et al., 2013). Co-management was 
originally developed as an inclusive approach for pro-active conflict prevention, or as a 
‘last resort’ measure to foster peaceful solutions to conflicts associated with competing 
claims to natural resources including land (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2000; Carlsson and 
Berkes, 2005; Castro and Nielsen, 2001). Collaborative forms of management can 
mitigate conflicts by fostering local control of resource use, and may also reduce poverty 
and promote democratic decision-making (e.g. Cundill et al., 2013). Co-management is 
here understood as a system of joint decision making between formal management 
structures and local communities (Berkes, 2009). In this sense, co-management allows all 
stakeholders to negotiate, define and guarantee equitable sharing of management 
functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory or set of natural resources 
( Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2000; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Cundill et al., 2013; 
Gutiérrez et al., 2011). Co-management thus distinguishes itself from other forms of 
participatory natural resource management through application of a philosophy of power-
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sharing and the promotion of partnerships (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005).  
 
In this thesis, co-management is defined as participatory, problem-solving arrangements 
in which the management of a territory or a set of natural resources is shared between a 
state administration and a community of resource users (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; 
Lockwood et al., 2006; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). One of the underlying hypotheses of 
co-management is that an inverse relationship exists between unsustainable resource 
management, including NRRC, and the fulfilment of a number of co-management 
conditions, such as a sense of ownership over, or effective participation in, the co-
management process by all individuals affected (Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom, 1990; Pomeroy 
et al., 2001, 2004).  
 
Power sharing arrangements can manifest themselves in many forms, and this variation 
can often be depicted along a continuum (e.g. Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). At one 
extreme, there are arrangements in which, despite consultation with local communities, 
full control remains with the relevant state agency. At the opposite extreme, there are 
arrangements in which local communities possess full control over the resources with 
little interference from state agencies. Power sharing arrangements at either end of this 
continuum, and everywhere in between, are here referred to as ‘co-management’ (see 
Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2. A sliding scale showing various levels of of co-management. Image obtained 
from Pomeroy & Berkes (1997). 
 
It was hypothesised that an inverse relationship exists between unsustainable resource 
management activities, including conflict actions, and the fulfilment of a number of 
enabling co-management conditions, such as a sense of ownership over, or effective 
participation in, the co-management process by all individuals affected (Berkes, 2009; 
Gutiérrez et al., 2011; Ostrom, 1990; Pomeroy et al., 2004; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). 
Our identification of enabling conditions that would determine the potential for co-
management to prevent or mitigate park–people conflicts is based on related research 
domains dealing with common property theory and institutional analysis (Berkes, 2009; 
Idrissou et al., 2013; Ostrom, 1990; Pomeroy et al., 2004; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997).  
 
The literature on co-management has identified as many as 28 conditions that are critical 
and should be put into place for the sustainable governance of common pool resources 
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(Berkes, 2009; Ostrom, 1990; Pomeroy et al., 2004; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). Several 
of these are directly relevant for the contribution of co-management to conflict prevention 
and resolution. We selected ten conditions, which allowed using individual participants’ 
judgments as the sole criterion to assess the fulfilment of enabling co-management 
conditions (See Table 1.3 for selected list of conditions and sub-conditions). For example, 
we included effective participation, but discarded enabling policies and legislations 
among the conditions. Our reasoning was that co-management participants can be 
expected to be able to self-asses or explain their involvement in making and changing co-
management rules i.e. a subcondition for effective participation) whereas all 
respondents could not realistically be expected to be aware of, or able to comment on all 
relevant co-management-related legislations. 
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Table 1.3. Enabling co-management conditions and interpretation 
Co-management 
Conditions 
Co-management Sub-Conditions 
Individual incentive Participants feel that the co-management process benefits them and that they are better off complying than not complying with rules  
Livelihood alternatives are provided in case of access restriction 
Coordinating body  There is a formal and operative body for co-management representing all stakeholder groups 
Trust Participants trust NPA functionaries 
Ownership Participants agree with the area of interest being a NPA and are willing to obey legislation and management rules  
In cases where there is some form of co-management, participants support it 
Effective participation Participants are involved in making and changing rules  
Local leaders are involved in making and changing rules  
There is at least one person of the local community appointed as park employee 
Free access to 
information  
Participants have free access to information (budgets, operational plans, etc.) when required 
Clear objectives  Participants are aware of and understand basic NPA and co-management objectives, activities and scope. This includes for example whether or not 
people know if they live inside or outside the NPA, who else is involved in the co-management, etc. 
Empowerment There is capacity building related to NPA and co-management objectives and activities if relevant. This includes the socialisation of the NPA 
Management Plan to the community 
Compliance NPA administration complies with prior informed consent procedures and/or with other (co-management) agreements and commitments 
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Conflict management There exists a formal, identified, consensual and functioning conflict management mechanism at the local level, where solutions to conflicts can be 
quickly resolved  
There is regular and informal communication between co-management stakeholders about how conflicts can be resolved 
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While initially co-management raised high hopes, today’s understanding is that it has not 
lived up to expectations (Cundill et al., 2013; Dressler et al., 2010). Widespread criticism 
suggests that in practice co-management tends to gloss over the institutional complexities 
posed by the management of common-pool resources (Adams and Hulme, 2001; 
Campbell et al., 2001; Cundill et al., 2013). Co-management has also been criticised as 
being a pretext to dissemble systems that empower the elite in the background while 
purporting to open up participation and benefit sharing (e.g. Cooke and Kothari, 2001). In 
some cases, co-management has been blamed for exacerbation of the conflict that it was 
intended to solve (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Castro and Nielsen, 2001). However, we 
argue that it may be premature to discard co-management as a tool for conflict resolution, 
since its potential to resolve conflicts has not been scientifically assessed. In this study we 
address this research gap. 
1.3. Hypotheses, Objectives & Justification 
1.3.1. Hypotheses 
The main aim of this research is to assess the pros and cons of co-management in 
mitigating park-people conflicts.  
 
As explained in the previous page, widespread criticism has suggested that co-
management may lead to the emergence of new conflicts rather than their solution 
(Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Castro and Nielsen, 2001).  
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We hypothesise that part of the criticism on co-management results from the way the co-
management system was evaluated. The majority of evaluation studies have only focused 
on conceptual and general theoretical assessments of whether and how local governance 
schemes, including co-management, contribute to sustainable management of natural 
resources (Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; Andersson and Agrawal, 2011; Cox et al., 2010; 
Gutiérrez et al., 2011). Systematic assessments of the role of specific enabling co-
management conditions in conflict prevention at grassroots level are non-existent.  
 
One of the underlying assumptions of co-management is that there exists an inverse 
relationship between the manifestation of park–people conflicts, and the presence of a 
number of conflict-enabling conditions. This assertion has not been systematically tested. 
Thus, we also hypothesize that:  
 
(i) if co-management models that establish the rights and responsibilities of all parties 
involved are implemented, it is likely that park-people conflicts will be prevented, solved 
or attenuated, guaranteeing a more effective, long-term problem-solving process; and  
(ii) in order for co-management to be successful, certain critical minimum conditions have to 
be met, such as a sense of ownership over, or effective participation in, the co-
management process by all individuals affected.  
 
Among the most important socio-economic and geographical determinants that affect 
attitudes to protected areas indentified in literature are: a person´s income, age, 
participation in protected area management, resource use patterns, educational level, 
gender and ethnicity, and spatial variables such as the specific protected area where a 
person resides and distance from protected area boundaries (Baral and Heinen 2007; 
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Bragagnolo et al., 2016; Ciocănea et al., 2016; Garekae and Tsompi Thakadu, 2016; 
Larson et al., 2016; Mehta and Heinen, 2001). However, the role of such determinants in 
shaping park-people conflicts has received considerably less attention (e.g. Bragagnolo et 
al., 2016; De Pourcq et al., 2015 and 2017).  
 
Multiple aspects of social identity such as gender, wealth, age and ethnic status, divide 
and cut across so-called “community'' boundaries (Leach et al., 1999). Diverse and 
sometimes conflicting interests rather than shared priorities require constant negotiation 
and bargaining among different interest groups living within the same household and/or 
community (Nightingale, 2006; Schroeder, 2002). Based on this, we also expect that:  
 
(iii) Different community members often have different perceptions of resource management 
and thus experience conflict and co-management differently; and 
(iv) Their individual experience of conflict (and co-management) is affected by previously 
mentioned socio-economic and geographical factors. 
1.3.2. Objectives 
The above hypotheses are addressed through the following research questions (RQs):  
RQ1. What specific park-people conflicts exist within Colombia’s NPAs? 
RQ2. What are the causal factors that underlie or trigger the actual park-people conflict 
manifestations?  
RQ3. Does social diversity, such as gender, ethnicity, age and/or income level, play a role 
in who experiences park-people conflicts and if so, why?   
RQ4. Does the fulfillment of enabling co-management conditions reduce the prevalence 
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of park-people conflicts? 
1.3.3. Justification 
There is a global consensus that biodiversity conservation should be achieved without 
bringing about any conflict. Hence, the question on how to achieve this becomes 
extremely relevant. Both conservation and policy practitioners need a framework and 
science-informed guidance to challenge, address and resolve long-lasting park-people 
conflicts. They also need practical guidelines to implement successful conflict resolution 
strategies. Not engaging in effective conflict resolution strategies is likely to result in 
NPAs, with potentially detrimental impacts on the people living in or near them. 
 
Colombia’s NPAs provide an excellent case for answering our research questions 
because: (i) this South American country is characterised by an exceptionally high level 
of biodiversity, much of which is located on protected areas; (ii) a substantial number of 
people inhabit Colombia’s NPAs. These comprise around 93,681 people: 35,695 
indigenous, 8,325 Afro-Colombians and 47,376 subsistence farmers of mixed ethnicity, 
often referred to as settlers or colonists (UAESPNN, 2012b, pers. comm.). Many more 
live along NPA borders, but exact figures are unavailable; (iii) the inhabitation of parks 
and exploitation of their resources infringe on NPA conservation goals (see also Nolte 
2015) and have led to a series of park-people conflicts (Cuesta, 2008; Duran, 2009; Ojeda, 
2012; UAESPNN, 2012e). However, existing documentation is very case-specific, 
making extrapolation difficult, and analysis of the sources of conflicts is inadequate and 
incomplete; (iv) the Policy for Social Participation in Conservation (PSPC), adopted in 
2001 by the Colombian NPA administration, aimed to address these historical conflict 
situations (see also Chapter 2; UAESPNN, 2007; Duran, 2009).   
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Collinearity of enabling conditions has been raised as an issue in co-management 
assessments (Agrawal, 2001; Cox et al., 2010). However, neither the set of enabling 
conditions see Table 1.3, page 29), nor the conflict categories we selected showed strong 
signs of collinearity (variance inflation factors smaller than 10 and 2, respectively), 
justifying the inclusion of selected co-management conditions (Kutner et al., 2004).  
1.4. Research Methodology 
Between 1/10/2011 and 31/08/2014, we carried out fieldwork in and/or along ten 
Colombian NPAs. We also obtained data from five additional NPAs that were not 
personally visited. All these fifteen NPAs covered surface areas ranging 1,000 - 1,000,000 
ha. Some were created decades ago while others were delineated more recently. Their 
ecological and socio-economic characteristics vary significantly, and they also present a 
range of different NPA management conditions. Taking into account the size and 
complexities of these NPAs, we only visited specific sub-areas. For some NPAs, we 
selected more than one sub-area. In total, we selected fourteen sub-areas (from the ten 
NPAs that were visited) with at least eight respondents. Sub-areas were selected according 
to: (i) feasibility in terms of access and safety aspects; (ii) presence of different Colombian 
bio-geographical regions, including the Amazon, Andes, and Pacific and Caribbean coast 
areas; and (iii) presenting a balanced illustration of cultural diversity, including 
indigenous groups, Afro-Colombians and settlers. 
1.4.1. Data Collection 
We interviewed a total of 677 respondents. At grassroots level, we interviewed 601 
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persons (473 ‘ordinary’ community members and 128 community leaders) living in or 
along the borders of fifteen NPAs. Most of these interviews were carried out during field 
visits (N = 586; 10 NPAs), at locations where the respondents had their residence (e.g., in 
their house, or public places). Field visits were complemented with interviews with 15 
leader representatives of the five additional NPAs in nearby towns or major Colombian 
cities (see Figure 1.3 and Table 1.4) . 
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Figure 1.3. Map of Colombia, showing the location and distribution of the NPAs that 
were studied (NPAs that were and were not personally visited in blue and yellow, 
respectively).  Shaded areas in dark and light brown relate to changes in altitude (Based 
on UAESPNN, 2016).  
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Table 1.4. Characteristics of the NPAs and study areas considered in this thesis. n=number of resondents. 
 
NPA Region Year of NPA 
creation 
Surface area 
(ha) 
Localities of residence of community respondents (n=601) Co-maangement 
in study sites 
SFF Los Flamencos Caribbean 1977 7,615 Cari Cari and Palaima (n=8) 
Indigenous Wayuu collective territory “Perratpu”) (n=43) 
Displaced community near Tocoromana (n=9) 
Afro-Colombian communities Los Cocos and Camarones (n=7) 
No 
Yes 
No 
NA* 
Tayrona Caribbean 1964 15,000 Indigenous community Tayrona (n=4) 
Settler/fisher communities Tayrona (n=61) 
NA 
No 
Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta Caribbean 1964 383,000 Settler communities La Lenguëta (n=60) 
Indigenous collective territory Kogui-Malayo-Arhuaco (n=10) 
Indigenous community Kankuamo (n=1) 
No 
No 
NA 
SFF Los Colorados Caribbean 1977 1,000 Settler communities Los Colorados (n=38) No 
Utria Pacific 1987 54,300 Afro-Colombian community councils (n=66) 
Indigenous collective territory “Jurubida-Chori-Alto Baudo” (n=41) 
Indigenous collective territory Alto Rio Valle Boro Boro (n=1) 
Yes 
Yes 
NA 
Los Farallones Pacific 1968 205,266 Afro-Colombian community councils Los Farallones (n=8) Yes 
Uramba Bahia Malaga Pacific 2010 47,094 Afro-Colombian community councils Bahia Malaga  (n=74) Yes 
Paramillo Andes 1977 460,000 Indigenous collective territory “Yaberarado” (n=20) 
Indigenous collective territory “Pollines” (n=2) 
Yes 
NA 
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Puracé Andes 1975 83,000 Indigenous collective territory Puracé  (n=44) 
Indigenous collective territory Rio Blanco (n=2) 
Settler community Puracé (n=2) 
No 
Yaigojé-Apaporis Amazon 2009 1,056,023 Indigenous collective territory “Yaigojé-Apaporis” (n=85) Yes 
Catatumbo-Bari Andes 1989 158,125 Indigenous collective territory (n=4) NA 
Los Katíos Pacific 1973 80,658 Afro-Colombian community Los Katíos (n=3) NA 
Nevado del Huila Andes 1977 158,000 Settler community Nevado del huila 2 NA 
Munchique Andes 1977 47,000 Settler community Munchique (n=5) NA 
Amacayacu Amazon 1975 293,500 Indigenous community Amacayacu (n=1) NA 
* NA refers to those study sites where we did not investigate the potential of co-management 
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Furthermore, we interviewed 76 stakeholders from various governmental and non-
governmental institutions. Governmental actors were predominantly from the NPA 
administration, the Colombian Institute for Rural Development (INCODER), the Agustin 
Codazzi Geographical Institute (IGAC, the governmental instance responsible for issuing 
and actualising land registers in NPAs), and the Superintendencia de Notariado y Registro 
(SNR, the Superintendence of Notaries and Registry Offices). Non-governmental actors 
included members from law firms and a number of nature conservation associations, such 
as the Humboldt Institute, World Wildlife Fund for Nature and Conservation 
International. The majority of interviews at institutional level were held at the institutions’ 
offices in the bigger Colombian cities, such as Bogota, Cali, Santa Marta and Riohacha.  
 
Closed and open-ended interviews at grassroots level were conducted during field trips 
that lasted from one week to several months, eventually amounting to a total of ten 
months. Uniform questionnaires were used to obtain information on livelihood activities 
and social diversity characteristics, all of which have been highlighted previously to be 
main determinants of attitudes to protected areas (Baral & Heinen 2007; Bragagnolo et 
al. 2016; Ciocănea et al. 2016; Garekae & Tsompi Thakadu 2016; Larson et al. 2016; 
Mehta & Heinen 2001). The information obtained includes: place of residence (within or 
outside the NPA), length of residency in NPA, gender, ethnicity, position within the 
community (community leadership or not), household size, age, income and education 
level, and resource use activities. Interview questions centred around economic and 
productive activities within NPAs, land tenure within NPAs, employment by the NPA 
administration as an indicator for participation in NPA management, and experiences of 
conflict(s) (if any) with their NPA administration. 
To identify conflict categories, we explicitly asked community members and leaders to 
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free-list all actions of NPA administrations (and staff) that they had perceived as an 
impairment or conflict. We grouped all these experiences in different conflict categories 
and presented these to NPA officials and other institutional stakeholders. Administrative 
officials mostly confirmed that those reported impairments and the way we grouped them 
are representative of the actual conflicts experienced by local communities residing in or 
near Colombian NPAs. We did not evaluate potential conflicts with wildlife, guerilla 
groups or any other outsiders. 
To identify potential causal factors of conflicts as well as interventions to resolve local 
conflict situations, we specifically asked for the opinions of officials at institutional level 
as well as community leaders. The latter respondents included presidents of local 
community councils, teachers and traditional leaders. We also sought the opinions of other 
community members on conflict resolution strategies, but most did not feel sufficiently 
knowledgeable or directed us to ask community leaders.  
 
Finally, we asked grassroots level respondents if co-management conditions were 
fulfilled. As we carried out all interviews ourselves in Spanish, potential interviewer bias 
should be constant across cases.   
 
When arriving at a community, permission was first requested to undertake research by 
explaining the goals and limitations of this study during a community assembly. Based on 
this, the communities collectively decided if, and under what conditions interviews would 
be carried out. Next, we sought every individual respondent’s verbal informed consent 
before proceeding with the interview. For participants under the age of 18, consent was 
sought and obtained from their parents or guardians. Consent was recorded in writing by 
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the interviewer. Community leaders were always interviewed first (i.e. presidents of the 
community councils, teachers, traditional leaders, etc.), which was generally very helpful 
to get an overall idea of the relationship between community members and NPA 
administration, and the (non) existence of conflicts. Following the discussions with 
community leaders, individual community members were interviewed, making sure to 
select a representative sample of different interest groups (i.e. men and women, young 
and old, fishermen, miners and farmers, people living in the centre of the village and 
others living on the outskirts, and so on). The latter interviewees were selected according 
to random sampling, which is thought to be the purest and most straightforward 
probability sampling strategy  (Gravetter and Forzano, 2011). All conversations were 
written down. Digital recordings were not used. For privacy and safety reasons, we 
assured respondents that all information would be treated anonymously.  
 
Committed to abide to ethical standards, we always tried to protect participants’ rights 
and privacy as much as possible. The scholarship for this research was approved without 
the need for evaluation of an ethics committee or IRB because of the nature of the 
interviews. The purpose of the study was not to observe, study or test individuals but 
rather to aggregate data gathered at individual respondents’ level for the evaluation of our 
research hypotheses. We did not try to obtain access to traditional knowledge, or to other 
types of knowledge protected by international or national regulations and legislation. We 
only questioned people about their livelihood activities, social diversity characteristics, 
individual experience of conflict with NPA administrations, and their perceptions of the 
importance and fulfilment of selected enabling conditions considered necessary for co-
management schemes to work (see also Table 1.3, page 29). The participating 
communities and Colombian NPA administration fully authorised this working method 
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and the latter formalized its agreement with this research in a written document. 
 
It is important to note that our analysis of conflict and co-management is based on local 
perceptions. However, local people’s perspectives do not necessarily match reality on the 
ground. For example, people may experience access conflicts in a context where the NPA 
administration actually does not impose any restriction measures. The perceptions of 
community members may be fuelled by rumour and gossip, and can be based on incorrect 
information. This may lead to experiences that contradict reality on the ground. However, 
since impairment involves emotional perceptions, social interests and their combination 
(Glasl, 1999), rumours are equally valid conflict sources as say, unfair legislation or lack 
of park funds. Such perceived impairments based on rumours would equally need 
interventions to be resolved. In this respect, it is interesting to note that suspicion and 
distrust underlying rumours are often the earliest sources of impairment as a conflict 
escalates (Glasl, 1999). 
 
In conflict studies, accounts by actors that are actively involved in conflict can be biased 
or may lack some detail. Our approach of conducting interviews and discussions at 
multiple levels, from grassroots to institutional, should have helped to overcome at least 
part of this obstacle (see also Madison, 2005). Interviewing different stakeholders or 
interest groups about the same topics is central to achieving accurate research results (see 
also Madison, 2005).  
 
 
At some point during the interviews, new hypotheses and explanations emerged. These 
were always probed extensively, to provide a more thorough and correct understanding of 
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the results. We conducted interviews until the point of data saturation, i.e. when we had a 
good understanding of the situation at hand and new informants did not add substantial 
information to the research questions. 
 
We also used more than one data collection technique. This not only enhances the 
objectivity of the research, it also increases the detail of the study because each method 
adds another angle, or reveals a slightly different version of the same reality (Brewer, 
2000). In this respect, we used different types of documents to corroborate, complement 
or refute interview results (see also Arts and Verschuren, 1999). Following Madison 
(2005), respondent biases were also reduced by complementing interview results with 
other data sources. To this respect, a number of documents were provided by conflict 
stakeholders. Relevant hard-copy documents included press releases, park-people 
meeting reports and agreements, and written memos about conflicts. Electronic 
documents included emails and related correspondence between park administration staff 
and community leaders, and NPA documents and program evaluations.  
 
NPA administration granted us a permit to review all park-people reports, agreements and 
correspondences within the 2012 – 2014 period. These comprised a few hundred files, 
totalling approximately 5000 pages. We read and analysed all these documents, a process 
that was essential to better understand the Colombian park-people conflict context. 
Reports were often a verbatim account of the conversations that took place during park-
people meetings and gatherings of NPA administration officials. Therefore, these texts 
were reliable sources to verify interviewers’ opinions on park-people relationships.  
 
Although documents are often viewed as secondary sources, Atkinson and Coffey (2011) 
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stated that they often provide an authentic and robust account of social reality.  
 
Besides document sources, direct participation in park-people meetings and observation 
of park-people encounters also appeared to be valuable tools to complement our other data 
collection techniques (e.g. Marfo and Schanz, 2009; Bernard, 2006; Silverman, 1997). 
With respect to participation and observation, since 2011 the author has lived in the Sierra 
Nevada de Santa Marta mountains near its NPA entrance. He spent more than ten months 
in the field living with and observing local people within the NPAs of interest. 
Furthermore, he attended eight official park-people meetings, which were mostly 
organised by the local NPA administration to discuss NPA related problems.   
1.4.2. Data Analysis 
There is a broad tradition in social science literature to use multiple methods instead of 
single methods for data analysis. To this respect, many scholars share the view that 
qualitative and quantitative methods should be seen as complementary rather than as 
rivals. They emphasize that the use of multiple method research designs allows for greater 
accuracy in the analysis of the data, which in turn leads to more precise results. The 
multimethod design is usually described in literature as the convergent or the 
multimethod/multitrait methodology (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). Others prefer terms 
such as convergent validation or “triangulation” (Jick, 1979; Yeasmin and Rahman, 
2012). Denzin and Lincoln (2011) broadly define triangulation as the combination of 
different analytical methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon.  
 
In the social sciences, the use of multiple methods can be traced back to Campbell and 
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Fiske (1959) who developed the idea of “multiple operationism”. They argued that more 
than one method should be used to ensure that the observed variance of the data reflects 
that of the trait itself, and not of the method. Convergence between two methods means 
that results are more likely to be valid and not a methodological artefact (Bouchard, 1976; 
Jick, 1979). Most textbooks underscore the need to mix methods, given the weaknesses 
found in a single-method design (Brewer and Hunter, 2006; Creamer, 2017; Creswell and 
Clark, 2011; Guest, 2011; Hesse-Biber, 2010).  
 
In line with the former ideas, we use qualitative as well as quantitative data analysis 
methods.  Qualitative data analysis allows for examination of “how things are related and 
interdependent” (Denscombe, 1998). It starts from the assumption that “social realities 
are wholes that cannot be understood in isolation from their contexts” (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). Where possible, our study attempts to illustrate the complexity of specific 
situations (e.g. the interrelationship between impairment conditions and their sources) 
using data reduction, data display and conclusion drawings (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
 
Following Mason (2002), rivalling field hypotheses were developed and tested in each of 
the case studies. We gradually rejected false hypotheses based on information obtained 
from increasing numbers of people. This means that we continued interviewing new 
respondents until we had sufficient data to answer the research questions. According to 
Mason (2002), this point is reached when informants do not add new substantial 
information about the social process under scrutiny. 
 
In general, statistical data analysis is used to generate numerical values and to identify 
statistically significant correlations. Following many other statisticians, we used R as 
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software for data analysis (Williams, 2011; Tippmann, 2014). Methods used for statistical 
data analysis for answering the research questions (RQ3 and RQ4) are presented under 
the Methods for Statistical Data Analysis sections of the respective chapters (i.e. Chapter 
4 and 5). 
1.5. Structure of This Dissertation 
This chapter 1 provided a thorough overview of the most pertinent issues regarding PAs 
worldwide and in Colombia specifically. It continued with a presentation of the theoretical 
background against which the concepts that are central to our research, conflict and co-
management, were elaborated. Following this, rationale, research aims and hypotheses 
were outlined. We also detailed our research methodology. 
 
The body of the thesis contains four chapters. Chapter 2 presents a set of case studies, 
providing empirical and critical insights into the ways Colombian conservation dynamics 
play out in the real world. It highlights how these complex dynamics have resulted in a 
variety of park-people conflicts. The basic goal of this chapter is to provide the reader 
with real cases and a sense of the breadth and depth of the issues at hand.  
 
 
The following three chapters consist of three separate studies that address the 
research questions. Chapter 3 classifies park-people conflicts in Colombia and discusses 
their triggering factors (RQ1 and RQ2). Chapter 4 assesses if and how socio-economic 
and geographical variables such as gender, ethnicity and income level, influence 
individual experience of park-people conflicts (RQ3). Chapter 5 examines the possible 
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role of co-management in the mitigation or resolution of park-people conflicts (RQ4).  
 
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion and discussion of key findings, with recommendations 
to improve NPA management, and suggestions for further study themes and questions. 
 
Supplementary material, references and Curriculum Vitae follow the body of the text.  
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Chapter 2. Understanding Park-People Conflicts and 
Co-Management in Colombia: Case Studies 
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The chapters where we focus on answering the research questions (chapters 3, 4 and 5) 
provide the reader with a lot of data. Most results in those chapters are based on statistical 
data analysis. 
 
This chapter is somewhat different as the findings are based on qualitative data analysis. 
We start with detailing recent Colombian conservation policies, several case studies, 
concrete situations and specific examples in order to provide empirical and critical 
insights in the ways Colombian conservation dynamics actually play out on the field and 
how these have resulted in the general conflict context that characterise Colombia´s NPAs.    
 
This chapter is ranked first in the thesis chronology as it improves the understanding and 
interpretation of the chapters that follow.  
 
In the overall conclusion (Chapter 6) we will come back to the use of both qualitative and 
quantitative data analysis and whether they can be viewed as complementary methods for 
conflict analysis or not.  
 
It is important to note that the nature of this research is period-bound as the findings are 
based on fieldwork we undertook between 2011-2015. The results come from interviews 
held in that period, mainly with NPA staff and community members, except where stated 
otherwise.  
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2.2. The Origins of the Colombian Conservation Model 
NPA development in Colombia started in the mid-twentieth century. The first Colombian 
NPA model was based on the US example of Yellowstone National Park, as was the case 
for many other NPAs in other countries around the world. This model promotes natural 
reserves where people are excluded as the ultimate conservation ideal (Adams et al., 2004; 
Kalamandeen and Gillson, 2006; Lele et al., 2010; Lockwood et al., 2006; West et al., 
2006; pers. comm. with NPA administration functionaries). One of the many 
consequences of the introduction of this ‘pristine wilderness’ model was that the bio-
centric approach for conservation became ingrained in environmental legislation (El 
Congreso de Colombia, 1959; El presidente de la Rebublica de Colombia, 1974; MAVDT, 
1977). According to these laws and decrees, nearly all local activities, became legally 
incompatible with NPAs. For example, Decree 622 of 1977 (MAVDT, 1977) declares that 
any activity, including timber extraction, fishing, agriculture or cattle ranching can be 
prohibited by the NPA administration. Prohibitions are to occur if the administration 
determines that the activities could potentially cause significant modifications to the 
natural environment or could threaten ecosystems in NPAs. 
 
In the previous decades, this ideal of parks without people has generated a multitude of 
park-people conflicts. Currently, most if not all of Colombia’s NPAs are still marked by 
park-people conflicts, which in some cases are extremely severe (see Cases 1 and 2).  
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Case 1. Puracé 
One of the most persistent conflicts was between Puracé NPA administration and the 
Kokonuco indigenous people, who in 1892 obtained the rights to collective, indigenous 
territory. Puracé NPA was created in 1968 and overlaps with the indigenous territory 
across an area of 3,413 hectares. The Kokonuco are exploiting the community-owned El 
Vinagre sulphur mine on the slopes of Volcan Puracé, an area that is located both in the 
NPA and in the indigenous territory. In 2002, EMICAUCA (Indigenous Mining 
Corporation of Cauca, the administrative entity of the sulfur mine) requested an additional 
exploitation zone bordering Puracé NPA. NPA administration strongly opposed this 
request because of its potentially devastating impact on conservation, which resulted in a 
decision by the Colombian government to decline EMICAUCA’s request. As a reaction 
to this decline, the indigenous Kokonuco assembly declared NPA staff Personas no 
Gratas in the indigenous territory of Puracé. In 2014, this declaration was still in place. 
Neither the NPA administration nor the local communities had taken the needed steps to 
revoke the declaration and repair their relationship.  
Case 2. Tayrona 
In March 2010, a fishing community in Gairaca beach, Tayrona NPA was evicted from 
their land and their homes were destroyed by the Colombian government. The reason for 
the eviction and house destruction was that community members lacked rightful titles to 
their properties (Consejo de Estado de la Republica de Colombia, 2011; pers. comm. with 
NPA administration and comm. members). In 2003, the inhabitants, several of whom had 
lived in the area since before the NPA’s creation, received a sanction given by the local 
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NPA administration ordering them to tear down their houses on the beach. The reason for 
this sanction was that their presence and activities contradicted conservation objectives ( 
Consejo de Estado de la Republica de Colombia, 2011; pers. comm. with NPA 
administration and comm. members). NPA administration officials, escorted by 
policemen and demolition trucks, entered the area in March 2010 and destroyed seven 
houses (Consejo de Estado de la Republica de Colombia, 2011; pers. comm. with NPA 
administration and comm. members). Residents received no compensation. Remarkably, 
NPA administration and local community members disclosed that none of the luxurious 
private houses nearby on the beach, some of them belonging to high-end officials in Santa 
Marta, were touched. According to local fisherman, the fact that properties of rich 
Sanmarios were left untouched, proved corruption pervaded local conservation dynamics.   
 
 
According to the fishermen, the reason for the forced displacement was not ecologic but 
rather economic, as the area is a popular place for sports and diving activities. The 
inhabitants complained to the Colombian government, stating that their basic 
constitutional rights, such as the right to work and their right to a dignified existence, had 
been violated. In June 2010 and again in October 2011, the Council of State and the 
Administrative Court of Magdalena Department ordered the Tayrona NPA administration 
to relocate the fishermen to an area where they could return to subsistence fishing 
activities (within 5 days) and live (within 5 months). However, NPA administration did 
not comply (Consejo de Estado de la Republica de Colombia, 2011; pers. comm. with 
NPA administration and comm. members). 
 
Other residents in Tayrona received letters from the NPA administration ordering them to 
54 
 
remove their domestic animals, such as dogs, cats and chickens, from the NPA. Others 
were invited to voluntarily leave the NPA within given deadlines. Some of these letters 
stipulated that people who did not follow such orders or invitations would be penalised, 
and run the risk of forceful displacement or expulsion without any form of compensation 
(UAESPNN, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d).  
 
Worldwide, there is an increasing tendency to promote voluntary instead of forced 
displacement from NPAs.  The Tayrona case shows that there are good reasons to be 
cautious before welcoming this policy shift (Schmidt-Soltau, 2009). 
2.3. Conservation and Co-management With Ethnic Groups - 
Mixed Results 
With respect to ethnic groups, the ideal of parks without people (parques sin gente) was 
abandoned by many Colombian conservationists and policy makers at the end of the 
previous century (pers. comm. NPA administration). In 2002, the Colombian Ministry of 
Environment and Sustainable Development formalised this new working ethos, and 
developed the idea of parks with people (parques con gente). The latter Ministry adopted 
a Participatory Conservation Policy (PCP) in order to: (i) facilitate co-management and 
peaceful relations between NPA authorities and local (mainly indigenous) groups; and (ii) 
increase sustainable development within NPAs (UAESPNN, 2007).  
 
However, this participatory model did not bring an end to the numerous park-people 
conflicts. At best, it delivered mixed results (UAESPNN, 2007; Duran, 2009). 
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In the context of the PCP, local as well as regional agreements between NPA 
administrations and (groups of) ethnic communities have been developed. At the local 
level, agreemennts or so-called Special Management Strategies were signed, which 
involve, among others, (i) the establishment of Special Management Regimes (SMRs) as 
a planning tool in NPAs that overlap with legally recognized, collective indigenous 
territories (or resguardos in Spanish); and (ii) the establishment of Agreements on Use 
and Natural Resource Management (AUNRM) in NPAs bordering 1  with legally 
recognised collective territories of Afro-Colombians. These agreements only apply where 
Afro-Colombians consistently and frequently use the NPAs natural resources 
(UAESPNN, 2007). 
 
In 2012, seven SMRs had been developed in Colombian NPAs: Utría, Catatumbo, 
Cahuinarí, Paramillo, Nevado del Huila, Macuira and the Flora and Fauna Flamingo 
Sanctuary. Furthermore, in at least ten NPAs, including Puracé, Sierra Nevada de Santa 
Marta, and Katíos, SMRs were at varying stages of advancement (UAESPNN, 2012a; 
pers. comm. with NPA administration). In total, 9 AUMNRs were signed in the National 
Parks of Utría, Farallones, Gorgona and Sanquianga. All AUMNRs expired around 2011-
2012, however, park administrations intended to renew them all in the near future 
(UAESPNN, 2012a). In 2015, all of these AUMNRs were yet to be renewed.  
 
The Regional Uramba Agreement signed on September 17, 2009, provides the framework 
                                                 
1 Colombian law defines incompatibility between NPAs and Afro-Colombian Collective Territories 
(Law 70 of 1993, art. 22).  
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that guides the relationship between NPA administration and Afro-Colombian territorial 
authorities which border with Pacific region NPAs. In this agreement, which is both a 
modification and re-affirmation of the 2002 Yanaconas Agreement, Park staff and Pacific 
Afro-Colombian territorial authorities:  
 
(i) declare they have a shared concern for the environmental situation in the Pacific region 
and the deterioration in living conditions of the local population. These problems arose 
from the negative impacts of armed conflict, illicit drug trafficking, mega-infrastructure 
development projects, expansion of mono-cropping, illegal (mainly coca) cultivation and 
concomitant aerial insecticide spraying; and 
(ii) aim to establish both regional and local coordinating bodies targeting effective Pacific 
bio-cultural conservation. These bodies are tasked with the development of participative 
mechanisms between park authorities and the Afro-Colombian communities (UAESPNN, 
2012a). 
 
Several of the agreements between park authorities and ethnic groups face severe 
challenges and have been interrupted by a variety of factors (see Cases 3, 4 and 5 below). 
Case 3. Interruption of the Co-management Agreement in Uramba 
In 2011, Afro-Colombian leaders came together to discuss the situation in every NPA 
where local leaders had signed the Regional Uramba Agreement. They agreed that their 
relationships with the Parks Office were facing severe challenges and conflicts 
(UAESPNN, 2012a; pers. comm. with NPA administration and community members). 
 
Some of the most critical points of conflict that came out of these meetings were that the 
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NPA administration: (i) arbitrarily displaced local families of their ancestral territories in 
Utria NPA; (ii) declared in 2010 that Utria NPA includes 2.5 km of coastline. Local Afro-
Colombian leadership did not agree with this declaration as they argued the coastline to 
be part of their territory; (iii) forbade Afro-Colombian families from inhabiting and 
undertaking traditional fishing practices in respective NPAs; (iv) used police to force local 
people to comply with NPA rules in Sanquianga NPA; and (v) violated the basic 
agreements which had led to the constitution of Bahia Malaga NPA in 2010 in two ways. 
First, NPA administration modified the initially defined NPA boundaries without 
consulting the communities. Second, NPA leadership had not yet established co-
management framework in practice., as they had promised earlier.  
 
For these reasons, it was decided that meetings with NPA administration would be 
suspended until appropriate mechanisms to address these problems were put into place. 
In 2015, relations remained suspended.  
Case 4. Interruption of the Co-management Agreement in Utria 
Utria NPA overlaps with the collective indigenous territories (resguardos) of Alto Río 
Valle (5,887 ha overlap), Alto Bojayá (14,806 ha overlap) and Jurubidá-Chori-Alto Baudó 
(23,543 ha overlap). In 2009, Utria park administration signed a SMR with the authorities 
of this resguardo, which included the communities of Puerto Indio (245 inhabitants), La 
Loma (187 inhabitants) and Jurubida (170 inhabitants).  
 
As of 2013, co-management in this NPA was scarcely more than a piece of paper signed 
between the two authorities. Villagers and leaders shared a total lack of knowledge of the 
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objectives and agreements of the co-management scheme, as well as of NPA management 
decisions, objectives, locations. For instance, community members of Jurubida claimed 
that they were living inside Utria NPA, while Utria NPA Management Plan and Park 
leadership proclaimed that they were living outside the NPA. Indigenous people 
complained of a total lack of communication between Park staff and themselves, asserting 
that NPA decision-making is non-participatory and that park administration did not 
comply with co-management agreements and commitments. 
 
In March 2012, a meeting between NPA staff and indigenous community leadership was 
held. During that meeting, the commencement of numerous activities later in that year 
was promised. These included activities aimed at: (i) restoring cultural identity; (ii) 
resolving existing conflicts; and (iii) assisting in small-scale, community-based 
agricultural projects. 
 
By the end of August of that year, no concrete steps had been taken towards any of these 
goals. As a consequence of these regular meaningless meetings (as community leaders 
termed them), as well as park administration inaction and several years of zero economic 
benefit, community members expressed the desire to cancel the co-management 
agreement. Community members wrote a letter to the park administration explaining the 
community′s intention to end the relationship and expel the NPA from their ancestral 
territories. Park administration replied that things would change to accommodate the 
community.  
 
At the end of August 2012, we attended the second meeting between Utria NPA 
administration and 15 local leaders, organised by the newly appointed director. Her main 
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task was to re-establish working relationships between NPA administration and local 
indigenous communities. During this meeting, park staff explained that no collaboration 
had occurred during the past several months mostly because of the resignation of the 
previous director of Utria NPA in May 2012, and a lack of sufficient budget.  
 
It is important to note that nineteen different individuals had directed the Utria NPA since 
its formation in 1987, so changes in NPA staff are not uncommon (UAESPNN, 2012c). 
Regarding the second claim, we determined that €160,000 was assigned to Utria NPA for 
2012, of which €42,000 was assigned to fostering participative processes with local 
communities (UAESPNN, 2012a). Some €11,200 had been assigned to the SMR with the 
indigenous reserve Jurubidá Chori-Alto Baudó. The fact that a fair amount of money was 
assigned to work with the communities, but nothing was done yet to help them, generated 
very strong local aversion towards park leadership. Community members accused them 
of having misused funds assigned for community purposes. Park leadership exacerbated 
this conflict situation in the meeting at the end of 2012, by refusing to release details of 
budgets and expenses to community leadership. According to central parks 
administration, sharing this type of information would create false expectations within the 
community, which could lead to further misunderstandings and conflicts.    
Case 5. Serious Threat to Co-management Agreement in Los Flamencos 
The Los Flamencos Fauna and Flora Sanctuary was established in 1977, with an area of 
approximately 7,000 ha. The sanctuary contains valuable ecosystems such as coastal 
lagoons, and tropical dry and mangrove forests. Prior to its creation, eight indigenous 
Wayuu communities (Tocoromana, Loma Fresca, Puerto Chentico, La Guasima, Palaima, 
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Caricari, La Ye) and two Afro-Colombian communities (Los Cocos and Perico) inhabited 
this area. In an adjacent zone, and only 10 meters from its eastern border, there resides an 
Afro-Colombian community (Camarones), of about 5,000 inhabitants.  
 
In 2006, the Tocoromana, Loma Fresca and Puerto Chentico communities established the 
indigenous collective territory (resguardo) of Perratpu, with the support of the parks 
administration. Perratpu possesses an area of 120 ha, and is totally surrounded by the 
sanctuary. In 2009, the parks administration signed a SMR with Perratpu authorities 
(UAESPNN, 2009a). 
 
A series of park-people conflicts now dominate local relationships and processes, whereas 
there are also some conflicts within the communities themselves. The most critical sources 
of conflict are as follows: 
 
(i) Afro-Colombian communities resent the violations of the resguardo’s sovereign 
boundaries. Members of the Camarones community (as well as outsiders) are buying 
pieces of land within the resguardo and within other communities that are located in the 
sanctuary. Local Afro-Colombians maintain that all this land legally belongs to them. 
They claim that above-mentioned purchases are in direct opposition to the bio-cultural 
conservation and protection aims held by many indigenous community members and even 
parks staff. This is seen as being in contravention of the legal framework established in 
2006. 
(ii) A lack of space or territory for the growing Wayuu indigenous population. At least 560 
Wayuu indigenous people were provided with only 120 ha of land (UAESPNN, 2009a). 
They are rapidly growing in numbers, and this has increased pressure on land and thus 
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contributed to territorial conflicts between the Wayuu themselves. For example, in 
Tocoromana the local leader ordered seven families to leave the community, because the 
latter would originally not be part of the Tocoromana community. There was, according 
to the leader, not enough space for all of them to reside in Tocoromana As internally 
displaced persons, they now live outside the sanctuary. 
(iii) Most indigenous Perratpu community members accuse the aforementioned leader in 
Tocoromana of theft and corrupt activities. They claim that she stole community funds, 
unjustly distributed benefits, and made decisions in a non-participatory and unilateral 
manner. That leader is also the legal representative of the indigenous Perratpu Reserve. 
Some of her alleged practises, such as the theft of community funds, are corroborated by 
an investigation undertaken by the fiscal policy agency (Contraloria General del 
Departamento de la Guajira, 2011). In 2012-2014, respondents found it worrying that this 
leader was still in place as the community’s legal representative. In this respect, people 
showed distrust towards local parks staff, who were thought to support the leader against 
their interests and to ignore traditional leadership decisions. This distrust resulted in 
conflicts across various social strata within the Perratpu community. 
(iv) From 2011 onwards, Park administration set restrictions on natural resource use. This led 
to depletion of certain natural products, such as firewood. As a consequence, Perratpu 
community members were forced to leave the NPA and their own resguardo in search of 
firewood. There have been cases reported where Wayuu community members have been 
electrocuted by electric fences of adjacent properties while searching for firewood. 
Conflicts have thus arisen between the Wayuu communities and adjacent landowners. 
(v) Since 2011, there is a persistent conflict between local communities and park 
administration due to the latter’s interdiction of infrastructure construction using modern 
materials such as bricks. The Sanctuary Director declared in 2013 that some brick home 
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constructions would need to be demolished in the near future. In 2016, nothing had been 
demolished yet. 
(vi) There is a conflict over fishing resources. Over 80% of the nearly 2,000 inhabitants of the 
sanctuary depend on marine products extracted from its lagoons. However, many 
Camarones fishermen, as well as inhabitants from nearby villages and cities enter the 
Perratpu Reserve in search of fish and other seafood during certain seasons. Wayuu 
inhabitants maintain that they alone are the legal and rightful owners of these resources. 
They accuse parks administration of turning a blind eye on these illegal sourcing practices. 
(vii) Palaima and Los Cocos families have received local government verdicts for their 
eviction. On November 2010, those communities received a letter from the mayor of 
Riohacha (Alcaldía de Riohacha, 2010; pers. comm. with NPA administration and comm. 
members), ordering some 35 families, as well as parks administration to leave the 
occupied lands within 30 days. Parks administration owns some tourist facilities and other 
buildings nearby, and was thus also required to leave. The basis of the verdict was that 
these territories belong to the National Maritime Authority (known as DIMAR in 
Spanish). The judgment asserted that Palaima and Los Cocos are situated on beaches, 
which are public spaces that, according to existing legislation, belong to DIMAR. If 
occupants were to refuse eviction, coercive measures would be taken to enforce their 
departure. A few months later, the area’s administration received a 20-year concession 
from DIMAR to exploit that same area as a tourist destination. This included the building 
of luxury tourist facilities. According to the Director of the Sanctuary, in 2013, there was 
a budget of at least €600,000 for this tourist development. The parks administration was 
granted a concession to keep its buildings where they were, while the community was 
forced to leave. These events caused great discontent within all Perratpu communities and 
powerful resentment towards park staff. Community members held them completely 
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responsible for the eviction measure. According to the Sanctuary Director, this accusation 
was false. He argued that displacement of the communities was inevitable, since the zone 
is at high risk for tsunamis and earthquakes (UAESPNN, 2005a). In this respect, if 
something were to happen to the indigenous population, the government would be 
considered negligent in its duties. According to the NPA Director, evacuation of tourists 
would be much easier than evacuating indigenous people during an environmental 
disaster. The NPA Director could not detail why or how it would be easier to evacuate 
tourists compared to indigenous people. 
  
These methods for dealing with sensitive, local problems and conflict situations raise the 
question of whether and how deeply park staff sympathise with local needs and concerns. 
These numerous administrative and political pinpricks support a common community 
view of a deceptive, underhanded relationship between parks administration and local 
political decision-making structures. Although this kind of conflict is most persistent in 
the communities of Los Cocos and Palaima, other communities also feel impaired. They 
have relatives in the dispute area and consider their ancestral territory to be in danger from 
external interests. According to NPA staff and community members (pers. comm.),  
physical damages against park facilities have already been reported. A few local 
respondents confirmed that if the park administration were to evict them and build tourist 
facilities, they would damage and burn park facilities. In 2015, almost all processes that 
were initially developed in partnership with the communities were suspended or under 
serious threat of suspension in the near future. 
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2.4. Successful Co-Management Practice 
The above cases show that co-management should not be seen as the silver bullet for 
resolving long-lasting park-people conflicts (see also Castro and Nielsen, 2001). Some of 
the conflicts presented here are directly linked to (failing) co-management processes. For 
example, in the Utria Afro-Colombian and Bahia Malaga sites (Case 3) and Utria 
indigenous site (Case 4), conflicts are related to non-compliance with co-management 
agreements. Hence, under certain circumstances, co-management can trigger new 
conflicts. 
 
This depressing image is somewhat countered by the experiences with co-management 
schemes in the Yaigojé-Apaporis and Paramillo NPAs (Cases 6 and 7). In these cases, co-
management has led, at least to a certain extent, to positive park-people relationships and 
low conflict incidence.  
 
 
Case 6. Ending Gold Mining Activity in Yaigoje-Apaporis 
Nineteen indigenous communities comprising seventeen different ethnic groups (over 
1,500 inhabitants in total) inhabit the humid tropical forests of Yaigojé-Apaporis. For 
decades, non-indigenous groups have undertaken mining activities, harvested timber and 
developed non-sustainable fishing activities, putting the region’s natural and cultural 
wealth under great strain. In light of these threats, various initiatives were developed to 
protect the natural and cultural diversity of the area.  
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A first important action to counter these threats was the establishment of the Yaigojé-
Apaporis indigenous reserve in 1988, and its subsequent enlargement in 1998 (Secretaria 
General Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2011). As a result, the indigenous 
communities, grouped under the indigenous umbrella ACIYA (Association of the 
indigenous leaders of Yaigojé-Apaporis), became the guardians of more than one million 
hectares of their ancestral territories.  
 
Another important event was the declaration of the indigenous Yaigojé-Apaporis reserve 
as a NPA in October 2009. Although Colombian conservation authorities had an interest 
in assigning NPA status to the area since 1977, the final decision came only after a request 
from the area’s indigenous communities. The primary reason for establishing this NPA 
that would encompass the complete indigenous reserve, was to protect the whole territory 
with its natural resources and cultures from various threats, but mainly from gold mining 
(Secretaria General Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2011). In 2007, for example, 
INGEOMINAS, the Colombian Geological Service, issued a gold mining permit for 
digging within the indigenous reserve (Libertad zone) (Secretaria General Corte 
Constitucional de Colombia, 2011). Although this permit was later revoked, it became 
clear that the Yaigojé-Apaporis indigenous reserve alone did not possess sufficient 
authority to protect its territories from further mining activities. Some other protection 
designation was needed. Since the ACIYA leadership knew of the NPA framework, 
achieving NPA status for the reserve became a priority of the Yaigojé-Apaporis 
leadership. 
 
The NPA Yaigojé-Apaporis is unique in Colombian history because its resolution 
stipulates that: (i) the NPA shall be governed under a joint partnership between the NPA 
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administration and the traditional authorities of the Yaigojé-Apaporis reserve; (ii) NPA 
management and conservation activities shall be based on traditional knowledge from 
ethnic cultures; (iii) the land belongs to the indigenous communities; and (iv) traditional 
practices, such as fishing, agriculture and hunting, will be maintained and respected.  
 
In 2014, indigenous and park authorities were developing a Special Management Regime 
to improve their co-operation. This SMR was based on the traditional system of regulation 
and management of the indigenous communities (MAVDT, 2009).  
 
As of 2014, co-management had evolved into a successful method of administration. Most 
communities considered the joint partnership to be a good idea, since it helps them in their 
struggle against illegal mining activities. 
 
The latter does not mean that the establishment and management of the Yaigojé-Apaporis 
NPA is devoid of problems. Firstly, just two days after the creation of the Yaigojé-
Apaporis NPA, INGEOMINAS issued a new mining permit to the Canadian multinational 
Cosigo Resources Ltd. for gold exploration within the NPA. This clearly violated 
Colombia’s 1991 constitution, as well as many other judicial rulings, as the assignment 
of mining permits in NPAs is clearly forbidden. For this reason, INGEOMINAS was 
requested to cancel this permit, and to stop all other processes that could possibly result 
in further grants of mining permits within this NPA. IN 2014, however, nothing had been 
been done yet to revoke the original mining permit. To the contrary, at least 23 more 
mining requests were further issued within the NPA (UAESPNN, 2012a and 2012d; pers. 
comm. with NPA staff).  
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Community members and their leaders reported that staff from Cosigo Resources had 
offered to finance projects, medicines and liquor to ordinary community members and 
their leaders. This created a division between communities because some accepted these 
incentives, whereas others refused them (Secretaria General Corte Constitucional de 
Colombia, 2011; pers. comm. with NPA administration and comm. members). Partly as a 
result of this, some communities of Vaupés formed a new indigenous organisation 
(ACITAVA). In 2014, it seemed that certain communities within ACITAVA supported 
gold mining in their territories, believing that this would bring development and 
prosperity. For those communities, co-management is not the solution for some of the 
problems, such as poverty and unemployment, faced in the region. 
 
In 2014, ACITAVA member communities, together with the mining corporation, had 
made a formal complaint to the Colombian government for the annulation of Yaigojé-
Apaporis NPA. They claimed that it had not been established according to legal norms.  
 
At the same time, proponents of the mining activities were working together with NPA 
administration to reach a termination of the mining permits. Many stakeholders said that 
lawyers and courts would determine the future of this NPA and the region.  
Case 7. Co-management as a Win-Win Scenario in Paramillo 
Paramillo NPA was created in 1977 and covers an immense surface of about 460,000 ha. 
The area covered by Paramillo NPA is located in a geostrategic region connecting the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This NPA was traditionally a war zone between several legal 
and illegal armed groups. Some 10,000 subsistence farmers, who are widely regarded as 
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illegal occupants, now inhabit the NPA. Although Paramillo overlaps with three collective 
Embera indigenous territories, no indigenous people live within the NPA.  
 
In 2007, an SMR was signed between the parks administration and the Cabildo of 
Chigorodo. It was an agreement stipulating the joint management, use and access to 
natural resources in the overlapping areas of Paramillo NPA and the collective indigenous 
territory of Yaberarado (10,992 ha, of which 3,947 ha overlap with the NPA).  
 
Contrary to a general pattern of conflicts and violence in the region, the overall 
relationship between park administration and the Cabildo of Chigorodo was seen by 
community leaders in 2012 as positive. This contrasts with nearby areas in Yaberarado, 
where during the same period there was constant armed combat between armed groups, 
mainly guerrillas and paramilitaries (pers. comm. with NPA administration and comm. 
members). Furthermore, the constructive relationship remained, despite NPA 
administration staff not complying with seven out of ten stipulations in the co-
management agreement. However, that non-compliance was not the result of a lack of 
interest in local development, but rather the result of a lack of resources (pers. comm. with 
NPA administration and comm. members). 
 
We identified several explanations for this positive relationship:  
 
(i) the geographical location of the overlap zone. It concerns a relatively small surface area, 
that is situated far from the nearest human settlements;  
(ii) the delineation of the NPA occurring before the creation of the indigenous reserve. The 
NPA was not considered as a superimposition on ancestral lands. To the contrary, local 
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respondent argued that the NPA administration helped the community to legally establish 
their indigenous reserve.  
(iii) a set of shared understandings. Both NPA administration and local communities agreed, 
to a large extent, about which resource management problems should be solved. For 
example, they both wanted to remove illegal farmers who grow coca from the overlapping 
territory. They also agreed there is a lack of clear borders between Paramillo NPA and 
Yaberarado, and that a territorial re-organisation process was the best way to resolve that 
issue; 
(iv) both entities also worked together in photographing animals for selling photos/videos 
afterwards. They agreed that a portion of funds that would be generated by this activity 
should fund the expansion of the overlapping territory, as well as the certification of 
community-owned natural forests according to FSC criteria (a first in Colombia); 
(v) both entities operated from the same building. Both Cabildo of Chigorodo and Park staff 
worked in the same office and this appeared to make meetings and dialogue processes 
easier and more frequent. 
(vi) community involvement and accountability. Leaflets that document the budgets and 
expenses related to the co-management scheme were regularly distributed to the 
Yaberarado community. 
2.5. Conservation and the Challenges for Recent Immigrants 
(“colonos”) 
Since the beginning of the 21th century, there has been intense debate by scholars, policy 
makers and environmentalists about whether settler communities, immigrants or colonos 
should be allowed to participate in NPA management and administration activities. While 
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the newly introduced Policy for Social Participation explicitly acknowledges their 
participation rights, Colombian environmental legislation completely ignores or denies 
these rights. Furthermore, the judicial system prevents colono communities who reside in 
Colombia’s NPAs from undertaking any activity within the NPAs that could lead to an 
improvement in their quality of life. As such, they are not allowed to produce or extract 
materials from within NPAs, to receive governmental support, or to claim or legally own 
land within NPAs. In short, they are not allowed to reside or undertake activities within 
the NPAs (El Congreso de Colombia, 1959; El presidente de la Rebublica de Colombia, 
1974; MAVDT, 1977). 
 
Despite the legal framework, in a few cases, participatory conservation strategies have 
been developed between NPA administrations and colono communities. This occurred, 
for example, in the Munchique, Galleras, Las Orquiedas and Sierra Nevada de Santa 
Marta NPAs (UAESPNN, 2009b). The agreements were deemed necessary by NPA 
leader officials, as colonos’ activities were seen as destructive for NPA conservation 
efforts. The basic objective of these agreements, referred to as Participative Ecological 
Restoration (PER initiatives), was to minimise the effect of colonos’ activities on 
ecosystems, and allow colonos to undertake certain sustainable income generating 
activities, including agricultural practices, in NPAs. The PER initiative was started in 
2007 with Resolution 247 (UAESPNN and MAVDT, 2007). However, it also stipulated 
that the beneficiaries would be relocated outside the NPAs within five years following the 
agreement. As of 2015, not one of the participants had been relocated yet. 
 
Actions taken towards colono communities have differed greatly and mostly depend on 
particular management situations and local decision-making procedures. Local residents 
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of Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta NPA and NPA staff openly questioned the value and 
purpose of the PER program. Sierra Nevada Santa Marta colono communities signed a 
PER agreement with the NPA administration in 2009 for implementing sustainable 
organic farming practices, including the production of cacao and avocado. According to 
colonos residing in the NPA, the project was marked by corruption, indecisiveness and 
vagueness (see Case 8, Page 73).  
 
The continuous deterioration and transformation of the Colombian NPA environment is, 
according to NPA administration staff and many environmentalists, for a great part driven 
by colono activities (pers. comm. with NPA administration; UAESPNN, 2007). Since the 
beginning of the 21th century, local communities, NPA staff and conservationists have 
recognised the need for more concrete action to mitigate the negative effect of the colonos’ 
activities on the NPA environment. On August 4th 2012, the so-called Agreement for 
Prosperity (AP, Acuerdo de Prosperidad) was signed in Santa Marta, Colombia. This 
Agreement resulted in the creation of a government-appointed coordinating body, to find 
a solution to problems ascribed to the colono presence in some NPAs (UAESPNN and 
MAVDT, 2012).  
 
The coordinating body, which is composed of several governmental agencies, including 
the central NPA administration, emphasises the importance of strict obedience by 
environmental regulations. According to these regulations, colono communities are not 
allowed to undertake activities within the NPAs that might lead to an upgrade of their 
quality of life or be given incentives to remain in these zones. Hence, after a decade in 
which support to the participation of colono communities in NPA management had 
grown, policy makers then made clear that now was a time for displacement or relocation 
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of colono communities from NPAs. 
 
Still, in Colombia the desirability of this exclusionary policy is subject to continuous 
debate. During our interviews, we asked NPA staff to define whether they would or would 
not agree with the displacement or relocation of colonos from NPAs. According to this 
survey, 63.5% of NPA staff respondents (N=52) explicitly disagreed with the 
displacement of colonos from their homes. The majority of these respondents felt that the 
solution for environmental degradation in NPAs and for the problematic park-colono 
relationships was not to relocate the colonos, but rather to reform environmental 
regulations (mainly the Decree 622 of 1977). They argued that it should be, under certain 
conditions, legally feasible to let colonos undertake sustainable activities within NPAs. 
Those respondents who maintained that NPAs would benefit from an absence of colonos 
(36.5%, N=52), did not have a clear position on how the displacement of these people 
from their homes should be performed in practice. 
 
Right from the beginning of 2013, the central NPA administration organised national as 
well as regional meetings in which colono leaders were invited to: (i) discuss problems 
attributed to their presence in NPAs; (ii) identify all actors involved; (iii) generate trust 
and confidence among all parties involved; and (iv) propose solutions, or at least a path 
towards reaching a solution, for the problems ascribed to the use and occupation of NPAs 
by colonos (pers. comm. with NPA administration and comm. members). 
 
Although no concrete proposals, let alone solutions, were defined, these dialogues served 
as initial meeting points between NPA administration and colono communities. It was 
hoped these meetings would develop a stronger momentum towards lasting solutions to 
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the many conflicts between NPA administrations and local colono communities. 
Case 8. La Lenguëta in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta NPA 
La Lenguëta was established in 1977 as an extension of the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta 
(SNSM) NPA. It is a humid tropical area of approximately 19,200 ha and acts as the 
SNSM’s NPAs gateway to the Caribbean Sea. It covers 15% of the total surface area of 
the SNSM NPA. More than 90% of La Lenguëta belongs to the indigenous Kogui-
Malayo-Arhuaco reserve (UAESPNN, 2005b). In 1979, the SNSM NPA was also 
declared to be part of a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) Biosphere Reserve.  
 
A few thousand inhabitants of La Lenguëta belong to the indigenous communities of the 
Kogi and Arhuaco groups. The whole area is considered to be the original ancestral 
territory of four ethnic groups that live in this mountain range, but until the 1970s only 
the Kogi indigenous people actually inhabited it. However, in the 1970s, colonos arrived 
and began clearing the forest for marijuana and other (illegal) cropping activities. The 
Arhuaco indigenous people then began to arrive in order to protect the sacred places of 
La Lenguëta from intrusion and damage. According to Kogi and Arhuaco respondents, 
the Arhuaco were needed, as Kogi alone would not have been able to stop the colonisation 
of the area’s sacred places (pers. comm. with comm. members). Partly as a result of these 
movements, the Kogi have been occupying the higher elevations of La Lenguëta, whereas 
the Arhuaco have confined themselves to the lower areas.  
 
In 2015, the colono population of La Lenguëta totalled about 800 to 2,000 persons 
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according to NPA administration and local leaders, respectively. Many colonos arrived in 
La Lenguëta before the creation of the NPA and they mostly live in very poor conditions. 
The colono villages have shops, bars, restaurants, schools, pool houses, small churches, 
soccer fields, community centres, and an old gasoline station used as a car repair centre. 
As of 2017, these people still undertake a range of occupational activities similar to those 
performed in any other village on the Caribbean coast. There are farmers, cattle breeders, 
motor taxi drivers, painters, timber harvesters, tourist tour guides, employees of the 
banana plantations that are located within the park’s boundaries, members of illegal armed 
groups, fishermen, Venezuelan gasoline sellers, fauna and flora traffickers, housekeepers, 
car washers, mineral extractors, producers and merchants of illegal drugs, hotel and 
camping managers, and so on (pers. observation).  
 
The presence of colonos in La Lenguëta is a consequence of processes that once made 
Colombia infamous, including armed conflict, internal displacement and illegal drug 
cartels. In this respect, three important colonisation waves took place during the previous 
century. The first, in the 1950s, directly resulted from the so-called La Violencia, a civil 
confrontation between the two traditional political parties of the country. This violent 
conflict led to the displacement of many people from their “homelands”, mainly from the 
interior of Colombia, such as Bolivar, Santander, Tolima and Antioquia. These internally 
displaced peoples (IDPs) migrated to other regions in search of new unoccupied land to 
colonize. Parts of the Caribbean coast and the lowlands of the Sierra Nevada perfectly 
suited these colonos needs (Fajardo, 2002). IDPs continued to arrive to the Caribbean 
coast during the following decades for a range of reasons, such as deficiencies in the 
formal agrarian organisation structure and armed conflict in other regions (Posada, 2009).  
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The second colonisation wave took place during the 1970s. During that decade, known as 
the Bonanza Marimbera, there was a boom in marijuana production and 
commercialisation in the Sierra Nevada (Posada, 2009). That business attracted many 
people from all over the country to settle in the Sierra Nevada lowland zone.  
 
In the 1980s, a third wave coincided with the growth of the coca and cocaine processing 
industry, which attracted many more people who came in search of financial profit and a 
better life (Posada, 2009). 
 
Nature conservation processes in La Lenguëta have been historically subjected to 
difficulties and complexities. Local residents and NPA officials cite the following list of 
challenges:  
(i) Violence and a failing state: the Caribbean region has been marked by a heavy presence 
of both legal and illegal (i.e. guerrilla and paramilitary) armed forces during the previous 
decades. During the marijuana “epidemic” of the 1970s, and the coca boom of the 1980s, 
paramilitary forces controlled illegal businesses in the area. These businesses provided 
private security services to drug lords and landowners in different areas of the Sierra 
Nevada (pers. comm. with NPA administration and comm. members). Throughout the 
1990s, paramilitary squads carried out massacres, selective assassinations, forced 
displacement and kidnapping along the northeastern slope of the Sierra Nevada, including 
in La Lenguëta,. They massacred and kidnapped as a means of securing a tight control of 
the population and resources (e.g. Ojeda 2012, pers. comm. with NPA administration and 
comm. members). The main paramilitary structure of the region, the Northern Division of 
the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (or Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
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Bloque Norte), ceased activities in 2006 when it participated in the highly controversial 
process of paramilitary demobilisation carried out under president Alvaro Uribe’s 
government. As a consequence, coca production in La Lenguëta ceased around that time. 
After 2006 and more than 25 years after the NPA’s creation, local NPA administration 
began to physically enter the area for the first time (pers. comm. with NPA administration 
and comm. members), whereas before 2004-2005, the region had still been tormented by 
violence and state absence. This may partly explain why nothing was done before 2005 
to curb the continuous arrival of colonos, or to regulate their activities. 
 
Between 2010-2017, La Lenguëta was located in a “red” or dangerous zone, where violent 
activities remained part of daily life, and where paramilitaries and other local armed 
groups still controlled most areas (pers. comm. with NPA administration and comm. 
members). Local respondents also stated that the de-mobilisation of the main paramilitary 
group resulted in the formation of smaller paramilitary factions and banda criminales (i.e. 
bacrim). In 2017, it is commonly known that boleteo (‘protection fees’), extortion, land 
and cattle ‘taxation’, theft, drug trafficking and other illegal activities are, just as before, 
the norm in this area (pers. comm. with comm. leaders La Lenguëta and staff of the 
Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom in Santa Marta or Grupo de Acción Unificada 
por la Libertad Personal ‘GAULA’ de Santa Marta). 
 
In 2015, It was clear that violence and political instability obstructed conservation 
processes within La Lenguëta. Armed conflict made it complicated for governmental 
agencies to enter La Lenguëta and do their job properly. For example, employees of the 
Agustin Codazzi Geographic Institution (IGAC) needed permission from armed groups 
to enter the NPA to revise property titles or make land ownership and occupation 
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inventories. When denied access, they had to base their assessment of the judicial status 
of tenure and land deeds on second-hand information alone (i.e. based on what people say 
rather than on in-depth field research).  
 
As governmental agencies could not do their job properly, invalid arguments were used 
to implement conservation programs, and possibly evict inhabitants from this UNESCO 
Biosphere Reserve. NPA officers also stated that they experienced hostility from local 
landowners who did not wish to be evicted from their lands. NPA staff claimed that some 
community members resorted to violence in order to protect their territories. 
(ii) Unsustainable conservation programs: the latter are marked by corruption, indecisiveness 
and vagueness. For example, a participative project with colonos was set up in La 
Lenguëta from 2009 onwards, titled “Paisajes de Conservacion.” This initiative permitted 
the participation of some 25 farming families in restoration and conservation activities in 
La Lenguëta. The project was financially supported by USAID and was legally supported 
by the clauses within Resolution 0247 of 2007 (pers. comm. with NPA administration and 
comm. members). More specifically, NPA administration offered technical training and 
support for implementing sustainable organic farming, including the production of cacao 
and avocado. According to NPA administration, four nurseries were developed with a 
focus on native timber and fruit species. Locals acknowledged that some nurseries were 
built. However, without any subsequent maintenance most plants died before planting. 
Respondents argued the lack of participation of NPA staff to be the main reason for the 
failure of this USAID-funded project. 
In short, according to local respondents, the project ended in a total fiasco. In a meeting 
with over twenty colonos, most of them local leaders, participants openly questioned how 
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the project could be implemented at all. As La Lenguëta forms part of an indigenous 
reserve, any kind of initiative with colonos therein would be illegal. All respondents 
(N=18) who participated in this project stated that the initiative did not foster nature 
restoration but ended in increasing personal profits by NPA and other government 
officials. Several NPA officials, not directly linked to the SNSM NPA, had also openly 
questioned the value and purpose of the cocoa project, as it was against the general legal 
framework (pers. comm. with NPA administration).  
 
A year after the cocoa project began, NPA administration drastically changed its 
conservation tactics. The park’s administration abandoned the idea of participation of 
local colono communities in conservation and prioritised their relocation to other regions 
outside the NPA. At the time of our study, unlike in other regions of the country (see Case 
2), no colono had yet been displaced from La Lenguëta. However, in recent years, colonos 
there received written communications from the NPA administration ordering them to 
stop a range of activities including wood extraction, fishing, agriculture, hunting and 
cattle ranching. As of 2017, colonos are still not allowed to rebuild or make adjustments 
to their houses, which are often in disrepair. As a direct result of the area’s protection 
status, they are also being denied their basic constitutional right of access to governmental 
support (e.g. loans) and a range of other public facilities and services (e.g. public sanitary, 
health services and schooling facilities). Furthermore, in accordance with prevailing 
legislation, they have not been allowed to formalise their land ownership. In short, colono 
communities in La Lenguëta are without any development options, since their residency 
and use of resources are not permitted within the NPA system. 
(iii) Complex tenure regimes and rights: notwithstanding its public character, a high 
percentage of La Lenguëta’s surface is de facto in private hands. A study of the judicial 
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situation of land tenure regimes and rights in La Lenguëta showed that 36% (i.e. 3,031 
ha) of a total of 8,424 ha under study had been granted with private land deeds by the 
Colombian government. Of these 3,031 ha, 1,846 ha corresponded to land titles that were 
expedited after the creation of the NPA. Thus, despite the NPAs’ public status, under 
which it is illegal to sell or buy any piece of land within their borders, Colombian notary 
agencies and the official state authority (INCODER in Spanish) have frequently granted 
land ownership deeds inside NPAs after their creation (Table 2.1) (SNR, 2012, 2013a-f). 
Today, properties in La Lenguëta range from farms of different sizes (some of them with 
land title, many of them without) to vacation domains, camping sites, tourist hotels, 
restaurants, banana plantations, private homes of powerful members of local elites, and 
so on. Among property owners, there are landowners and high-end government officials. 
Judging by recent convictions, some of these owners have connections with drug 
traffickers or irregular armed forces (pers. comm. with NPA administration and comm. 
members). 
Table 2.1. Number of properties adjudicated after NPA creation (SNR, 2012, 2013a-f)  
NPA Total ha 
(approx.) 
Number of ha under study and 
its percentage of total area 
Number of properties acquired after 
NPA creation (surface in ha) 
La Lenguëta*  15,356 8,424 (55%) 103 (5,076) 
Tayrona 15,000 15,117 (100%) 172 (9,636) 
Nevado Del Huila 158,000 3,459 (2%) 102 (1,844) 
Los Hermosas 125,000 19,393 (16%) 233 (12,778) 
Pisba 45,000 3,848 (8%) 111 (1,105) 
Los Nevados 38,000 16,083 (42%) 68 (3,429) 
Farallones 206,770 5,754 (3%) 718 (3,943) 
* La Lenguëta is not a NPA in itself but forms part of the NPA Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta 
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(iv) Unsustainable land use practices and policies: La Lenguëta is characterised by intense and 
unsustainable natural resource use and mega-infrastructure development projects. The 
lower altitude areas of La Lenguëta contain lots of pastureland. The latter have completely 
transformed the original forest environment. Amongst the bigger enterprises, we noticed 
the presence of two large banana plantations (Kasuma and Don Diego), which grow 
bananas for the internal Colombian market and also for exportation. Both farms are over 
90 ha in size and provide work and income for many families living within the NPA. At 
the level of smaller properties, permanent and semi-permanent crop farms and a smaller 
number of animal farms were identified, on plots ranging from one to twenty hectares. 
Many of the activities they develop, degrade the soil due to unsustainable practices such 
as slash-and-burn and use of agrochemicals. In 2014 and repeated in 2015, several staff 
members of both the Kasuma and Don Diego banana plantations also said that they had 
initiated legal proceedings that could eventually lead to the annulation of the entire SNSM 
NPA. These people maintain that the NPA was not created according to existing 
legislation and that therefore their creation was illegal. Furthermore, the El Troncal Caribe 
highway, connecting Colombia with Venezuela, brings heavy traffic through a fifteen km 
stretch of La Lenguëta land. The highway brings increased air pollution and noise, 
increases human pressure and also leads to decreased wildlife numbers (pers. comm. with 
NPA administration and comm. members). 
 
(v) Human rights violations: colono communities in La Lenguëta are not allowed to undertake 
any activity that could lead to an improvement of their quality of life or that might generate 
an incentive to remain in the NPA (UAESPNN and MAVDT, 2012). Hence, any activity 
that would typically be considered a basic human right is legally not permitted. According 
to respondents, the denial of basic human rights is the main problem faced by colonos in 
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today’s park management (pers. comm. with NPA administration and community 
members). 
 
(vi) The presence of the Kogui-Malayo-Arhuaco indigenous reserve: the establishment of this 
reserve in 1994 generated lots of frustrations among many non-indigenous families. They 
argue they were born in this area or had lived there for decades, and that the indigenous 
reserve was imposed on them without prior consultation. The Colombian Constitution of 
1991 established that NPAs as well as indigenous territories are not subject to private 
property regulations. The granting of legal status to the indigenous reserve strengthened 
the indigenous people’s belief that they are the only rightful owners of this area, causing 
some to act or behave as sole owners of the entire La Lenguëta territory. According to 
both indigenous and non-indigenous people, indigenous families allowed their pigs, 
donkeys and cattle to graze without fencing, resulting in damage to crops of neighbouring 
non-indigenous farming families. On many occasions, indigenous people also entered 
colono lands to harvest the latter’s crops without permission. Indigenous people have also 
captured water flows that “traditionally” belong to colono families and cut down big trees 
near springs and water flows (pers. comm. with NPA administration and comm. members; 
pers. observ.). Arhuaco indigenous leaders interviewed did not refute these accusations. 
They argued that the Colombian government had recognised the entire land as indigenous 
property, and hence colonos should adapt to their ways of life or leave the area (pers. 
comm. with comm. members). 
 
(vii) Weaknesses in management capacity: in La Lenguëta, conservation policies have been 
implemented without prior analysis and understanding of the local context. The NPA 
administration lacks exact information, such as on the number of inhabitants, their 
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activities, their origins, the amount and extension of private properties, and the threat 
posed by armed groups on local livelihoods. Exact figures of the area’s biodiversity are 
also missing. Furthermore, no maps exist that clearly define NPA borders. The boundaries 
between the indigenous reserve and private land plots, and between private land plots 
themselves are also unclear. As one park administrator explained, this mess has provided 
the ideal foundation for the current conflicts between stakeholders to take root.   
 
(viii) Weaknesses in local organisational capacity: the social organisations that represent the 
communities of La Lenguëta, such as the Juntas de Accion Communal, lack a solid 
organisational structure to start and conduct sustainable long-term, community-based 
activities. Conflicts over leadership and internal division often dominate local 
organisational dialogue. In 2013-2014, these conflicts resulted in the absence of leaders 
who represent the community. Respondents commented on the fact that local 
organisations were not functional, leaders were tired (sic), and almost nobody participated 
in community assemblies or meetings. Some respondents argued that the “low solidarity” 
among these communities might be attributed to fears generated by the conflicts that 
exist(ed) in this region, as well as to the inhabitants’ diversity of origin and culture (pers. 
comm. with NPA administration and comm. members). In this context, it is hard to find 
sustainable and widely supported initiatives to resolve these conflicts. These types of 
weaknesses are inherent to many communities residing in Colombia’s NPAs (see Case 5). 
Globally, tribal and rural communities have responded to exclusionary conservation 
approaches through adaptation and resistance. The political and economic marginality of 
these communities often makes it impossible for them to protest or stand up against their 
displacement, even for the benefit of environmental protection. As a result, many 
communities have adopted strategies to avoid confrontation and minimise the adverse 
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effects of their physical exclusion, such as impoverishment (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). A 
decision by grassroot communities to migrate from an area may reflect such an adaptive 
strategy.  In general, the most common reason for migration is an inability to remain in 
one’s home territory due to severe environmental degradation or denial of access to 
needed resources (Bryant and Bailey, 1997).  
 
In contrast to adaptation, local groups may also decide to fight against oppression by 
conservation institutions through what Scott (1985) terms ‘everyday resistance’ (Bryant 
and Bailey, 1997). According to the latter author, this is a form of resistance in which 
silent opposition to authority avoids open confrontation and instead takes the ‘hidden’ 
form of foot-dragging, dissimilation, desertion, and so on (Aklilu and Dessalegn, 2000). 
Patterns of ‘everyday resistance’ are often difficult to discern because marginalised people 
rarely seek to draw public attention to their resistance, fearing negative reactions from 
power institutions. Feierman (1990) explains that “there is good reason for everyday 
resisters to avoid stating their intentions openly if they are to be effective. For resistance 
to be effective, it must frustrate the historian” (cited in Neumann, 1996).  
 
In La Lenguëta, 80% of colono respondents (N=55) were willing to negotiate with the 
government to start a land expropriation process. According to NPA staff and local 
leaders, this percentage also applied to the whole colono population in La Lenguëta, and 
probably also to colonos residing in other Colombian NPAs  (pers. comm.). They were 
willing to leave their properties because they had been denied access to much-needed 
resources and their basic constitutional rights had been violated. They realised they were 
without any development options, since infrastructure development is not permitted 
within the NPA system.  
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A smaller proportion of the colono respondents (20%) did not want to leave La Lenguëta. 
They feared expropriation would not include any compensation for lost belongings and 
would be synonymous with forced eviction, leading to further impoverishment. Active 
colono resistance in La Lenguëta amounted to activities deemed illegal by authorities, 
such as exploitation of natural resources, firewood collection, harvest and sale of timber, 
hunting of (protected) wildlife, slash-and-burn activities, house construction, cattle 
ranching, sale of gasoline and other activities. In La Leguëta, these activities are seen as 
a political statement, as they “represent a rejection of the state’s claims of ownership and 
management” (Neumann, 1996). Several local respondents stated that they chose to 
behave as if La Lenguëta did not belong to any NPA whatsoever. This was confirmed by 
the author’s own observations. We witnessed slash-and-burn activities almost every day 
while visiting the region. Furthermore, local people asked us whether we were interested 
in buying timber or tropical birds. In general, we observed a lack of obedience to the 
imposed institutions. Interviewees wondered why they should obey regulations, as the 
government had done nothing during decades of violence when they most needed its 
support. As a result of this neglect, people had lived in this area for decades without formal 
law or the presence of police and other governmental agencies. This eventually resulted 
in government agencies, including NPA administration, lacking the legitimate authority 
to impose their will. 
 
A growing proportion of colonos completely disregard the official environmental 
regulations and consider the only way forward to be receiving legal entitlement to their 
lands. They are not against the NPA in principle, but they maintain that current NPA 
policies are violating their human rights. Instead of being victim to relocation measures, 
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they suggest that those who want to stay could be employed as forest guards and tourist 
guides. In return, they would be willing to participate in conservation and restoration. 
Conservation activities could be complemented with other sustainable income-generating 
activities, such as the growing of cocoa and avocado trees. The funds for this project, they 
maintained, could come from the budget that would otherwise be used for land 
expropriations. These respondents were also considering supporting the banana 
plantation’s staff in their struggle for the annulation of the entire NPA in case the 
government would not respond to local people’s voices. In several occasions, locals also 
suggested other measures to put the government under pressure, such as blocking the 
highway that crosses La Lenguëta, and committing violent acts against park 
administrators. 
2.6. Preliminary Conclusions 
The insights from this chapter lead to five preliminary conclusions regarding conflict, co-
management and their relationship. First, the implementation of both exclusionary and 
inclusionary conservation initiatives has been at the expense of park-people relations. The 
resulting conflicts are related to a range of issues, including (illegal) mining, 
displacement, corruption, denial of traditional leadership decisions, obstruction of local 
development processes, human rights violations, limited participation in NPA 
management processes, and non-compliance with (co-management) agreements  
 
Secondly, we agree with literature that co-management should not be seen as the miracle 
solution for long-lasting park-people conflicts (Castro and Nielsen, 2001). Out of seven 
cases where co-management agreements were formally implemented, four were marked 
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by intense park-people conflicts (Cases 3, 4, 5 and 8). Some of the park-people conflicts 
in these cases are directly linked to (failing) co-management processes. For example, in 
the Utria indigenous, Utria Afro-Colombian and Bahia Malaga cases, the main conflicts 
were related to non-compliance with co-management agreements. However, this does not 
mean that co-management cannot reduce park-people conflict. Instead, what these issues 
demonstrate is that conflicts easily occur when co-management exists on paper, but is not 
implemented in practice.  
 
Thirdly, our cases show that co-management in practice holds the potential to reduce park-
people conflict. Both functional co-management schemes of Yaigojé-Apaporis (Case 6) 
and Paramillo (Case 7) have led to fairly positive experiences and park-people 
relationships, with low conflict incidence. In line with our hypothesis, these cases show 
that for co-management to lower the occurrence of conflict, it is necessary that certain 
critical, minimum conditions are met. Chapter 5 presents an assessment of the relative 
importance and interrelatedness of these so-called enabling conditions. The discussions 
in that chapter provide details of the role of co-management in conflict resolution.  
 
Fourthly, Colombia’s NPA management system is inherently complex. Most NPAs are 
affected, among other things, by damaging natural resource use and extraction, complex 
tenure regimes and rights, budget shortages, violent environments, local group conflicts 
over resources, and a variety of park-people conflicts. It is clear that these problems have 
multiple sources, implying that resolving them requires intervention at multiple levels. 
Hence, it is naive to expect that the full implementation of co-management alone would 
overcome all the difficulties that NPAs face. In this respect, chapter three underakes a 
more rigorous analysis of factors that bring about park-people conflicts, and the 
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interventions that are considered necessary to resolve these conflicts. 
 
Finally, our data shows that the future of colonos in Colombia’s NPAs does not look 
bright. Around 2010, several short-term or small-scale participative conservation 
approaches with colono communities were set up in a few Colombian NPAs. However, it 
became clear in the following years that the authorities would not allow colonos to 
undertake activities that might lead to an improvement of their quality of life, or provide 
an incentive to remain in these zones (UAESPNN and MAVDT, 2012). In 2017, these 
often tribal, low-income communities still do not have any development options if they 
stay in NPAs.  
 
At the same time, the Colombian government does not make the necessary arrangements 
for buying their properties, funding land improvements or effectively planning any 
displacements. As a result, many colonos find themselves in a very complex situation. As 
seen in the La Lenguëta Case (Case 8), a lot of colono inhabitants actively resist the 
national park authority and its regulations by performing activities deemed illegal by the 
authorities, such as exploitation of natural resources, harvest and sale of timber, slash-
and-burn activities, and house construction. Furthermore, they have already suggested 
violent acts against park administrators if the government does not listen to the local 
people’s voice of being able to stay within the NPA and participate in conservation and 
restoration projects. Taking into account the violent past of many of these areas and the 
people who live there, these warnings should be taken seriously.  
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Chapter 3. Understanding and Resolving Park-People 
Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
 De Pourcq, K., Thomas, E., Arts, B., Vranckx, A., León-Sicard, T., Van Damme, 
P., 2017. Understanding and Resolving Conflict Between Local Communities and 
Conservation Authorities in Colombia. World Dev. 93, 125–135.  
 
A Spanish translation of the article published in the Journal World Development is 
accepted for publishing in the Colombian Journal Revista Gestión y Ambiente. See: 
www.revistas.unal.edu.co. Thus, Spanish speaking people will have access to some of the 
main findings of this research project. 
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3.1. Abstract 
Conflicts between indigenous and local communities, on the one hand, and national 
protected area administrations on the other are pervasive. A better understanding of these 
park-people conflicts would assist in suitable policy changes to constructively address 
them while concurrently pursuing conservation and livelihood goals. We interviewed 601 
people living inside or along the borders of fifteen Colombian NPAs to identify five main 
categories of park-people conflicts. Based on interviews with 128 community leaders and 
76 institutional-level respondents, mainly park officers, we discuss the five principal 
factors underlying the identified conflicts and present a conflict framework relating the 
dominant sources to the most prominent conflict manifestations. Finally, we detail five 
strategies towards conflict prevention. While simultaneous interventions at multiple levels 
would be ideal or preferred, our analysis suggests that the incidence of park-people 
conflicts in Colombia can be substantially lowered through (i) making the environmental 
legislative body more socially inclusive; and (ii) adequately empowering NPA 
administrations. We expect our findings to be valuable for helping to manage conflict in 
protected areas in other tropical countries. Further research is necessary to determine the 
most effective interventions for matching conflict resolution and meeting conservation 
goals. 
 
Key words: Protected areas, conflict, indigenous and local communities, environmental 
policy, co-management   
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3.2. Introductary Note  
This chapter begins by exhaustively characterising park-people conflicts and the factors 
underlying their manifestations (RQ1 and RQ2). Based on this characterisation, and in 
combination with an analysis of relevant Colombian policy measures, we then develop a 
conflict impairment framework. We use this framework to formulate a set of 
recommendations and a step-by-step approach aimed at preventing and mitigating the 
most salient identified conflicts. We refer to the general introduction for information on 
theoretical background and research methodology (page 16 and 35, respectively). 
3.3. Results 
Based on interview data, we distinguished five main impairment categories: (i) 
constrained socio-economic development; (ii) access restriction; (iii) non-compliance; 
(iv) constrained communication and participation; and (v) imposition of exogenous 
objectives (see Figure 3.1 for conflict categories, Table 3.1 for full meaning). 
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Figure 3.1. Impairment framework (based on Yasmi et al., 2006) with proportions of 
individuals (N=677) reporting the main impairment categories and their principal sources. 
Full lines denote the most important relations between source and impairment.  
 
Local leaders and administrative officials reported five principal factors underlying the 
conflict manifestations: (i) the legacy of Colombian environmental policy, based on the 
so-called fortress conservation model (see also Brockington, 2002); (ii) weaknesses in 
NPA management capacity; (iii) conflicts of interests within the Colombian government; 
(iv) violent environments; and (v) weak organisation at community level (Figure 3.1 for 
categories, and Table 3.2 for full definitions).  Administrative weaknesses and the fortress 
conservation model were most frequently cited factors by both parties. Respondents at 
institutional level were more likely to claim the presence of violent environments, weak 
community organisation and conflicts of interests when compared to local leaders. 
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Table 3.1. Impairments experienced by respondents.  The percentages refer to the proportion of individuals (N=601) experiencing certain conflict 
categories. 
Category Meaning Examples of actions perceived as impairment % 
Limited 
development 
Actions intended to prevent or limit local 
infrastructure and/or development projects 
 
Limitations to the building of houses, schools, tourism infrastructure, road construction, gas 
pipelines, electricity networks, etc. 
50 
Access 
restriction 
Actions intended to prevent people from having 
access to a particular resource  
Restriction on extraction and/or use of natural resources (e.g. timber); restriction on access to land 
and/or entrance to territory; obstruction of the legalization or formalization of land ownership 
48 
Non-
compliance 
Non-compliance by NPA administration with earlier 
agreements or existing rules 
Non-compliance with prior informed consent procedures (e.g. appointment of park functionaries 
without consulting local communities); non-compliance with (co-management) agreements and 
promises to adequately reflect community interests in NPA management; etc.  
47 
Constrained 
participation 
Actions that (un)intentionally limit participation of 
stakeholders in NPA decision-making 
Constrained local leadership in NPA management and administration; no, or limited numbers of, 
local park employees; constrained coordination and communication between NPA staff and local 
communities; barriers to community access to information; etc.  
44 
Imposition 
of 
objectives 
Actions implemented to pursue management 
objectives or goals of the NPA administration 
beyond the will or interests of the local community 
Enforcement of the imposition of NPAs on ancestral lands; obligation of local residents to 
undertake certain management operations; forced displacement; etc. 
     39 
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Table 3.2. Conflict sources experienced by local leaders and respondents at institutional level (N=204, percentages refer to proportion of 
individuals reporting each of the conflict sources). 
 
Category Meaning Examples of conflict sources  Relationships with conflict conditions or 
impairments 
% 
Fortress 
conservation 
model 
Inconsistency between the classical approach 
for nature protection, which separates national 
parks from people, and socio-economic 
realities on the ground 
Non-compatibility between NPAs and tenure regimes; 
non-compatibility between NPAs and local resource use 
and extraction customs; absence of a legal framework 
supporting participation and/or local leadership in NPA 
management 
Environmental regulations feed conflicts 
related to limited development, access 
restriction, constrained participation, and 
imposition of objective 
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Administratio
n weaknesses  
The problem of so-called paper-parks (see e.g. 
Carey et al., 2000; Lockwood et al., 2006), 
where areas are declared as protected by a 
government but were never fully implemented 
Lack of financial (and human) resources; non-existent, 
contradictory and/or unclear environmental regulations; 
lack of reliable information on NPA contexts, etc. 
Weaknesses have brought about a tradition 
of non-compliance with conservation- 
related efforts 
78 
Violent 
environments 
Ongoing violence and political instability 
within or near NPAs 
Armed conflict; displacement; production and 
merchandising of illicit crops; etc. 
Ongoing violence makes it difficult to 
comply with conservation processes 
32 
Conflict of 
interests  
Conservation and local livelihoods are 
secondary to the exploitation of nature for 
financial and political gain 
Public money injected in the NPAs that are more 
marketable and valuable as tourist destinations; granting 
of mining permits and initiation of other development 
projects within certain NPAs, etc. 
Hidden interests of the central government 
(i.e. tourism and mining) may lead to non-
compliace with conservation obligations 
34 
Weak local 
organisation 
Weaknesses, instability and low capacity at 
local community level 
Fragile local organisations; internal community 
conflicts; power struggles for local leadership; local 
corruption; undemocratic decision-making processes at 
the local level; etc. 
Community weaknesses put at risk the 
effective and efficient implementation (i.e. 
compliance) of conservation projects 
 
23 
94 
 
3.4. Discussion 
In what follows, we focus on the roles of the fortress conservation model and 
administrative weaknesses in conflict genesis. Violent conflicts have been an unfortunate 
reality in Colombia for over 40 years. We decided to integrate this factor in our discussion 
for its undeniable influence on park-people relationships. 
 
This discussion is structured following the ‘Conflict Impairment Framework’ shown in 
Fig. 3.1, in which we relate the five dominant sources of conflict to five prevalent 
impairment conditions.  
3.4.1. The fortress conservation model 
The NPA model introduced in Colombia, and other parts of the global South, since the 
1950s is based on the US example of Yellowstone national park. This model considers 
nature reserves free of humans as the ultimate conservation ideal (Adams et al., 2004; 
Kalamandeen and Gillson, 2006; Lele et al., 2010; Lockwood et al., 2006; UAESPNN, 
2007, pers. comm.; West et al., 2006). This so-called fortress conservation model (term 
used first by Brockington, 2002), has been identified by researchers around the world as 
the basic reason for the escalation of a range of park-people conflicts (Adams et al., 2004; 
Kalamandeen and Gillson, 2006; Lele et al., 2010). Implementation of this model in 
Colombia implicitly assumed that most NPAs were not already inhabited before their 
establishment. However, in reality nearly all NPAs had been inhabited and/or used by a 
wide range of local communities long before their creation. Three distinctive dimensions 
of Colombia’s environmental legislation implementing the fortress conservation model 
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are particularly problematic.  
 
First, according to Colombian environmental legislation (Ministerio de Ambiente 
Vivienda y Desarollo Territorial, Decree 622 of 1977, Art. 7), NPAs are incompatible 
with all types of land tenure except in the specific case of legally established indigenous 
territories. As a consequence, people not formally recognized as indigenous are not 
allowed to formalise individual or communal land ownership rights in NPAs.  
 
If an individual or a group of people obtained legal property rights before the creation of 
a particular NPA, the Colombian State (through INCODER) is legally entitled to reclaim 
these rights through financial compensation (either by negotiation or direct appropriation; 
Ocampo Duque and Chilamack, 2012). Once the property rights are obtained, the 
respective landowners may be evicted or relocated to other areas (Ibidem, 2012). If the 
individual or group lacks legal property rights but inhabited the specific NPA since before 
its creation, the Colombian government (through INCODER) is empowered to confiscate 
their lands. Existing inhabitants are financially compensated for any land improvements 
(eg. investments in agriculture, infrastructure, etc.) that they carried out, after which they 
could be relocated outside the NPA (ibidem, 2012; UAESPNN, pers. comm.). Property 
purchase and land improvements that occurred after NPA creation are not recognised as 
legally established property (El Congreso de Colombia, 1959, Art. 13; El Congreso de 
Colombia, 1993). Hence, under such conditions persons or communities can be removed 
from NPAs without any compensation.  
 
 
There are multiple cases of forceful evictions of people from NPAs in Colombia. To our 
96 
 
knowledge, the most recent example occurred in Tayrona NPA, which is located along 
the Caribbean Coast and is one of the most famous touristic areas in the country. In March 
2010, a fishing community in Gairaca beach, lacking official property titles, was evicted 
and their homes destroyed (Consejo de Estado de la Republica de Colombia, 2011; 
community members and UAESPNN, pers. comm.). Although these fisher families had 
inhabited and used the area since before its transformation into a NPA, they received no 
compensation, based on the contention that their activities were in contradiction with the 
NPA’s conservation objectives.  
 
Despite the public status of NPAs, under which it is illegal to sell or buy land within their 
confines, Colombian notary agencies and the relevant State authority (i.e. INCODER) 
have frequently adjudicated land ownership acts inside NPAs after their creation (Table 
2.1; SNR, 2012, 2013a-f). For example, during the 2002-03 period the number of private 
properties within the boundaries of Tayrona NPA increased from 108 to 160 (Ojeda, 
2012). Inconsistencies in public policy related to the adjudication of land ownership deeds 
within NPAs have fostered park-people conflicts all over the country. These conflicts are 
caused by the government’s inability or unwillingness to validate or value ownership 
deeds that had been legalised by the State in earlier times. For example, in the lowlands 
of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta NPA, several large landowners and high-level 
government officials obtained land ownership certificates after the establishment of the 
NPA. Anecdotal reports from IGAC staff indicate that these certificates may lose 
legitimacy within the next years (IGAC staff, pers. comm.) as private land ownership 
within NPAs is illegal. Local elites have indicated they strongly oppose the notion of land 
expropriations and that, if necessary, they would use violence to safeguard their territories 
(community members, pers. comm.). 
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A second problematic dimension of Colombia’s environmental legislation is the non-
compatibility between NPAs and resource use and extraction activities. Conservation law 
prohibits all activities that NPA administrations would deem causal of significant 
modifications to the natural environment or as a threat to the natural capital of NPAs. 
These include activities such as wood extraction, fishing, agriculture, cattle ranching, 
industrial development projects, oil production and mining (MAVDT, 1977, Art. 30). 
Access restrictions resulting from this legal framework are a significant source of conflict 
in all visited NPAs. Furthermore, the legislation brings about conflicts related to 
restrictions to local development. These include limitations on building projects in 
Colorados, the denial of tourist infrastructure development projects in Tayrona, and the 
obstruction of local gas and electricity adduction in the lowlands of the Sierra Nevada de 
Santa Marta.  
 
By law, both indigenous territories that co-exist with NPAs, and Afro-Colombian 
communities predating the establishment of the NPAs in which they are located, have the 
right to continue traditional production practices and income-generating use of renewable 
natural resources. However, NPA administration often restricts these rights, arguing that 
certain activities are incompatible with conservation objectives as established by the NPA 
administration of a particular area (El Congreso de Colombia, 1993, Art. 22; MAVDT, 
1977, Art. 7). An example of constraints on traditional practices is where Afro-Colombian 
families are forbidden to undertake their customary fishing activities in some of the 
Pacific regions’ NPAs, such as in Utria and Sanquianga. Restrictions on indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian traditional productive practices are a clear human rights violation, 
according to the International Labour Organisation convention of 1989. The latter was 
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ratified by Colombia in Law 21 of 1991.  
 
Respondents reported a third major problem stemming from environmental legislation 
and subsequent legal frameworks. This was the regulation of community participation and 
local leadership rights in NPA creation and management. These legal regulations were a 
major source of constrained participation conflicts.  
In response to international commitments, the Colombian NPA administration adopted 
the Policy of Social Participation in Conservation (PSPC) in 2002. The PSPC prescribes 
the need for dialogue with, and the participation of indigenous, afro-descendant and 
subsistence farmer communities in NPA administration. It also declares that NPA 
management should address historical conflict situations in NPAs and foster sustainable 
development solutions (UAESPNN, 2007). However, Colombian environmental 
regulations (El Congreso de Colombia, 1959; El presidente de la Rebublica de Colombia, 
1974; MAVDT, 1977) have not been aligned with the PSPC, and this discrepancy creates 
legal loopholes. In reality, the older legal regulations hold more weight in comparison to 
the PSPC when it comes to legal decision-making.  Thus, the legal statuses maintain 
strong limitations on community participation in NPA management practices. 
3.4.2. Weaknesses in Management Capacity  
Colombia experiences similar difficulties as other developing nations in the realisation of 
its national conservation commitments. It shows a lack of institutional capacity and 
resources, unclear and contradictory legislation, weak national planning strategies and 
nonexistent coordination between governmental agencies (see also Carey et al., 2000; 
García-Frapolli et al., 2009; Lockwood et al., 2006; Nolte, 2015; Stolton et al., 2003).  
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Respondents at community and institutional levels frequently reported weaknesses in 
management capacity as a source of conflicts experienced (67% and 94%, respectively). 
Remarkably, nearly all NPA staff interviewed identified the administrative weaknesses of 
their own institution as the most important factor contributing toward park-people 
conflicts. This is in line with Nolte’s research findings (2015), which pointed out that 
many Colombian park officials are frustrated about the weaknesses in management and 
prevailing enforcement regimes. Below, we examine the weaknesses listed most 
frequently by both “sides” in our study. 
 
A first weakness is the lack of financial resources, which is a problem of many, if not 
most, NPAs around the world. Very few protected areas turn profits, with the vast majority 
depending on external funding (Cundill et al., 2013). In Colombia, the budget assigned to 
each NPA is about USD 100,000 per year on average or less than USD 0.5 per hectare 
(UAESPNN, 2012e). This is very low, even considering that every dollar assigned by the 
Colombian Government is matched by external funding (UAESPNN, pers. comm.). 
According to NPA staff, the budget assigned is insufficient to undertake even the most 
basic management activities such as ecological restoration, supporting community-based 
organisations, and enacting conflict resolution initiatives (see also UAESPNN, 2011a, 
pers. comm. with NPA staff). 
 
Secondly, as in numerous other countries of the Global South (see e.g., García-Frapolli et 
al., 2009), the Colombian federal government lacks a systematic overarching national 
planning strategy for nature conservation. Furthermore, several regulations are 
contradictory, and there is confusion about the legal mandates and competencies of 
relevant conservation agencies (see also Nolte, 2015). 
100 
 
 
Respondents also frequently listed the lack of a national conservation strategy. This is 
most apparent in the absence of a coherent framework that would regulate the use, 
occupation and tenure regimes of settlers in NPAs. Several NPA employees confirmed 
that there are no concrete strategies or proposals, let alone solutions, for resolving 
problems resulting from the presence of thousands of settlers in Colombian NPAs. These 
problems include illegal land occupation, environmental degradation and/or rural poverty. 
Settlers are legally not allowed to exploit land within NPAs and do not have access to 
public services, such as gas and sanitary infrastructure, and/or cheap governmental loans. 
However, the Colombian government has not undertaken any serious initiatives to arrange 
their relocation. In the SFF Los Colorados and Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta NPAs, 
settlers showed willingness to leave the area if they would be relocated to other areas 
and/or paid for their lost territories. They blamed local NPA administration for not 
undertaking the necessary legal steps to make this happen.  
 
Another constraint in enacting conservation programs in Colombia relates to weak or non-
existent coordination both within and among governmental agencies at different levels 
(i.e., federal, regional and local governments). This problem has been reported in a 
number of other countries of the Global South, such as Mexico (see e.g., García-Frapolli 
et al., 2009). Consequently, many challenges requiring effective inter-agency cooperation 
are malmanaged or ignored. These include compliance with complex regulatory 
frameworks and issues related to resource use, land occupation and tenure regimes of 
settlers (see also Nolte, 2015). 
 
A further point is that conservation policies have been implemented without clear 
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integration and understanding of local contexts. Most NPA administrations lack accurate 
information on the number of inhabitants, their origins and their current activities, the 
exact NPA boundaries, the number and extension of private properties, the actual threats 
of armed groups and precise biodiversity data. Many respondents argued that this absence 
of updated information leads to misunderstandings between different parties, 
inappropriate budgetary, logistical and priority planning, and general mismanagement. 
Eventually, this lack of information can lead to conflict (see also UAESPNN, 2007); 
 
Weaknesses at the level of the NPA administration management have brought about a 
tradition of non-compliance with earlier agreements or existing rules (an important 
impairment condition). Stakeholders do not comply with a range of issues, including 
implementing co-management arrangements and conservation laws, and supporting local 
development projects (see also Figure 3.1, page 92).  
3.4.3. Violent Environments and Unstable Political Context 
The potential detrimental impacts of armed conflict on (forest) conservation in protected 
areas is well-known (Dudley et al., 2002; Ordway, 2015). Yet, few documented examples 
exist that illustrate the implications of armed conflict on park-people relationships.  
 
Violent environments in Colombia continue to strain relationships between park managers 
and local people. Such environments include armed conflicts and their associated 
processes of displacement, as well as the production and merchandising of illicit crops 
(mainly coca and marijuana). According to Nolte (2015), park staff officials in Colombia 
often experience risk to their well-being resulting from enforcement practices in the recent 
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past. Several park employees were killed in the previous decades and the presence of 
armed groups within parks is quite common. Furthermore, park employees said they 
would avoid risky tasks, such as the identification and sanctioning of violators, to reduce 
the risk of retaliatory actions (Nolte, 2015). 
 
We also evidenced that violence complicates governmental agency access to NPAs, and 
thus hampers communication between park authorities and local communities. For 
example, in Munchique NPA, park officers could not enter areas of the park in 2012 due 
to the presence of guerrilla and paramilitary groups. This was also the case in many other 
NPAs, such as Macarena, Paramillo, Catatumbo-Bari and Farallones. Under such 
conditions, maintaining a healthy dialogue and negotiation between NPA administrations 
and local communities can be complex. On several occasions, NPA staff referred to the 
“violent environment” as a reason for being unable to comply with co-management 
agreements, environmental regulations and land purchasing processes. In 2012, IGAC 
employees needed to obtain permission from armed groups to enter the Sierra Nevada de 
Santa Marta NPA to revise property titles and make inventories. Several IGAC staff 
members interviewed stated that when they were refused entrance, they were forced to 
base their judicial assessments of tenure and occupation regimes for this NPA mainly on 
second-hand information (i.e. interviews). This resulted in erroneous interpretations, 
which were then used to implement conservation programs, and possibly initiate eviction 
measures in this UNESCO Biosphere Reserve. NPA officers complained that landowners 
are often associated with armed groups and are reluctant to return their lands to the 
government. They stated that landowners undertake everything in their power to prevent 
governmental agencies from entering their areas. Several residents from the Sierra Nevada 
de Santa Marta NPA explicitly declared that fellow community members were 
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considering the use of violence against park officers to safeguard their territories.   
 
There was a large divergence in perception of community- and institution-level 
respondents about violent environments as a factor for park-people conflicts (identified 
by 8% and 70%, respectively; see also Figure 3.1, page 92). Many NPAs in Colombia are 
governed from a distance through uniform, centralised and technocratic management, 
which often leads to a lack of understanding and knowledge of the situation on the ground, 
including security concerns (see also García-Frapolli et al., 2009 for the case of Mexico). 
Colombia’s history of violence, political instability and state oppression makes it difficult, 
and often dangerous, for government employees to enter contested areas (here NPAs). For 
local people, instability and oppression is part of their daily lives and they may not 
necessarily regard it as factors that complicate park-people relationships, or simply prefer 
not to mention them in order to avoid the risk of worsening relations with local armed 
groups. 
3.5. The Way Forward: Some Suggestions  
This chapter is premised on the idea that when particular conflict sources are present, 
associated conflicts (now also known as impairments) will follow. The conflict 
impairment framework was employed to describe the associations between conflict 
sources and resultant impairments. The model suggests unidirectional links between 
particular sources and impairments (see Figure 3.1, page 92). The conflict examples 
featured throughout this chapter provide strong qualitative evidence for these links. For 
the first time the impairment approach proved to be helpful to understand actual park-
people conflict situations, and thus is valuable for the resolution of these conflicts. We 
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recommend further research use the impairment approach for studying and resolving 
conflicts in other common-pool resource contexts, such as fisheries, agriculture, forestry 
and water management.  
 
Our findings suggest that interventions at multiple levels are needed to work toward the 
effective resolution of the identified park-people conflicts. We propose five priority areas 
of action for the Colombian government. 
 
First of all, the environmental legislative body needs to be reformed. It is paramount to 
improve local participation rights in NPA management and effectively move from 
autocratic approaches of governance to the concept of co-governance. The establishment 
and management of NPAs as mechanisms to divide and control people, spaces and 
resources may strengthen legitimacy and state governance (Peluso and Vandergeest, 
2011; Roth, 2008). However, this often leads to the exacerbation of a range of park-people 
conflicts. Earlier research has shown that co-management of NPAs, whereby resource 
management is shared by public and/or private sector stakeholders, can be successful in 
reducing conflict at grassroot levels. This is true as long as some critical enabling 
conditions, such as information-sharing, effective participation and benefit-sharing, are 
realised in practice (see also De Pourcq et al., 2015 or Chapter 5).  
 
Inclusionary conservation might not be the silver bullet solution for all problems faced by 
NPAs. However, it is all too easy to criticise and deny the need for involving local groups 
in protected area management, when no concrete alternatives are readily available. Today, 
inhabitation of Colombian NPAs and/or use of their resources are strongly limited or 
completely forbidden; yet, fair relocation, subsistence and income-generating alternatives 
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are usually not provided. Numerous members of the Colombian conservation society we 
interviewed, including park directors, believed the relocation of farmer-inhabitants is 
inevitable to allow for effective biodiversity conservation in NPAs. However, this goal is 
unrealistic, at least in the short- to mid-term future. It is highly doubtful that Colombia 
will have the necessary funds to relocate all farmers (>47,000 people, and growing) to 
other areas. Moreover, current budgets assigned to NPAs are insufficient to undertake 
even the most basic management activities such as ecological restoration and alternative 
livelihood development strategies.  
 
A second priority area of action for the Colombian government is to empower its NPA 
administration. Moving beyond the so-called paper-parks requires that environmental 
regulations be followed on the ground. To accomplish this, NPA administrations need 
more financial and human resources, training opportunities, and increased accessibility to 
information necessary for adequate NPA management. Furthermore, proven functional 
mechanisms need to be put in place to facilitate effective coordination within and among 
governmental agencies at different levels. The NPA administration also needs more legal 
decision-making power to confront the complex challenges ocurring within NPAs. 
 
Thirdly, peaceful and safe living conditions in NPAs are essential for avoiding and 
mitigating park-people conflicts. Colombia has recently entered a peace-building process 
at numerous levels. This progression hopefully represents a major step in ensuring that 
the competition between resource extraction and conservation stays within constructive 
borders and does not escalate.  
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The Colombian government also needs to re-align its conservation goals with other 
interests (e.g. the exploitation of nature for financial and political benefit), and to ensure 
that regulations, interventions and investments are not in contradiction with one another.  
 
Finally, more efforts are needed to overcome weaknesses in local organisations’ 
institutions and capacities. Without strengthening the capacities of these organisations, 
the implementation of both local development goals and environmental regulations on the 
ground, will not succeed. It should be clear that the responsibility for park-people conflicts 
not only lies with park officials. Multiple intra- and inter-community problems, such as 
power struggles for local leadership or illegal logging and mining in NPAs, may remain 
and put undue pressure on park-people relationships.  
 
We expect the findings of this study to be valuable for managing conflict in protected 
areas in Colombia but also in other tropical countries. Literature examples on park-people 
conflicts in the South, including those on displacement (e.g., Brockington et al., 2006), 
social exclusion (e.g., Lele et al., 2010) and impoverishment (e.g., Adams et al., 2004), 
are comparable to the Colombian experiences. Similarly, protected area designation and 
management elsewhere in the tropics is affected by comparable complex realities and 
historical trajectories, just like the ones detailed in this chapter, including fortress 
conservation and the paper-parks phenomenon (Carey et al., 2000; Lockwood et al., 2006; 
Stolton et al., 2003). 
 
Looking ahead, a major challenge for protected areas in Colombia and elsewhere will be 
to overcome the dichotomy between biocentric and anthropocentric approaches to nature 
conservation. Finding a balanced ecocentric approach to conservation that works in 
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practice calls for a clear definition of acceptable trade-offs between human development 
and nature protection goals in NPAs. There is some evidence that protected areas are better 
conserved when they are inhabited and/or managed by traditional societies (Ellis and 
Porter-Bolland, 2008; Vergara-Asenjo and Potvin, 2014). However, this does not 
automatically imply that all activities carried out by residents in NPAs should be tolerated. 
It is clear that some activities such as illegal gold mining activities simply need to be 
banned from NPAs, full stop Further research is needed to determine which interventions 
lead most effectively to conflict resolution and mitigation but also to searching 
conservation gains. For example, is it possible that conservation goals are achieved 
regardless of the fact that NPA residents are exposed to multiple conflict situations? Or, 
can conservation fail even at low levels of conflict? In any case, a better understanding of 
the potential linkages between conflict and conservation would benefit the conservation 
society.  
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Chapter 4. Exploring Park-People Conflicts Through a 
Social Lens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
De Pourcq, K., Thomas, E.; Elias, M.; and Van Damme, P. Exploring Park-People 
Conflicts in Colombia Through a Social Lens. Submited and accepted for peer-review in 
the Journal for Environmental Conservation. 
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4.1. Abstract 
Natural resource-related conflicts between local communities and nation states can be extremely 
destructive. Worldwide, interest is growing in gaining a better understanding of why and how 
these conflicts originate, particularly in protected areas inhabited by local communities. The 
literature on local attitudes towards, and perceptions of, park conservation and park-people 
conflicts is quite extensive. Studies have examined the socio-economic and geographical 
determinants of attitudes to protected areas. However, the role of such determinants on the 
experience of park-people conflicts has received considerably less attention. Drawing on 601 
interviews with people who live in or near fifteen Colombian NPAs, we examine the socio-
economic and geographical variables that are most influential in people’s experience of conflict 
related to restricted access to natural resources. We find that the experience of this type of 
conflict is largely explained by the NPA where a person resides, pursuit of productive activities 
within the NPA, previous employment in NPA administration, and ethnicity. Based on our 
findings, we recommend implementing socially inclusive conservation strategies for conflict 
prevention and resolution in Colombia’s NPAs. Both women and men from different ethnic 
groups should be engaged in their design and implementation to engender more equitable 
outcomes for all. 
 
 
Keywords 
Nature conservation, conflict management, participatory management, gender, ethnicity, 
Colombia  
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4.2. Introductary Note 
As we have showed in the previous chapter, park-people conflicts have surged around the 
world in recent years (see also Adams et al., 2004; West et al., 2006).  
 
This chapter aims to identify and better understand the socio-economic and demographic 
variables, such as gender and ethnicity, that influence local people’s experiences of access 
conflicts (RQ3). We use our findings to formulate recommendations aimed at preventing 
these type of conflicts.  
We focus on access conflicts for two reasons. First, it has been reported as one of the most 
prevalent type of park-people conflict in Colombia (Table 3.1, page 93; Duran, 2009; 
Ojeda, 2012; UAESPNN, 2007)  and other countries in the tropics (Cisneros and Mcbreen, 
2010; Lele et al., 2010; Vedeld et al., 2012; West et al., 2006). Second, access restrictions 
in protected areas are known to affect attitudes towards park conservation among all layers 
of society and different socio-economic groups (Baral and Heinen, 2007; Bragagnolo et 
al., 2016; Ciocănea et al., 2016; Garekae and Tsompi Thakadu, 2016; Larson et al., 2016; 
Mehta and Heinen, 2001). 
 
Please see the general introduction for info on theoretical background and research 
methodology (except for the statistics used; page 16 and 35, respectively). 
4.3. Methods for Statistical Data Analysis 
We considered “access conflicts” as conflicts resulting from actions intended to prevent 
local people’s access to a particular resource or area, while often ensuring the 
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imposer’s own access (see Table 3.1, page 93). Such actions included (i) restrictions on 
extraction and/or use of natural resources (e.g. on timber extraction, fishing and hunting, 
cattle breeding, agricultural practices, mining, fuel wood collection, and so on); (ii) 
restrictions on access to land and/or entrance to territory (such as staying overnight within 
the NPA; imposing entrance fees, prohibiting children’s entrance into the NPA); and (iii) 
obstruction of the legalization or formalization of land ownership within the NPA (Table 
3.1, page 93). 
The conflict categories we selected did not show strong signs of collinearity (variance 
inflation factors smaller than 2, respectively), justifying the inclusion of selected access 
conflicts (Kutner et al., 2004). We scored conflict experience as 0 when no conflict was 
experienced or 1 when at least one access conflict was reported. Given the binary nature 
of the response variable, we developed logistic generalised linear models with binomial 
distribution for identifying variables that significantly explain the perception of access 
conflicts among respondents. The set of socio-economic and geographical parameters 
mentioned above was used as explanatory variables. A full model containing all possible 
explanatory variables was first developed. An iterative modelling process was then 
applied to retain the most parsimonious set of variables, based on Aikake’s information 
criteria (AIC) and likelihood ratio tests (Zuur et al. 2009). AIC and LRT are metrics that 
allow to estimate the relative quality of statistical models for a given set of data and to 
detect the most parsimonious set of variables. The most parsimonous model solution 
refers to the minimum combination of potential expanatory variables that explain the 
maximum proportion of variability in the experience of access conflicts by people. We 
compared model residuals across different NPAs and subareas, but did not find any 
evidence of spatial autocorrelation (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 16.76; P=0.33). We 
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additionally examined pairwise relationships between all social diversity attrributes 
collected and people´s reported experience of access conflicts, for all respondents together 
and for women and men separately, by means of X2 tests for categorical values and a 
logistic generalized linear model with a binomial distribution for participant age. 
4.4. Results 
Research participants pursued a range of productive and extractive activities in NPAs for 
household consumption or sale. The dominant occupations of participants were farming, 
hunting for subsistence purposes, and fishing. Few local men engaged in mining activities, 
while some households raised cattle for milk or meat production, both for self-
consumption and local sale. Many respondents undertook other income-generating 
activities, such as daily labour in construction works, running a restaurant or driving a 
moto-taxi. People were often involved in several economic activities at once. 
Nearly half of all respondents (48%) reported access conflicts with the NPA 
administration. Respondents perceived more access conflicts specifically related to 
resource use and extraction from NPAs (43%) compared to access conflicts related to 
entrance and tenure (8 and 13%, respectively, X2 = 17.305, p = 3.18e-05; Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Proportion of respondents (in %), organized by ethnic group, who experienced 
conflict related to access (referred to here as entrance), tenure, or resource use and 
extraction. 
Four primary determinants of access conflicts were retained by the most parsimonous 
logistic generalized linear model solution (p < 0.05) (Table 4.1): (i)  the NPA where a 
person resides; (ii) pursuit of productive activities within the NPA; (iii) previous 
employment in the NPA administration; and (iv) ethnic background.  
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Table 4.1. Most parsimonious solution of logistic generalized linear model with a 
binomial distribution and experience of conflict (yes/no) as response variable. First line 
reports on residual deviance and after Aikake Information Criteria (AIC) of the model; 
the next lines provide values for these parameters should each individual variable be 
removed from the model, and the significance of the difference. This model explains 34% 
of the null deviance.  
Variable Meaning Df Deviance AIC LRT Pr (>Chi) 
   511.39 549.39   
Area of residence Persons who reside in certain NPAs 
perceive more access conflicts than 
residents of other NPAs 
14 738.04 748.04 226.650 < 2.2e-16 
Pursuit of 
productive 
activities within the 
NPA 
Settlers perceive more access 
conflicts (60%) than indigenous or 
Afro-Colombian persons (40%) 
1 543.11 579.11   31.724 1.7e-08 
Employment by the 
NPA 
Administration 
Persons who are or have been 
employed by the NPA administration 
perceive fewer access conflicts (30%) 
than those who have not been 
employed (48%) 
1 524.34 560.34   12.953 3.2e-04 
Ethnicity Persons who undertake productive 
activities in NPAs perceive more 
access conflicts (50%) than those 
who do not (40%) 
2 518.68 552.68    6.476 2.6e-02 
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Figure 4.2 shows the frequency of experience of access conflicts across the study 
communities (for cases where n > 20). The highest proportions of people reporting access 
conflicts were found in Utria and Tayrona NPAs, and the lowest proportions in Paramillo, 
Yaigojé-Apaporis and Bahia Malaga. 
 
Figure 4.2. Proportion of respondents (in %) in NPAs (n>20) reporting access conflicts. 
While gender was not retained by the most parsimonious model solution, it did 
significantly explain people´s experience of access conflicts, and interacted differentially 
with most other social attributes that explained part of the variation in the experience of 
access conflicts. A detailed account on how gender influences people’s perception of 
access conflicts and interacts with other social attributes is given in the Supplementary 
Material (see page 161).  
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4.5. Discussion 
In this study we aimed to identify the set of personal attributes that best explain the 
probability that residents from Colombian NPAs will experience park-people conflicts 
related with access to and use of natural resources from NPAs. We find that the minimum 
set of variables explaining the highest proportion of variation in the experience of access 
conflicts are (i) the NPA where a person resides; (ii) pursuit of productive activities within 
the NPA; (iii) previous employment in the NPA administration; and (iv) ethnic 
background.  
4.5.1. Area Where Person Resides 
Area of residence was the most important determinant for explaining whether anyone 
would experience access conflicts (Table 4.1). The fewest access conflicts were 
experienced in the Paramillo, Yaigojé-Apaporis and Uramba Bahia Malaga NPAs (Figure 
4.2). Both the Yaigojé-Apaporis and Uramba Bahia Malaga are unique in that their 
resolutions guarantee that traditional resource use and extraction activities will be 
tolerated and that the NPAs will be co-managed between park authorities and local 
communities (MAVDT, 2009 and 2010). In the Paramillo case, there is an agreement 
stipulating the joint management, use and access to natural resources in the overlapping 
areas of Paramillo NPA and the collective indigenous territory. Both the NPA 
administration and local community leadership operated from the same building and both 
entities confirmed comunity involvement in NPA management. There was also a shared 
understanding between both parties about which resource management problems should 
be solved. For example, they agreed on the need to remove illegal farmers who were 
growing coca in the overlapping territories. 
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The highest proportion of access conflicts were experienced in NPAs where residents are 
not involved at all in decicsion making and where they are prohibited from making any 
use of the park’s natural resources. For example, in Utria NPA, both indigenous as well 
as Afro-Colombian people are forbidden from a range of traditional subsistence activities, 
such as agriculture, hunting and fishing.  
 
Hence, the type of NPA program (i.e. participatory or not), seems to be indicative for 
explaining whether a person experiences access conflicts, rather than the area where a 
person resides perse. Participatory conservation measures reduce access conflicts between 
a specific NPA administration and local residents (Bragagnolo et al., 2016). By contrast, 
exclusionary conservation measures engender access conflicts.  
4.5.2. Ethnicity 
A second determinant for experiencing conflict was ethnicity (Table 4.1), with settlers 
perceiving more access conflicts than indigenous or Afro-Colombian persons (Figure 
4.1). It has been shown elsewhere that indigenous versus migrant/latecomer status can be 
a powerful predictor of attitudes towards conservation (Baral and Heinen, 2007; 
Bragagnolo et al., 2016). This is unsurprising because formal or customary tenure regimes 
based on lineage or ethnicity generally confer different rights to access and control of 
natural resources (e.g. Bragagnolo et al., 2016; Pélissier, 1980). 
 
In the present study, this ethnic difference can, at least partly, be ascribed to the legal 
framework, which prescribes that particular ethnic communities have the right to continue 
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traditional and economic use of renewable natural resources, and to undertake traditional 
production activities. These communities include all indigenous groups owning territories 
that co-exist with NPAs, and all Afro-colombian communities that were located within 
NPAs prior to their creation. The situation is more complex for settlers who, as more 
recent arrivals to the areas, do not have the same rights to use and extract NPA resources 
as indigenous or Afro-Colombian people. This can explain why settlers experience more 
use and extraction conflicts than the other groups (Figure 4.1). Nonetheless, indigenous 
as well as Afro-Colombian people do experience access conflicts. These may relate to the 
NPA administration’s right to restrict their activities if these are considered incompatible 
with the objectives of the NPA administration (UAESPNN, 2007). 
 
The fact that Afro-Colombian participants experienced more access conflicts than 
indigenous participants illustrates that there also exists differentiation among these groups 
(Figure 4.1). According to Colombian environmental legislation (MAVDT, 1977), NPAs 
are only compatible with indigenous communities that have legally established collective 
territories. In contrast, NPAs are not compatible with land owned by Afro-Colombians 
(and settlers). Thus, their land claims within NPAs are, by definition, denied by the 
government. This explains why Afro-Colombian and settler interviewees (both men and 
women) reported more conflicts related to land tenure than indigenous people (Figure 
4.1). However, some indigenous respondents also reported this type of access conflict 
based on the belief that NPA administration impedes the entitlement or the expansion of 
their territories. This was, for example, the case in NPA Los Flamencos. Furthermore, 
some indigenous groups (such as the Kokonuco in NPA Puracé, and the Wayuu in NPA 
Los Flamencos) experienced considerably more access conflicts than other indigenous 
groups (such as the Embera in NPA Utria and the Kogui in NPA Sierra Nevada de Santa 
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Marta). This demonstrates that generalisations not only between but also within ethnic 
categories are problematic.  
 
Variability in the experience of access conflicts largely results from the ways different 
indigenous groups use and transform the natural environment. For example, whereas the 
Kokonuco highly depend on the extraction and sale of natural resources (i.e. the 
exploitation of a sulfur mine), potato cultivation and cattle grazing in Puracé NPA, the 
indigenous Kogui in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta extract natural resources from the 
park mainly for basic subsistence. The impact of the Kogui’s subsistence activities on the 
natural environment is minimal compared to the more extractive activities of the 
Kokonuco, which results in differences in conflict manifestations.  
 
The concept of ‘environmentality’ (or ‘eco-governmentality’) advanced by Agrawal 
(2005), among others, can help explain inter-ethnic differences in the perception of NPA-
related conflicts. This concept builds on Foucault´s (1979) notion of “governmentality”, 
which refers to the governing of behaviour or the state’s use and construction of 
institutions and tactics to regulate social-environmental interactions (Bose et al., 2012; 
Foucault, 1979). ‘Environmentality’, then, is the state’s construction of the ‘environment’, 
to legitimise state actions in the domain of environmental governance (Agrawal, 2005).  
 
We argue that the role of race or ethnicity in experiencing access conflicts can be 
understood within the institutionalisation of rights based on identity-based categories (i.e. 
settler vs indigenous). In Colombia, the so-called fortress conservation model or 
‘wilderness’ conservation ideology (cf. Brockington, 2002) helps to justify the morality, 
rationality and ideology of some of Colombia’s conservation policies. For instance the 
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full restriction of the use of natural resources within NPAs is used as justification for the 
displacement of settlers, but less so for indigenous or Afro-Colombian people. In 
Colombia, ethnic groups are often seen as "natural conservationists" or “green 
individuals” as opposed to “non-ethnic settlers” who are seen as “not-green-enough” or 
destructive to the environment. This “racist rhetoric” links indigenous groups to 
ecological conservation, and assigns roles to what is ethnic and what is not (Bocarejo, 
2011; Neumann, 1996).  
 
The re-definition of groups and their roles also influences how different local groups 
experience access conflicts. We argue that the experience of conflict is not inherently 
dependent on being ‘indigenous’, ‘Afro-Colombian’ or ‘settler’, but rather related to 
environmental policies based on the social construction of identities (West et al., 2006). 
These regimes of differentiation are based on a hierarchical classification of these groups’ 
‘environmental ethics’ and result in the granting of additional or less rights to certain 
groups. 
 
These processes are manifest in Colombia, where indigenous peoples enjoy more rights 
in NPAs than Afro-Colombians, who in turn have more rights than settlers. As our data 
show, this has repercussions for each of these groups’ perceptions of conflict.  
 
4.5.3. Pursuit of Productive Activities within the NPA 
The most parsimonious model solution and pairwise comparisons show that the 
experience of access conflicts increased when people pursued productive activities in 
NPAs (Table 4.1), corroborating prior work on the topic (e.g. De Pourcq et al., 2015 and 
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2017; Cisneros and Mcbreen, 2010; Lele et al., 2010; Vedeld et al., 2012; West et al., 
2006). It seems a logical consequence of the fact that numerous productive activities 
undertaken by local communities, including wood extraction, fishing, agriculture, and 
cattle ranching, are forbidden within NPAs (MAVDT, 1977).  
4.5.4. Employment by NPA administration 
Local people who have been employed by the NPA administration, as local experts or as 
a communication bridge between the respective NPA administration and local 
communities, experience fewer access conflicts than those who were never employed 
(Table 4.1). Similarly, Anthony (2004) found that residents who were employed or who 
had family members employed by Kruger National Park, South Africa, had more positive 
impressions of the park than those who did not. This suggests that local participation in 
management is important for improving local attitudes towards parks, and for preventing 
conflicts (cf. De Pourcq et al., 2015 and 2017; Pomeroy et al., 2001). This is also in 
agreement with our finding that fewer conflicts are experienced in NPAs that adopt 
socially inclusive conservation measures.    
4.6. The Way Forward: Some Suggestions 
Our data shows that a range of socio-economic and geographic variables explain the 
idiosyncratic experience of access conflict in Colombia’s NPAs. Most importantly, the 
perception of access conflicts depends on the area of residence (i.e. the specific NPA in 
question), with particularly frequent conflicts in NPAs where exclusionary conservation 
measures are implemented as opposed to those that promote participatory conservation.  
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Ethnicity was another important determinant of access conflicts, with settlers 
experiencing more access conflicts than their Afro-Colombian counterparts who in turn 
experience more conflicts compared to the indigenous people. One explanation for this is 
because Colombia grants rights to land and resources based on lineage or ethnicity. This 
has resulted in situations in which settlers have received the fewest and indigenous people 
the most rights.  
 
Today, working towards social reforms and the resolution of park-people conflicts are big 
issues in Colombia. In 2017, after nearly 50 years of conflict, the Colombian government 
signed a Peace Agreement with the country’s largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The agreement officially ended Latin America’s 
longest-lasting armed conflict and undoubtedly represents a positive step towards a more 
stable political situation In Colombia. While it may generate a range of opportunities for 
better park configuration and management, it remains unclear how effective the agreement 
will be in halting or reducing ongoing right violations of Colombia’s marginalized 
populations. The agreement itself might not be sufficient to achieve the much-wanted 
social reforms, terminate land use conflicts, increase local decision-making power in 
nature conservation management and resolve park-people conflicts. As shown by Suarez 
et al. (2017) the new post-conflict scenario may actually bring about more deforestation 
and land use conflicts. 
 
Within Colombia’s post conflict agenda, rights of indigenous and other local communities 
to land and resources in NPAs should be revised, solidified and made more equitable 
across ethnic groups. Any new policies crafted to grant rights to land and resources should 
not be based solely on ethnic categories and hierarchies. Rather, decisions about the 
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feasibility of continued inhabitation or resource use within NPAs should also take into 
account factors such as local people’s historical relationship with the NPAs in question 
and their commitment to conservation. 
 
Failing to implement more socially inclusive legal conservation programs in NPAs for not 
only a few but for all involved parties (i.e. both women and men from different local 
groups) not only ignores the differentiated needs and interests of distinct segments of 
society, but can also exacerbate conflicts. Conservation efforts that are more participatory 
and equitable also tend to be more effective, as they are more likely to be accepted by a 
greater share of the population. This may not only help to reduce conflicts but also to 
enhance the conservation status of protected areas (Vergara-Asenjo and Potvin, 2014). 
 
Although there is a huge variability in between protected areas, the problems and 
historical trajectories in NPAs detailed by other authors are in many cases very similar to 
this Colombian example. Other research also found that across many tropical countries, 
including Colombia, protected area establishment and management is generally affected 
by complex realities and historical conditions, including displacement (e.g. West et al., 
2006), social exclusion (Lele et al., 2010), and impoverishment (Adams et al., 2004). 
 
This research led to a better understanding of access conflicts and defined appropriate 
ways to constructively address them. While we conducted fieldwork all across the 
Colombian territory, encompassing a broad array of social and cultural conditions, to 
some extent it remains unclear how the findings are applicable beyond the cases or 
Colombian borders. More work is necessary, for example, to determine whether our 
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findings (e.g. ethnicity affects the experience of access conflicts) can be generalized to 
other NPA contexts in the global South. 
 
  
  
 125 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5. The Role of Co-management in Lowering 
Park-People conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
 De Pourcq, K., Thomas, E., Arts, B., Vranckx, A., León-Sicard, T., Van Damme, 
P., 2015. Conflict in Protected Areas: Who Says Co-Management Does Not Work? PloS 
One, 10(12).  
Online available:  
126 
 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0144943  
  
 127 
5.1. Abstract 
Natural resource-related conflicts can be extremely destructive and at times undermine 
environmental protection. Since the 1990s, co-management schemes, whereby the 
management of resources is shared by public and/or private sector stakeholders, have been 
an important strategy for reducing these conflicts worldwide. Despite initial high hopes, 
in recent years co-management has been perceived as falling short of expectations. 
However, systematic assessments of its potential role in conflict prevention or mitigation 
are non-existent. Interviews with 584 residents from ten protected areas in Colombia 
revealed that co-management can be successful in reducing conflict at grassroots level, as 
long as some critical enabling conditions, such as effective participation in the co-
management process, are fulfilled  not only on paper but also in praxis. We hope these 
findings will re-incentivize global efforts to make co-management work in protected areas 
and other common pool resource contexts, such as fisheries, agriculture, forestry and 
water management.  
 
Keywords: Common property, protected areas, governance, institutional design 
principles, conflict resolution 
5.2. Introductary Note 
As we have mentioned several times, Colombia’s NPA management has resulted in a 
range of park-people conflicts, in a context of variable degrees of co-management. To 
date, there is no consensus on the possible role of co-management in conflict prevention. 
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In this chapter, we  assess whether the fulfilment of enabling co-management conditions 
as perceived by park residents (see also Table 1.3, page 29) reduced their reported 
experience of park-people conflicts (RQ4).   
 
Necessary information on theoretical background and research methodology (except for 
the statistics used) can be found in the general introduction (page 16 and 35, respectively). 
5.3. Methods for Statistical Data Analysis 
Collinearity of enabling conditions has been raised as an issue in co-management 
assessments (Agrawal, 2001; Cox et al., 2010). However, neither the set of enabling 
conditions (see Table 1.3, page 29), nor the conflict categories showed strong signs of 
collinearity (variance inflation factors smaller than 10 and 2, respectively), justifying their 
inclusion (Kutner et al., 2004). We applied an iterative modelling approach based on 
Aikake’s information criteria (AIC) and likelihood ratio tests (Zuur et al. 2009)—
employing generalized linear models with a binomial distribution and logit link 
function—to retain the most parsiminous set of variables that significantly contributed to 
explaining the experience of conflict by respondents and, hence, to evaluate the power of 
co-management to prevent or mitigate conflict. The response variable was the proportion 
of conflicts reported to be experienced by individual respondents. Our initial set of 
explanatory variables was a combination of the perceived degree of fulfilment of the 
different enabling conditions by respondents (see Table 1.3, page 29) and the set of 
personal attributes mentioned previously (i.e. sex, age, etc., see page 40). We also 
examined pairwise relationships between the fulfilment of different co-management 
conditions and the reported experience of different park–people conflicts by means of 
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logistic generalized linear models.  
5.4. Results and Discussion 
The most parsimonious combination of variables that explained people’s experience of 
conflict were: (i) the area where a person resided; (ii) trust in NPA staff; and (iii) the 
feeling that they could effectively participate in the co-management process (Table 5.1). 
This means that it is the simplest plausible subset of all the variables we measured that 
best explains the variation in the numbers of conflict categories reported by the people we 
interviewed. It does not mean that the other variables are necessarily insignificant, as 
discussed below. 
Table 5.1. The most parsimonious set of variables retained by iterative modeling approach 
based on generalized linear model with a binomial distribution and logit link function 
(only study areas with at least 8 respondents; N=565). The first line reports on residual 
deviance and AIC of the model. In the next lines, we provide values for these parameters 
for the case in which each individual variable is removed from the model (LRT), and the 
significance of the difference. This model explains 59% of the null deviance. 
Explanatory variable Df Deviance AIC LRT Pr 
(>Chi) 
  100.25  395.14   
Area where a person resides 13 159.27 428.16 59.019 7.7e-08 
Effective participation condition 1 112.46 405.34   12.203   4.8e-04 
Trust condition 1 111.76 404.64 11.504 6.9e-04 
 
The importance of a person’s residence was not related to the existence of a formal co-
management agreement between local communities and NPA administration. In four of 
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the six study areas (n≥20) where co-management agreements had been signed, 
respondents reported a similar number of conflict as in the four areas where such 
agreements were lacking (Figure 5.1 below). Thus; the fulfilment, as perceived by 
respondents, of co-management conditions was a more important predictor of conflict 
than the actual existence or not of a written co-management agreement. Only in these 
study areas where co-management agreements had been signed and where more than half 
of the respondents considered more than half of the enabling conditions to be fulfilled, 
were individual experiences of conflict close to zero (Figure 5.1). It is interesting to note 
that while for most study areas, there was quite some variation in the number of conflict 
conditions reported by the respondents, the latter seemed to agree much more on the 
proportion of co-management conditions perceived to be fulfilled. This is evidenced by 
the wide and narrow nature of boxplots on the left and right charts of Figure 5.1. These 
findings were anticipated, since conflict is influenced by many factors, including personal 
factors, while the fulfilment of co-management conditions was expected to be more a 
matter of external factors. Hence it was less susceptible to high variation between 
individuals. If this interpretation is correct, our results would suggest that the median 
values of proportions reported by respondents per area (Fig 5.1, right chart), are likely to 
be realistic approximations. Only for the two areas where respondents said that more than 
half of the co-management conditions were fulfilled (i.e. Paramillo and Yaigojé-
Apaporis), perceptions of the numbers of fulfilled co-management conditions were more 
variable. It is unclear why this is so. 
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Figure 5.1. Distribution of the experience of conflict and the perception of the fulfilment 
of co-management conditions according to residents of the different study areas, where n 
≥ 20 (N=530). Distributions were significantly different (p << 0.001) across study areas 
(Kruskall-Wallis chi-squared= 177.04 and 352.39 for conflict and co-management 
conditions, respectively). Letters indicate groups of study areas with similar distributions, 
based on multiple comparison post-hoc tests (threshold at p < 0.01) (Siegel and Castellan 
Jr., 1988). 
 
Interestingly, the most parsimonious model solution suggests that co-management 
conditions were more decisive determinants of people’s reported experiences of conflict 
than social diversity characteristics such as sex, ethnic background or level of education 
(Table 5.1). From a policy perspective, this is encouraging, as state authorities might find 
it more straightforward to influence the fulfilment of enabling conditions than to address 
social diversity attributes, at least in the short term.  
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Although proportionally only few people considered more than five enabling co-
management conditions had been met (11%), we found a strong inverse relationship 
between the fulfilment of enabling conditions and the perception of conflict by 
respondents. Figure 5.2 shows that the vast majority of people who considered at least 
four conditions to be met (85 out of 114; 75%) did not experience any conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Co-management framework. Conflicts reportedly experienced by people as a 
function of the number of co-management conditions perceived to be fulfilled. GLM with 
binomial distribution and logit link function (N=584; z=-5.68; p < 0.001). A condition 
was considered to be fulfilled if at least one of its sub-conditions was met (see Table 1.3 
for list of sub-conditions, page 29).  This model explains 11% of the null deviance. 
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In line with the variables retained by our model (Table 5.1), the most effective 
combination of co-management conditions was trust in NPA staff and effective 
participation: 96% of respondents who considered these conditions fulfilled reported no 
experience of conflict Figure 5.3). This finding suggests that trust-building and ensuring 
the effective participation are the most decisive factors among the extensive list of 
conditions for lowering conflict listed in Table 1.3 (page 29). Hence, they should be 
priority tasks for governments and NPA administrations interested in preventing or 
mitigating park-people conflicts on a tight budget. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Distribution of the reported experience of conflict and the perception of the 
fulfilment of trust and effective participation conditions according to residents of the 
different study areas. 
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The importance of trust and effective participation for participatory environmental 
management is well-documented in literature. Environmentalists, policy practitioners and 
research scholars have repeatedly highlighted the vital role of participation and public 
involvement in a range of conservation development concerns, including implementing 
policies for environmental protection, and co-management (Lynam et al., 2007; Ostrom, 
1990; Turnhout et al., 2010; Wollenberg et al., 2009). Participation can improve learning 
processes and the quality of decision-making. It encourages empowerment, democratic 
citizenship and public support for planning decisions. As a consequence, it can lead to 
effective and efficient implementation processes as well as the prevention or mitigation 
of conflicts (Stringer et al., 2006; Turnhout et al., 2010). Likewise, trust has been 
identified as a highly influential factor in predicting the success or failure of 
environmental management and cooperation agreements (Berkes, 2009; Idrissou et al., 
2013; Lewicki, 2006; Lijeblad et al., 2009). Trust is a key requisite for peace building 
within participatory resource management processes (Berkes, 2009; Idrissou et al., 2013; 
Lewicki, 2006). A vast body of literature exists about the factors that make the greatest 
contribution towards building trust between individuals, groups and the organisations 
and societies to which they belong (Kramer, 1999; Lewicki, 2006; Lijeblad et al., 2009; 
Ostrom, 1990). 
 
An evaluation of pairwise relations between the reported fulfilment of conditions and 
experiences of conflict revealed that, although the level of fulfilment of most conditions 
reported by respondents was generally low, all but two co-management conditions 
correlated negatively with at least one conflict category. Table 5.2. suggests that in 
addition to (i) trust-building between local people and NPA staff, and (ii) ensuring local 
people’s effective participation in the co-management process, priority conditions in 
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which governments and park administrations should invest are: (iii) stimulate ownership 
over the co-management process, (iv) operationalise a coordinating body, and (v) create 
individual incentives, all of which significantly lowered the experience of at least four out 
of five conflict categories. 
 
Numbers correspond to z and P values; significant values at P<0.01 are in bold. All 
significant relations refer to inverse correlations. Percentages in row and column heads 
refer to the number of respondents experiencing different conflict categories and 
considering a specific enabling condition fulfilled. For enabling conditions with sub-
conditions (see Table 1.3, page 29), degree of fulfillment was calculated as the proportion 
of all sub-conditions queried.  
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Table 5.2. Pairwise relations between idiosyncratic perceptions of the fulfillment of co-management conditions and the reported experience of 
conflict categories, based on GLMs with binomial distribution and logit link function.  
 
CM conditions 
Conflict 
categories  
Constrained 
Development (52%) 
Non-
compliance 
(48%) 
Access restriction 
(49%) 
Constrained 
participation (43%) 
Imposition of 
objectives (38%) 
Conflicts 
Experienced 
Individual incentive (10%) 
Z  -4.13 -3.25 -3.89 -3.52 -3.30 -4.34 
p 3.6e-05 1.14e-03 1.02e-04 4.31e-04 9.71e-04 1.41e-05 
Coordinating body (8%) 
Z  -4.1 -3.88 -3.35 -3.5 -2.88 -4.66 
p 4.09e-05 1.05e-04 8.17e-04 4.59e-04 4.02e-03 3.11e-06 
Trust (6%) 
Z  -4.23 -4.15 -3.07 -3.07 -3.12 -4.51 
p 2.32e-05 3.33e-05 2.12e-03 2.17e-03 1.79e-03 6.61e-06 
Ownership (16%) 
Z  -5.48 -4.11 -5.16 -3.31 -2.07 -4.87 
p 4.27e-08 4e-05 2.53e-07 9.22e-04 3.85e-02 1.12e-06 
Effective participation (20%) 
Z  -4.41 -4.46 -3.59 -0.31 -1.42 -3.78 
p 1.04e-05 8.14e-06 3.27e-04 7.57e-01 1.56e-01 1.59e-04 
Free access to information 
(3%) 
Z  -2.64 -2.58 -2.02 -1.84 -1.88 -2.85 
p 8.38e-03 9.76e-03 4.32e-02 6.55e-02 6.01e-02 4.44e-03 
Clear objectives (5%) 
Z  -3.43 -1.43 -2.75 -1.86 -0.91 -2.36 
p 6.07e-04 1.52e-01 6e-03 6.35e-02 3.64e-01 1.84e-02 
Empowerment (7%) Z  -3.37 -1.5 -2.06 0.43 -2.37 -2.35 
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p 7.45e-04 1.32e-01 3.92e-02 6.66e-01 1.76e-02 1.89e-02 
Compliance (4%) 
Z  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -2.37 -0.02 -2.29 
p 9.84e-01 9.84e-01 9.84e-01 1.77e-02 9.85e-01 2.22e-02 
Conflict management (3%) 
Z 
p 
 
-1.69 
9.04e-02 
 
-9.74e-01 
3.3e-01 
 
-1.65 
9.98e-02 
 
-8.66e-01 
3.86e-01 
 
-6.16e-01 
5.38e-01 
 
-1.35 
1.77e-01 
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5.5. The Way Forward: Some Suggestions 
In recent years, co-management has lost much of its appeal as an effective mechanism for 
preventing or resolving natural resource-related conflicts worldwide. In contrast to this 
understanding, our findings reveal, for the first time quantitatively, that it is premature to 
discard co-management as a tool for conflict resolution. Park administrations and 
policymakers are called upon to ensure the fulfilment of enabling conditions for co-
management not only on paper, but also, and more importantly, in practice. Our findings 
suggest that building trust between partners and achieving more effective participation of 
local groups in NPA management are most-important conditions to prevent or mitigate 
park-people conflicts. This could be a daunting task, but surely far from impossible. 
Dismissing the potential effectiveness of co-management is likely to result in the status 
quo of conflicts, or lead to their escalation, with potentially detrimental consequences for 
the conservation of biodiversity. This is particularly relevant for countries such as 
Colombia, which are in post-conflict decision-making processes at numerous levels.  
 
Looking ahead, further work is necessary to determine to what extent the outcomes of this 
study can be generalised to co-management schemes in protected areas and other common 
property contexts in the global South, such as in fisheries or forestry. Also, indicators to 
monitor the state and progress of the fulfilment of enabling conditions will need to be 
developed and measured.  
 
Furthermore, a number of outstanding research questions remain. More work is necessary 
to improve our understanding of the extent to which the number of conflicts experienced 
by respondents reflect their actual manifestation or escalation on the ground. History has 
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taught that certain tipping points must be crossed for conflict to escalate, but it is not clear 
if this also applies to park-people conflicts, and if so, how to ensure conflicts stay within 
constructive limits (Yasmi et al., 2006). Lastly, more research is necessary to better 
understand if and how the fulfilment of co-management conditions on the ground actually 
results in improved biodiversity conservation in protected areas. 
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Chapter 6. General Conclusion, Discussion and 
Recommendations 
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6.1. General Conclusion 
Conflicts between local communities and park administrations can be extremely 
damaging both for local livelihoods and the natural environment. We need a better 
understanding of these conflicts and their causes, and more appropriate methods to 
constructively address them. 
 
The aim of this thesis was to address this knowledge gap in the research literature, by 
focusing on park-people conflicts and co-management in the complex case of Colombia′s 
national protected areas.  
 
We identified five main categories of park-people conflicts. Interview data also showed 
that a number of causal factors bring about these conflicts (see also Figure 3.1, page 92). 
 
Furthermore, our research showed that a range of socio-economic and geographical 
variables considerably influence whether a person will experience a given conflict.  
 
The most-important result of this research thesis is that co-management of NPAs can be 
successful in reducing conflict on the ground, as long as some critical enabling conditions 
are realised not only on paper, but also in practice (see Figure 5.2, page 132). The most 
effective combination of co-management conditions would seem to be (i) trust in NPA 
staff; and (ii) effective participation: some 96% of respondents who considered these 
conditions fulfilled reported no experience of conflict (see Chapter 5, Figure 5.3). In 
addition to these two conditions, priority areas for government and park administration 
investment are: (iii) stimulating ownership over the co-management process; (iv) 
142 
 
operationalizing and maintaining an active coordinating body; and (v) creating individual 
incentives, such as benefit-sharing. 
 
The conclusion that co-management works as a tool for conflict resolution contrasts with 
the increasingly widespread view that co-management is not effective, and should be 
abandoned in favour of more classical conservation approaches, like 
the Yellowstone model, with strictly enforced national parks from which people are 
excluded. 
 
The major outcomes of this study should be generalizable to a certain degree to conflict 
contexts in PAs of other developing tropical countries. Natural conservation in the global 
south, including South America, has historically been conflict-prone, because of such 
mechanisms as displacement (e.g. West et al., 2006), social exclusion (Lele et al., 2010) 
and impoverishment (Adams et al., 2004). These problems are very similar to this 
Colombian example. Other research also found that across many tropical countries, just 
as in Colombia, PA establishment and management is generally affected by complex 
realities and historical trajectories, including fortress conservation (see e.g. Adams et al., 
2004; Lele et al., 2010) and the paper-parks phenomenon (Carey et al., 2000; Lockwood 
et al., 2006; Stolton et al., 2003). Furthermore, several countries in the tropics have been 
experimenting with co-management in recent decades, with mixed results.  
6.2. Discussion 
This study is premised on the idea that when particular conflict sources (factors) are 
present, associated conflicts (also known as impairments) will follow. The conflict 
impairment framework was employed to describe the causal relationships between 
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potential conflict sources and resultant impairments  (see Chapter , Discussion). The 
framework suggests these unidirectional links exist between particular sources and 
impairments (see Figure 3.1, page 92).  
 
However, these relationships may be more complex than the impairment framework 
suggests, as evidenced by the high level of co-occurrence of various conflict sources. 
 
Qualitative analysis shows that both the most- and least-impaired communities are 
powerful illustrations of the statistical data provided by the impairment and the co-
management framework (see Figures 3.1 and 5.2). These frameworks depict direct 
relationships between conflict sources and impairment (impairment framework), as well 
as between local people′s experienced conflict and the number of fulfilled co-management 
conditions (co-management framework).  
 
For example, In Utria and Los Flamencos NPAs (chapter 2, cases 4 and 5), local 
communities and NPA authorities agreed to co-manage park responsibilities. However, in 
practice we were able to show they were situated on the extreme end of the co-
management continuum, with authorities retaining all control (see Chapter 1, Figure 1.2, 
page 27; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). This is a de facto fortress conservation situation, 
where local people are excluded from NPAs.  
 
In Utria, the two parties did not communicate or collaborate on any park activities. Utrian 
communities complained of zero economic development (limited development), the 
absence of local influence in NPA management (constrained participation) and non-
compliance of NPA staff with earlier agreements (non-compliance).  Los Flamencos 
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authorities were more explicit about their desire to rid the park of its inhabitants. They 
explicitly requested the removal of local communities (access restriction), refused them 
any economic benefit from park resources (limited development) and imposed their 
management objectives against the will of the local communities (imposition of 
objectives). Our impairment framework predicts that the fortress conservation approach 
employed by Utria and Los Flamencos NPA staff would lead to those exact impairments.  
 
Furthermore, in Los Flamencos local community representatives accused park authorities 
of engaging in a corrupt relationship with a mistrusted local leader. In response, they 
refused to comply with the terms of their co-management agreement, and expressed the 
desire to cancel it. As our framework suggests, this is a case of management weakness 
and conflict of interest leading to non-compliance. Thus, the specific analysis of these two 
cases highlights the direct relationships between conflict sources and impairment in the 
framework underpinning our research. 
 
In contrast, both Paramillo and Yaigojé-Apaporis NPAs (Chapter 2, Cases 6 and 7) 
demonstrate that the absence of conflict sources corresponds with the absence of certain 
impairments. In both cases, local communities and NPA authorities had put co-
management agreements into practice (i.e. several enabling co-management conditions 
were fulfilled), thus situating them in the centre of the co-management continuum (see 
Chapter 1, Figure 1.2; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997).  
 
In Yaigojé-Apaporis, the NPA was an initiative of the local community, whereby the local 
government had agreed with their propositions. The agreement stipulated that local 
indigenous communities would live, develop economically and share in park decisions. 
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Thus, as predicted by the framework, the co-management model of Yaigojé-Apaporis (as 
opposed to the fortress conservation approach) brings about the absence of all of the 
earlier mentioned impairments. Furthermore, the local government revoked a gold-mining 
permit, in line with indigenous community interests. The framework suggests that strong 
local organisations and shared (as opposed to conflicts of) interests will raise compliance. 
Moreover, community members who opposed to mining activities also supported 
continued agreement compliance, while those who followed the miner′s interests did not 
want to comply with the co-management agreement. These observations at Yaigojé-
Apaporis provide further support for the directional relationships between conflict source 
and impairment depicted in the framework.  
 
Paramillo NPA presents the highest level of collaboration in our sample and also the 
lowest levels of impairment within this study. Authorities continue to allow full access to 
indigenous inhabitants to the latter’s ancestral lands, and do not restrict their resource use 
and economic development. The framework predicts that this co-management approach 
of Paramillo NPA staff would lead to the absence of impairments. In Paramillo NPA, 
there is a high level of communal participation across projects of shared interest, ranging 
from removal of illegal coca fields, to documenting animal species of interest and 
reorganisation of physical borders between the NPA and the indigenous territory. Perhaps 
most importantly, communal leaders and NPA staff operate from the same building, which 
makes meetings and dialogue processes easier and more frequent. This in turn may lead 
to rapid responses to potential conflict sources between the two groups. The latter 
conditions contrast those of the most-impaired NPAs, where orders are imposed from a 
distance, and access is denied to land and resources. We argue these differences in 
conditions to be the main reasons for the variations in conflict experiences between the 
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cases. 
 
The fact that our qualitative case material matches the statistcal data of both frameworks 
has wider theoretical implications. It reveals for the first time that both impairment and 
co-management frameworks are helpful to better understand actual park-people conflict 
situations, and can be valuable tools for the resolution of these conflicts. Second, it proves 
that multi-method designs in conflict studies lead to more robust or valid conclusions 
compared to the use of a single-method design. It underlines that both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches should be viewed as complementary methods for conflict analysis 
(Brewer and Hunter, 2006; Creamer, 2017; Creswell and Clark, 2011; Guest, 2011; Hesse-
Biber, 2010). 
 
Developing or determining one’s theoretical beliefs, if done right, is a difficult affair. In 
our own pursuit for developing the best outlook on this study, we used ideas from various 
research domains, including rational institutionalism (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Gautam 
and Shivakoti, 2005; Gibson and Koontz, 1998; Ostrom, 1990), political ecology 
(Escobar, 1995; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Le Billon, 2001; Peluso and Watts, 2001; Etter 
et al., 2006; Robbins 2012), critical ethnography (Crang and Cook, 2007; Madison, 2005) 
and the impairment approach (Glasl, 1999; Marfo and Schanz, 2009). It is generally 
known that the use of multiple theories can be functional to develop a broad perspective 
on the field of inquiry. The downside of using different theories is that they may offer 
different (or even incompatible or conflicting) perspectives on human nature, society, 
resource conflicts and co-management, and also use different (maybe incompatible) 
methodologies for their inquiries. 
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The central tenet of rational institutionalism is that universal design principles exist for 
the sustainable management of CPRs and that these institutional arrangements exist 
independently of human knowledge or perception of them. Rational institutionalism is an 
analytical approach aiming at knowing and understanding these institutions. Our data 
indicate the belief in universal institutions is grounded, at least for our study domain. We 
proved that co-management works for resolving park-people conflict as long as certain 
enabling conditions or institutional arrangements are in place.   
 
Political ecology is a normative approach that claims that environmental conflicts go back 
to deep-seated social, political and economic conditions or processes, specific historical 
contexts and long standing power relations. Political ecologists argue that conflict results 
from discrimination in the socio-economic and political world, including inequality in 
land rights, environmental and social injustice and unequal power relations. They also 
contend that conflicts do not ask for merely technical or managerial interventions (for 
example the setting of institutions or design principles), but rather for changes in the 
existing socio-economic and political world. 
 
Following political ecologists, we showed that park-people conflicts are often rooted in 
environmental injustices and inequalities in the socio-political sphere. Unequal rights to 
land and resources in Colombia´s NPAs based on lineage or ethnicity, for example, result 
in a situation where settlers experience more access conflicts than their Afro-Colombian 
counterparts who in turn experience more conflicts compared to the indigenous people. 
Unequal power relations and marginalization of the poor also influence the experience of 
conflict. For example, in Tayrona NPA a fishing community was evicted from their land 
and their houses were destructed. This conflict between local inhabitants and the park 
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administration was worsened as none of the neigboring luxurious private houses, some of 
them belonging to high-end officials in Santa Marta, were touched.  
 
Critical ethnography and the impairment theory share the idea that people´s individual  
stories are central for knowledge generation. The impairment model defines conflict as a 
situation in which an actor perceives impairment from the behaviour of another actor. 
Critical ethnography can be defined more broadly as the study of the world in a way as it 
is experienced and understood in the everyday lives of people who are at the margins of 
society, for example impoverished racial groups. Although both these theories are 
qualitative in their study design and start with subjective stories from the ground, they 
appear to be useful for the generation of data and findings that can be statistically 
analyzed. 
 
Thus, our analysis of conflict is based on local perceptions. However, local people’s 
perspectives do not necessarily match ´reality´ on the ground. We explained that people 
may experience access conflicts in a context where the NPA administration actually does 
not impose any restriction measures. Also, people may be unaware of injustices done to 
them, for example through unequal tenure arrangements, which they still take for granted, 
but which should actually justify a conflict. The impairment theory of conflict does not 
account for this, because people do not experience a (justified) conflict themselves. A 
premise of this study is that we select and work with those conflict types which allowed 
using individual participants’ judgments as the sole criterion to assess whether a conflict 
exists or not. Saying this, it stands no doubt that certain injustices (and so conflicts) might 
not be accounted for by respondents. However, we are convinced that interviewing over 
600 park inhabitants (from different socio-economic groups with often conflicting 
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interests) and 76 park managers, as well as the employment of other data collection 
techniques, lead to a good “reality” check and overcomes (at least partly) that certain 
injustices are not accounted for in our data set.   
 
Our ethnographic and impairment model show that both rational institutionalism and 
political ecology provide correct insights on how park-people conflict originate. In this 
study, we focussed on co-management and asked ourselves whether the fulfillment of 
enabling co-management conditions decrease conflict or not. According to our findings, 
complying with these conditions bring lasting solutions to a series of conflict, including 
conflicts related to environmental injustices. For example, the fulfillment of enabling co-
management conditions decreases access restriction conflicts, which includes conflicts 
related to unjust rights to land and resources. From a policy perspective, this is 
encouraging, as state authorities might find it more straightforward to first and foremost 
influence the fulfilment of enabling co-management conditions than to influence on long 
standing power relations or change deep seated land right injustices.  
 
However, our case material shows that cause-conflict relationships may be more complex 
than our data suggest. For example, certain conflicts related to land right injustices may 
definitely bring about new conflicts, as shown by our cases. Although we did not list these 
injustices or conflicts as root causes, research on the link between these and other park-
people conflicts deserve more attention. For example, further research could investigate 
whether the fulfilment of co-management conditions is more significant in explaining 
certain park-people conflicts compared to environmental injustices, or the other way 
around.  
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We worked with different models and theories for understanding part of the world. This 
proved to be useful for pushing the creative boundaries of knowledge creation and for 
greater accuracy in the understanding of the data and results.  We urge to develop a 
tradition in the social sciences where different (or even conflicting) theories are seen as 
potentially complementary and not always as rivals.   
6.3. Moving Towards a Peaceful Colombia: Recommendations 
for Park-People Conflict Mitigation 
Colombia is currently moving towards a peace-building process at numerous levels. In 
2017, a Peace Agreement was signed between the Colombian Government and the biggest 
guerrilla group, i.e. the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The Accord 
officially terminated Latin America’s longest-lasting armed conflict. More than 7,000 
rebels are giving up their arms under U.N. supervision in 26 “transitory normalization 
zones” in rural areas around the country. In exchange for the rebels’ approval to hand in 
their weapons, the government guaranteed billions of dollars in aid and education, land 
reform, rural infrastructure and political representation over the next decade. President 
Santos also promised to protect the rebels from reprisals by right-wing paramilitary 
groups. A cornerstone of the Accord is agrarian reform, including the government’s 
commitment to return land to property owners who were displaced by violence during two 
decades of conflict (Bustamante-Reyes, 2017; Herbolzheimer, 2016; Suarez et al., 2017; 
Young, 2017). 
 
We agree that the Peace Agreement is a positive step towards generating overall political 
stability as it ends a civil war of more than 60 years. However, we are afraid that the 
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Accord will not be enough to achieve the much-wanted social reforms, terminating land 
use conflicts, increasing local decision-making power in nature conservation management 
and resolving park-people conflicts. Suarez et al. (2017) already showed in other post 
conflict countries that the new post conflict scenario may often bring about more 
deforestation and land use conflicts. 
 
One thing is sure: the Peace Agreement generates a range of opportunities but also 
challenges for the conservation of the environment and well-being of the people therein.  
 
In Colombia, working towards effective resolution of park-people conflicts requires 
interventions at multiple levels. Within Colombia’s post conflict agenda and seen through 
the conflict impairment framework, we suggest five priority areas of action. 
 
First of all, the Colombian environmental legislative body needs to be reformed. In this 
respect, NPA management in Colombia should move from autocratic governance models 
towards co-governance schemes. Furthermore, the legislative framework should also give 
attention to rules or laws that enhance the equal treatment of different community groups. 
The rights of indigenous and other local communities to NPA land and resources should 
be revised, solidified and made more equitable across ethnic groups. Any new policies 
crafted to grant rights to land and resources should not solely be based on ethnic categories 
and ethnic hierarchies. In Colombia, policies that cement racial segregation exist as 
indigenous people are granted more land and usage rights in NPAs in comparison to Afro-
Colombian and farmer communities (see also Chapter 3, Discussion). Such policies often 
do not lead to better nature conservation outcomes and overall well-being for park 
residents. We argue that decisions about human use and occupation rights within NPAs 
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should also take into account factors such as local people’s historical relationships with 
the NPAs in question and perhaps more importantly, their actual commitment to 
conservation.  
 
Failing to implement more socially inclusive legal conservation practises in NPAs for all 
key stakeholders may lead to interventions that ignore the different needs and interests of 
distinct segments of society, and may exacerbate conflicts.  
 
Another reform should aim at developing detailed, transparent and fair legislation on 
tenure and occupation rights. Fair relocation, subsistence and income-generating 
alternatives should be provided in situations where local people’s occupation or use of 
resources within NPAs is not considered feasible.  
 
A second priority area of action for the Colombian government is to empower central and 
local NPA administrations. Environmental regulations should not only be decreed, they 
must also be put into practice. A science-informed, well-trained NPA administration is a 
critical step for Colombia to rid itself of paper-parks, effectually comply with its 
environmental regulative body, and lower the occurrence of park people conflicts. The 
government must strengthen the role of NPA administrations by providing them with the 
following: (i) more financial and human resources; (ii) adequate capacity building; (iii) 
enhanced communication and coordination with all relevant government agencies at 
different levels; (iv) access to higher quality and quantity of training and knowledge for 
sustainable NPA management; and (v) greater legal independent decision making power 
to confront the complex challenges found within NPAs. 
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Third, in order to avoid and mitigate park-people conflicts, park environments should be 
peaceful and safe. Although a Peace Agreement was recently signed, violent 
environments in Colombia continue to strain relationships between park managers and 
local people. Such environments include armed conflicts and their associated processes 
of displacement, as well as the production and merchandising of illicit crops (mainly coca 
and marijuana).  
 
As of 2017, the Agreement has not yet stopped the on-going rights violations of 
Colombia’s marginalised populations, which include labourers, farmers, women, 
internally displaced persons, Afro-Colombians and indigenous people. Violent activities 
remain part of daily life, and paramilitaries and other local armed groups still control most 
rural regions, including vast areas within and near NPAs. The demobilization of FARC 
militias is creating vacuums throughout the country, which are being occupied by 
paramilitary groups and other (often poorly organized) criminal organizations (generally 
referred to as bacrim). It is commonly known that boleteo (‘protection fees’), extortion, 
land and cattle ‘taxation’, theft, drug trafficking and other illegal activities are still the 
norm in many, if not most, rural areas of Colombia (Bustamante-Reyes, 2017; Suarez et 
al., 2017; Young, 2017). Furthermore, reports say the growing of coca is reaching peaks 
never seen before. (pers. comm. with NPA staff; pers. comm. with staff from GAULA 
and staff from the Central Direction of Judicial Police and Intelligence of Santa Marta or 
Dirección Central de Policía Judicial e Inteligencia de Santa Marta; The Guardian, 2017; 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2017).  
 
Since 2011, the author has lived near the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta NPA, in the North 
of Colombia. In January 2018, most of the businesses in this region, at least in the 
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countryside, were being extorted and protection fees were paid to the paramilitary group 
Los Pachencas. Since the Peace Agreement was signed last year, the author observed a 
strong increase of paramilitary activity in this region, also within some sections of the 
NPA. Scientific research is needed to corrobate or refute this observation.  
 
If paramilitary factions and bacrim continue to control local park environments, then we 
argue the Peace Agreement will not necessarily resolve long-standing conflicts between 
park administrations and local people. As we showed, violence and political instability 
easily lead to non-compliance with earlier agreements by both park administrators and 
local groups. In turn, non-compliance obstructs conservation processes and fosters park-
people conflict.  
 
The Paramillo NPA (Chapter 2, Case 7) provides good evidence of the benefits resulting 
from the absence of violence. Paramillo NPA is an area within a region suffused with 
violent conflict while the visited park area itself is free of violence. Authorities and 
community groups share trust and share in the economic benefits that may derive from 
park management. The conflict impairment framework proposes that violent 
environments directly lead to non-compliance with earlier agreements or existing rules, 
but the Paramillo case suggests that the opposite is also true (Yasmi et al., 2006).  
Fourth, Colombia’s central government needs to re-align its conservation policies with 
other interests, to avoid direct or unavoidable conflicts of interest. The government must 
ensure that regulations, interventions and investments are not in contradiction with 
resource extraction and other economic interests., such as mining or tourism. This will 
help to avoid destruction of natural areas for the financial or political benefit of private 
entities. The conflict impairment framework suggests that conflicts of interest directly 
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lead to impairments related to non-compliance with earlier agreements or promises. A 
number of case studies (see Chapter 2, Cases 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8) involve conflicts of interest. 
For example, in the case of Yaigoje-Apaporis the government assigned illegal mining 
permits within the NPA. This conflict of interest between economic gain on the one hand 
and conservation on the other, led to park-people conflicts. Such conflicts of interest need 
to be avoided at national policy level. 
 
Finally, more efforts are needed to overcome weaknesses in local organisations’ 
institutions and (management) capacities. At the local community level, there are 
disagreements regarding mining, logging and fishing, and there are struggles for power 
within community leadership roles. These often place park-people relationships under 
great strain. Local disagreements and battles for power make it difficult for authorities 
and the general community to comply with environmental regulations and co-
management schemes. Once again, the conflict impairment framework suggests that weak 
local organisations directly lead to impairments related to non-compliance with 
agreements and the law. Thus, it is clear that the responsibility for park-people conflicts 
lies with all stakeholders, including local communities and their leaders, and park 
officials. 
6.4. Shortcomings and Perspectives for Future Research 
Despite the innovative character of our results and their relevance beyond the Colombian 
case, a few problems, shortcomings or research gaps can still be identified.  
 
This research led to a better understanding of park-people conflicts and defined 
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appropriate ways to constructively address them. The fieldwork was conducted across the 
whole of the Colombian territory, whereas the research also encompasses a broad array 
of social and cultural conditions. However, in some way, it remains unclear how these 
findings are applicable beyond Colombian borders. More work is necessary, for example, 
to determine to what extent our main finding (i.e. lowered impairment through effective 
co-management, see Chapter 5), can be generalised to co-management schemes and their 
contexts in the global South. For example, studies could investigate the influence of 
effective co-management on conflicts in tropical fisheries or forests. More work is also 
needed to examine the extent to which factors that lead to conflict manifestations, 
according to the conflict impairment framework (Chapter 3), are relevant for conflict 
settings in other tropical countries.  
 
A second limitation relates to the methodology we used. Most of our conclusions are 
based on interviews with around 600 community members. These interviewees were not 
stratified within and across cases. Some parks or socioeconomic groups were more 
heavily represented by a larger number of interviewees, thereby potentially skewing the 
results to more heavily reflect the conflicts occurring in these parks. Future research could 
use more evenly stratified samples from different parks and from different socioeconomic 
groups (their occupation, income, wealth, social status). 
 
A further limitation relates to the complex ethnic diversity of Colombia. Local 
communities living within and around parks include a large diversity of indigenous 
groups, Afro-Colombian communities and colonos, rebels, mid- to large-size farmers, and 
urbanites.  Most of our findings are derived from a synthesis of perspectives of these many 
groups within each park analysis. It is acknowledged that the motivations and expectations 
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of these groups regarding NPAs may differ substantially amongst them. In Chapter 4, we 
studied the impact or role of socio-economic and geographical variables on the experience 
of access conflicts. However, further similar research should synthesise results on the 
relation between conflict experience and compliance with co-management conditions, 
while controlling for key variables, such as ethnic origin, gender or geographic 
differences. This would potentially generate interesting new findings and insights.  
 
Another issue within this research is that NPA staff perceptions regarding the perceived 
conflicts and co-management conditions are not as well-represented as the local people’s 
perspectives. Conflict and co-management involves at least two parties, but this research 
focuses mainly on the opinions of park inhabitants. Further research on park-people 
conflicts should include more interviews on conflict and fulfilment of co-management 
conditions with park staff. 
 
We decided on an ethnographic approach that gives attention to the subjective meanings 
and experiences of local people who are at the margins of society (Brewer, 2000; Crang 
and Cook, 2007). This approach stands in contrast to practices used by other researchers 
in this field. The latter have provided mounting evidence from the park or governmental 
perspective on park-people relationships. We assert that many findings of these 
researchers reflect values and structures of the dominating centre of society. For example, 
the presupposition that local communities are detrimental to PA biodiversity outcomes, 
without providing historical, political, ecological and economical meaning to it, favours 
the more powerful civilization. We aimed to contribute something useful to this body of 
knowledge by more broadly exploring socio-economic and political conditions in the 
field.  
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A further shortcoming of this research is that we focused on presence and absence, rather 
than degree of conflict. The case studies (Chapter 2) provide a description of different 
park-people conflicts in a selected group of representative Colombian NPAs. From 
literature and our own findings, it became apparent that conflicts are situated on a 
continuum that ranges from disagreement, to verbal debates or disputes and violence 
(from less to more severe; Marfo and Schanz, 2009). To further address park-people 
conflict beyond the questions and scope of this research, future studies should focus not 
only on numbers of conflict but also on conflict severity or on their escalation. More 
research is also needed to understand if and why some types of park-people conflicts are 
more pervasive and destructive than others. It is important to determine whether co-
management can be successful, not only in reducing the number of conflicts, but also in 
lowering conflict intensity. History shows that certain ′tipping points must be crossed for 
conflicts to escalate, but it is not clear if this also applies to park-people conflicts, and if 
so, how one can ensure conflict to stay within constructive limits (Marfo and Schanz, 
2009). 
 
Further questions need to be addressed which relate to the implementation of co-
management in the field. We showed that co-management can be successful in reducing 
conflict, as long as some critical enabling conditions, such as effective participation in 
NPA management and trust-building, are fulfilled. However, a concrete guideline as to 
how one has to implement trust and effective participation in the field, is missing. Perhaps 
the development of key performance indicators could help monitor to what extent co-
management conditions are applied in practice. Monitoring the functioning of co-
management in the field could be a central task for NGOs working on the topic. 
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Another issue is the cross-sectional (rather than longitudinal) nature of this research. The 
scope and exploratory aims of this study only permitted a comparison between NPAs, but 
did not analyse any changes in practices within single NPAs over time. This study 
discusses priority activities that would reduce conflict. However, future studies could 
determine which of the identified changes reduce conflict in single NPAs.  
 
Further research is also encouraged that emphasises categorisation of NPAs, based on 
budget, funding and other administrative characteristics. Such research could compare 
park-related experiences according to their resources and administrative capacities (i.e. 
funds, staff numbers, sources of funding). This type of research may strengthen the claims 
made here, based on the conflict impairment framework, that fostering administrative 
capacities is important for improving park-people relations.  
 
Likewise, there are more variables beyond co-management conditions that may explain 
the variation in experienced conflict. These include, but are not limited to, region, age of 
respective NPAs, climate, NPA size, conservation interests and the presence of illegal 
farming, mining or armed groups in these areas. Further research could take more 
contextual factors into account as a set of explanatory variables that moderate the 
experience of conflict and co-management by respondents.  
 
A key future challenge for PAs of the world will be to overcome the dichotomy between 
bio-centric and anthropocentric approaches to biodiversity conservation. It is perhaps a 
further shortcoming that this research does not link co-management and conflict 
perception data directly to biodiversity outcomes. In this respect, future research could 
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show the extent to which the experience or escalation of conflict is associated with 
conservation aims on the ground, particularly when co-management agreements are in 
place. Example questions include: does the fulfilment of co-management conditions 
improves or decreases biodiversity conservation in protected areas? And: is it possible 
that conservation goals are achieved regardless of the fact that NPA residents are exposed 
to multiple conflict situations? Or: does conservation fails even at low levels of conflict? 
In any case, a better understanding of the potential linkages between co-management, 
conflict and conservation would be valuable for fostering peace-building processes and 
enhancing conservation efficiency. 
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Supplementary Material: the Role of Gender in Shaping Access 
Conflicts 
Gender is one of the most critical factors structuring rural and forest-dwelling 
communities (Colfer et al., 2017). Gender also mediates local divisions of labour, access, 
control, use and benefits of natural resources. Women and men collect and use different 
forest products, gather the same products in different spaces, or use the same product in 
different ways (Howard, 2003; Rocheleau et al., 1996). Gender also interacts with class, 
caste, race or ethnicity in shaping attitudes towards park conservation (e.g. Allendorf and 
Allendorf, 2012; Bitanyi, 2012; Bragagnolo et al., 2016). However, the role of gender in 
park-people conflict has been under appreciated or neglected (Allendorf and Allendorf, 
2012; Colfer et al., 2017).  
 
Although gender was not retained by our most parsimonous model solution (which 
represents the minimum set of variables that together explain the highest portion of 
variation in data), it was significant in explaining people´s experience of access conflicts. 
Two key findings related to gendered perceptions of access conflicts emerged from the 
data. First, overall, men perceived significantly more access conflicts than women (55% 
versus 35% of respondents, respectively, X2 = 17.31, p = 3.18e-05; see Figure 4.1). Second, 
men experienced more conflicts than women specifically related to resource use and 
extraction (48% versus 32% of respondents, respectively, X2 = 13.08, p = 2.98e-04) and 
land tenure (14% of men versus 8% of women, X2 = 5.16, p = 2.31e-02), whereas women 
experienced more conflicts than men related to entrance in NPAs (10% versus 8% of 
respondents, respectively, X2 = 11.74, p = 2.87e-03; Figure 4.1).  
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Gender differences are also apparent across pairwise comparisons between personal 
attributes and the experience of access conflicts (Table S1). When considering only male 
respondents, significant relationships were found for seven out of eight variables 
considered, while for women only four out of eight attributes were significant (Table S1). 
 
A gendered experience of conflict was shown to be shared by all ethnic communities. In 
fact, certain gender-specific activities and resource use patterns are shared across ethnic 
groups (see also Bitanyi et al., 2012). Although women also entered NPAs, they were less 
involved in productive and/or extractive activities than men. When women were asked to 
list their main livelihood activities, raising the children and carrying out domestic 
activities were the predominant answers. Nonetheless, based on empirical observations 
during fieldwork, it is clear that household work is complemented with activities that 
women carry out in the NPAs, such as collection of fuel wood, fodder and other non-
timber forest products. Women also work with men on the household’s agricultural lands 
inside or near the NPAs, where they are often responsible for planting, weeding and 
harvesting. The observation that women generally experience fewer conflicts than men 
might be, in part, because NPA administrators consent to how they use NPA resources, 
such as in the collection of non-timber forest products. This contrasts with men’s 
activities, which are often more visibly destructive (e.g. field clearance and burning). 
However, women perceived significantly more conflicts than men related to entering 
NPAs, across all ethnic groups. This may be due to women’s reliance on their children’s 
help to accomplish their tasks. Children are often prevented access to NPAs, which makes 
women particularly affected by this type of restriction.   
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Table S1.  Pairwise comparisons of the relations between personal attributes and the experience of at least one conflict by men, women and both 
sexes together (significant values in bold) (X2 tests for categorical values and logistic generalized linear model with a binomial distribution for 
participant age). 
Attribute Relation with the experience of at least one access conflict Men Women All people 
  p-value p-value p-value 
 NPA  Persons who live in certain areas have greater probability of experiencing at least one access 
conflict than persons who live in other areas 
3.68E-19 6.18E-05 1.27E-27 
Ethnicity Settlers have a higher probability of experiencing at least one access conflict (60%) than 
indigenous or Afro-Colombian persons (45%) 
7.97E-06 7.69E-01 7.25E-05 
Pursuit of productive and /or 
extractive activities within 
the NPA   
People who engage in productive and/or extractive activities with NPAs have a probability of 
experiencing at least one access conflict (50%) than people who do not (40%) 3,13E-01 1.00E+00 3,96E-02 
Pursuit of income-generating 
activities in NPA 
Persons who undertake economic activities in NPAs have a higher probability of experiencing 
at least one access conflict (60%) than persons who do not (35%) 
3.70E-05 3.60E-03 2.16E-09 
Employed by NPA 
Administration 
Persons who are or have been contracted by the NPA administration have a lower probability of 
experiencing at least one access conflict (30%) than persons who have not been contracted 
(48%) 
4.85E-02 1.00E+00 1.37E-02 
Age  Elder persons have a higher probability of experiencing at least one access conflict than younger 
persons  
1.63E-02 1.54E-03 2.24E-05 
Education People with higher education (at least secondary school) have a higher probability (60%) of 
experiencing at least one access conflict than people with lower education (at most elementary 
school; 50%) 
4.64E-02 8.62E-03 2.72E-03 
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Wage Persons who earn more than the national minimum wage have a higher probability of 
experiencing at least one access conflict (70%) than persons who earn less (50%) 
9.39E-04 3.99E-01 8.93E-05 
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More men than women perceived access conflicts related to tenure and rights to land. 
According to Colombian environmental legislation, NPAs are incompatible with all types 
of land tenure except in the case of legally established indigenous territories. No 
individual can obtain any formal land rights in a NPA after its creation (MAVDT, 1977). 
If an individual or group of people had obtained legal property rights before the creation 
of a particular NPA, the Colombian government (through INCODER; Colombian Institute 
for Rural Development) could acquire these rights in exchange for financial compensation 
(either by negotiation or direct appropriation) (De Pourcq et al., 2017). The divergence in 
experience of conflicts related to tenure and land rights between genders may be due to 
the fact that men continue to have primary rights over land (Deere & Leon, 2003). This is 
true despite Colombia holding one of the most progressive land tenure regulations and 
land reform laws in Latin America, in terms of extending women’s rights to land and 
resources (Deere and Leon, 2003).  
Other factors may also explain why women of all local groups we worked with reported 
fewer access conflicts than men. Women were often less informed than men about the 
existence and management systems of NPAs. This is because information about natural 
resource management tends to be disseminated through male-dominated channels. For 
example, women participate less in public meetings (see also Allendorf and Allendorf, 
2012; Xu et al., 2006). Women may also be less aware of the implications of certain park 
regulations, and thus continue their daily activities without knowing that NPA authorities 
will sanction their actions (see also Bragagnolo et al., 2016). This is supported by our 
data, which indicate that 18% of men (n=410) and only 6% of women (n=191) 
respondents were well-informed about NPA management activities. Women knew very 
little about the basic objectives of the NPAs, often did not know if they actually lived in 
an NPA or not, and could not name their NPA. In this respect, men were generally more 
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knowledgeable. Additionally, women may be less inclined than men to recognise or voice 
the existence of NPA-related conflicts due to differences in how gender groups are 
socialised (Allendorf and Allendorf, 2012; Arjunan et al., 2006). Socially-constructed 
gender differences have been linked, in both the Global North and South, with differential 
access to education and information, a lower sense of confidence among women, and the 
cultural inappropriateness for women to present negative opinions (Arjunan et al., 2006; 
Bragagnolo et al., 2016). Educational programs and awareness raising activities should 
therefore look for the most effective ways to reach both boys and girls from NPAs and 
beyond in an equitable fashion. 
 
  
  
 167 
References 
 Adams, W., Aveling, R., Brockington, D., Dickson, B., Elliott, J., Hutton, J., 
Roe, D., Vira, B., Wolmer, W., 2004. Biodiversity conservation and the eradication of 
poverty. Science (80-. ). 306, 1146–9. 
 Adams, W., Brockington, D., Dyson, J., Vira, B., 2003. Managing tragedies: 
understanding conflict over common pool resources. Science 302, 1915–6. 
 Agarwal, B., 2010. Gender and Green Governance: The Political Economy of 
Women’s Presence Within and Beyond Community Forestry, Gender and Green 
Governance: The Political Economy of Women’s Presence Within and Beyond 
Community Forestry. Oxford University Press, Oxford, England. 
 Agrawal, A., 2001. Common Property Institutions and Sustainable 
Governance of Resources. World Dev. 29, 1649–1672. 
 Agrawal, A., 2005. Environmentality: community, intimate government, and 
the making of environmental subjects in Kumaon, India. Curr. Anthropol. 46, 161–190. 
 Agrawal, A., Chhatre, A., 2006. Explaining success on the commons: 
Community forest governance in the Indian Himalaya. World Dev. 34, 149–166. 
 Agrawal, A., Gibson, C.C., 1999. Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role 
of Community in Natural Resource Conservation. World Dev. 27, 629–649. 
 Agrawal, A., Redford, K., 2009. Place, Conservation, and Displacement. 
Conserv. Soc. 7, 56. 
 Aklilu, K., Dessalegn, R., 2000. Listening to the Poor: A Study Based on 
Selected Rural and Urban Sites in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies., 
Addis Ababa. 
 Alcaldía de Rihohacha, 2010. Decreto No. 127 Por el Cual se Regula la 
168 
 
Reubicacion de los Asentamientos en Palaima y los Cocos. 
 Allendorf, T.D., Allendorf, K., 2012. The role of gender in park-people 
relationships in Nepal. Hum. Ecol. 40, 789–796. 
 Andam, K., Ferraro, P., Pfaff, A., Sanchez-Azofeifa, G., Robalino, J., 2008. 
Measuring the effectiveness of protected area networks in reducing deforestation. Proc. 
Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 105, 16089–94. 
 Andersson, K., Agrawal, A., 2011. Inequalities, institutions, and forest 
commons. Glob. Environ. Chang. 21, 866–875. 
 Anthony, M., Knuth, B., Lauber, B., 2004. Gender and citizen participation in 
wildlife management decision making. Soc. Nat. Resour. 17, 395–411. 
 Arjunan, M., Holmes, C., Puyravaud, J., Davidar, P., 2006. Do developmental 
initiatives influence local attitudes toward conservation? A case study from the Kalakad-
Mundanthurai Tiger Reserve, India. J. Environ. Manage. 79, 188–197. 
 Armenteras, D., Rodriguez, N., Retana, J., Morales, M., 2011. Understanding 
deforestation in upper montane and lower montane areas of the Colombian Andes. Reg 
Env. Chang. 1, 693–705. 
 Arts, B., Verschuren, P., 1999. Assessing political influence in complex 
decision-making: an instrument based on triangulation. Int. Polit. Sci. Rev. 20, 411–424. 
 Atkinson, P., Coffey, A.J., 2011. Analysing documentary realities, in: 
Silverman, D. (Ed.), Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice. Sage 
Publications, London, pp. 56–75. 
 Baral, N., Heinen, J.T., 2007. Resources Use, Conservation Attitudes, 
Management Intervention and Park-People Relations in the Western Terai landscape of 
Nepal. Environ. Conserv. 34, 64. 
 Berkes, F., 2009. Evolution of co-management: role of knowledge generation, 
  
 169 
bridging organizations and social learning. J. Environ. Manage. 90, 1692–702. 
 Bernard, R., 2006. Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and 
Quantitative. Altamira Press, Oxford, England. 
 Bertzky, B., Corrigan, C., Kemsey, J., Kenney, S., Ravilious, C., Besancon, 
C., Burgess, N., 2012. Protected Planet Report 2012: Tracking progress towards global 
targets for protected areas, IUCN, Gland, Switzerland. 
 Bitanyi, S., Nesje, L., Kusiluka, S., Chenyambuga, P., Kaltenborn, B., 2012. 
Awareness and perceptions of local people about wildlife hunting in western Serengeti 
communities. Trop. Conserv. Sci. 5, 208–224. 
 Bocarejo, D., 2011. Dos paradojas del multiculturalismo colombiano: la 
espacialización de la diferencia indígena y su aislamiento político. Rev. Colomb. 
Antropol. 47, 97–121. 
 Borrini-Feyerabend, G., Farvar, M., Nguinguiri, J., Ndangang, V., 2000. Co-
management of natural resources: Organizing, Negotiating and Learning-by- Doing. 
Kasparek Verlag, Heidelber, Germany. 
 Bose, P., Arts, B., van Dijk, H., 2012. “Forest governmentality”: A genealogy 
of subject-making of forest-dependent “scheduled tribes” in India. Land use policy 29, 
664–673. 
 Bouchard, T., 1976. Unobtrusive Measures: An Inventory of Uses. Sociol. 
Methods Res. 4, 267–300. 
 Bragagnolo, C., Malhado, A., Jepson P., Ladle R., 2016. Modelling Local 
Attitudes to Protected Areas in Developing Countries. Conserv. Soc. 14, 163–182. 
 Brewer, J., Hunter, A., 2006. Foundations of Multimethod Research: 
Synthesizing Styles, SAGE Publications, Inc. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 
London. 
170 
 
 Brewer, J., 2000. Ethnography. Open University Press, Buckingham. 
 Brockington, D., 2002. Fortress conservation. The preservation of the 
Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania. James Currey, Oxford. 
 Brockington, D., Igoe, J., Schmidt-Soltau, K., 2006. Conservation, human 
rights, and poverty reduction. Conserv. Biol. 20, 250–252. 
 Brockington, D., Schmidt-soltau, K., 2004. The social and environmental 
impacts of wilderness and development. Oryx 38, 1–3. 
 Brondo, K., Bown, N., 2011. Neoliberal conservation, garifuna territorial 
rights and resource management in the Cayos Cochinos arine protected area. Conserv. 
Soc. 9, 91. 
 Bruner,  A., Gullison, R., Rice, R., Da Fonseca, G., 2001. Effectiveness of 
parks in protecting tropical biodiversity. Science (80-. ). 291, 125–8. 
 Bryant, R., Bailey, S., 1997. Third World Political Ecology. Geography 5, 237. 
 Buckles, D., 1999. Conflict and collaboration in natural resource management, 
Buckles, D.(Ed). IDRC/World Bank, Ottawa. 
 Bude, J., Converse, E., Edmonds, R., Fink, M., 2015. Some conceptual 
difficulties in the theory of social conflict. J. Conflict Resolut. 12, 412–460. 
 Bustamante-Reyes, J., 2017. Colombia’s path to peace. New Zeal. Int. Rev. 
42, 14–17. 
 Campbell, B., Sayer, J., Frost, P., Vermeulen, S., Pérez, M., Cunningham, A., 
Prabhu, R., 2001. Assessing the Performance of Natural Resource Systems. Ecol. Soc. 5, 
22. 
 Campbell, D., Fiske, D., 1959. Convergent and discriminant validation by the 
multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychol. Bull. 56, 81–105. 
 Carey, C., Dudley, N., Stolton, S., 2000. Squandering paradise? The 
  
 171 
importance and vulnerability of the world ’ s protected areas. World Wide Fund for 
Nature, Gland, Switzerland. 
 Carlsson, L., Berkes, F., 2005. Co-management: concepts and methodological 
implications. J. Environ. Manage. 75, 65–76. 
 Carlsson, L., Sandström, A., 2008. Network governance of the commons. Int. 
J. Commons 2, 33–54. 
 Castro, A., Nielsen, E., 2001. Indigenous people and co-management: 
implications for conflict management. Environ. Sci. Policy 4, 229–239. 
 CBD, 1992. Convention on Biological Diversity. Montréal, Canada. 
 Chape, S., Spalding, M., Jenkins, M., 2008. The World’s protected areas. 
Status, values and prospects in the 21st century. University of California Press, London. 
 Ciocănea, C., Sorescu, C., Ianoşi, M., Bagrinovschi, V., 2016. Assessing 
Public Perception on Protected Areas in Iron Gates Natural Park. Procedia Environ. Sci. 
32, 70–79. 
 Cisneros, P., Mcbreen, J., 2010. Overlap of indigenous territories and protected 
areas in South America. International Union for Conservation of Nature. 
 Colfer, C., Elias, M., Basnett, B., Hummel, S., 2017. Introduction to gender 
and forests: Themes, contents, and gaps, in: Colfer, C.P., Elias, M., Basnett, B., Hummel, 
S. (Ed.), The Earthscan Reader on Gender and Forests. Earthscan, London, pp. 1–26. 
 Colmenares, G., 1999. Historia Economica y Social de Colombia 1. Bogota, 
Colombia. 
 Consejo de Estado de la Republica de Colombia, 2011. Accion de Tutela - 
Impugnacion del 7 de marzo 2011. Colombia. 
 Cooke, B., Kothari, U., 2001. Participation: The New Tyranny? Zed Books, 
London. 
172 
 
 Coser, L., 1957. Social conflict and the theory of social change. Br. J. Sociol. 
8, 197–207. 
 Cox, M., Arnold, G., Tomás, S., 2010. A Review of Design Principles for 
Community-based Natural Resource [WWW Document]. Ecol. Soc. URL 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art38/ 
 Crang, M., Cook, I., 2007. Doing Ethnographies, Doing ethnographies. Sage 
Pubications, Thousand Oaks, California. 
 Creamer, E., 2017. An introduction to fully integrated mixed methods 
research. SAGE Publications., Thousand Oaks, California. 
 Creswell, J., Clark, V., 2011. Designing and conducting mixed-methods 
research, The Sage handbook of qualitative research. Sage Pubications, London. 
 Cuesta,  L., 2008. Analisis juridico para la declaracion de areas protegidas en 
territorios colectivos de comunidades negras en Colombia. Rev. Inst. unversidad Tecnol. 
del Choco Investig. Biodivers. y desarollo 27, 45–54. 
 Cundill, G., Thondhlana, G., Sisitka, L., Shackleton, S., Blore, M., 2013. Land 
claims and the pursuit of co-management on four protected areas in South Africa. Land 
use policy 35, 171–178. 
 DANE, 2016. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Censo 
General 2005. [WWW Document]. URL http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-
por-tema/demografia-y-poblacion/censo-general-2005-1 (accessed 11.9.17). 
 De Pourcq, K., Arts, B., Van Damme, P., 2017. Governing forests and parks: 
the need for inclusive approaches. Simposio Internacional: Reforma Rural Integral: Retos 
para la construcción de paz, Bogota, Colombia. 
 De Pourcq, K., Thomas, E., Arts, B., Vranckx, A., León-Sicard, T., Van 
Damme, P., 2015. Conflict in Protected Areas: Who Says Co-Management Does Not 
  
 173 
Work? [WWW Document]. PLoS One 10. URL 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0144943 
 De Pourcq, K., Thomas, E., Arts, B., Vranckx, A., León-Sicard, T., Van 
Damme, P., 2017. Understanding and Resolving Conflict Between Local Communities 
and Conservation Authorities in Colombia. World Dev. 93, 125–135. 
 De Pourcq, K., Thomas, E., Van Damme, P., 2009. Indigenous community-
based forestry in the Bolivian lowlands: some basic challenges for certification. Int. For. 
Rev. 11, 12-26. 
 Deere, C., Leon, M., 2003. The gender asset gap: land in Latin America. World 
Dev. 31, 925–947. 
 Denscombe, M., 1998. The good research guide for small-scale social research 
projects, Psychological Science. Open University Press, Buckingham. 
 Denzin, N., Lincoln, Y., 2011. The SAGE handbook of qualitative research, 
The SAGE Handbook. Sage Pubications, Thousand Oaks, London. 
 Dressler, W., Büscher, B., Schoon, M., Brockington, D., Hayes, T., Kull, C., 
Mccarthy, J., Shrestha, K., 2010. From hope to crisis and back again? A critical history of 
the global CBNRM narrative. Environ. Conserv. 37, 5–15. 
 Dudley, N., 2008. Guidelines for applying protected area management 
categories. International Union for Conservation of Nature, Gland, Switzerland. 
 Duran, C., 2009. Gobernanza en los Parques nacionales naturales 
colombianos: Rev. Estud. Soc. 60–73. 
 Eken, G., Bennun, L., Brooks, T., Darwall, W., Fishpool, L., Foster, M., Knox, 
D., Langhammer, P., Matiku, P., Radford, E., et al., 2004. Key biodiversity areas as site 
conservation targets. Bioscience 54, 1110. 
 El Congreso de Colombia, 1959. Ley 2 De 1959: sobre economía forestal de 
174 
 
la Nación y conservación de recursos naturales renovables. Colombia. 
 El Congreso de Colombia, 1993. Ley 99 de 1993. Por la cual se crea el 
Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, se reordena el sector público encargado de la gestión y 
conservación del medio ambiente y los recursos naturales renovables , se organiza el 
sistema nacional ambiental -SINA- y se dicta. Colombia. 
 El Congreso de Colombia, 1994. Ley 165 del 9 de noviembre de 1994. Por 
medio de la cual se aprueba el “Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biologica”, hecho en Rio 
de Janeiro el 5 de junio de 1992. Colombia. 
 El presidente de la Rebublica de Colombia, 1974. Decreto 2811 del 18 de 
diciembre de 1974. Colombia. 
 Ellis, E., Porter-Bolland, L., 2008. Is community-based forest management 
more effective than protected areas? For. Ecol. Manage. 256, 1971–1983. 
 Escobar, A., 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of 
the Third World. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
 Etter, A., McAlpine, C., Wilson, K., Phinn, S., Possingham, H., 2006. Regional 
patterns of agricultural land use and deforestation in Colombia. Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 
114, 369–386. 
 Fajardo, D., 2002. Para sembrar la paz hay que aflojar la tierra. Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia, Bogota, Colombia. 
 FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2018. [WWW 
Document]. URL http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index/en/?iso3=COL (accessed 
28.5.18). 
 Feierman, S., 1990. Peasant Intellectuals. Anthropology and History in 
Tanzania. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison. 
 Forero-Medina, G., Joppa, L., 2010. Representation of global and national 
  
 175 
conservation priorities by Colombia’s protected area network. PLoS One 5. 
 Foucault, M. 1979. Governmentality. Ideol. Conscious. 6, 5–21. 
 García-Frapolli, E., Ramos-Fernández, G., Galicia, E., Serrano, A., 2009. The 
complex reality of biodiversity conservation through natural protected area policy: three 
cases from the Yucatan Peninsula, Mexico. Land use policy 26, 715–722. 
 Garekae, H., Tsompi Thakadu, O., 2016. Attitudes of Local Communities 
Towards Forest Conservation in Botswana: A Case Study of Chobbe Forest Reserve. Int. 
For. Rev. 18, 180–191. 
 Gautam, A., Shivakoti, G., 2005. Conditions for Successful Local Collective 
Action in Forestry: Some Evidence From the Hills of Nepal. Soc. Nat. Resour. 18, 153–
171. 
 Gibson, C., Koontz, T., 1998. When “community” is not enough: Institutions 
and values in community-based forest management in southern Indiana. Hum. Ecol. 26, 
621–647. 
 Glasl, F., 1999. Confronting conflict. A first aid kit for handling conflict, 
Confronting conflict. A first aid kit for handling conflict. Hawthorne Press, Bristol. 
 Gravetter, F., Forzano, L, 2008. Research Methods for the Behavioural 
Sciences. 4th ed. Wadsworth Cengage Learning, Belmont, C.A. 
 Guest, G., 2012. Describing Mixed Methods Research: An Alternative to 
Typologies. J. Mix. Methods Res. 7, 141–151. 
 Gutiérrez, N., Hilborn, R., Defeo, O., 2011. Leadership, social capital and 
incentives promote successful fisheries. Nature 470, 386–9. 
 Hardin, G., 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science (80-. ). 162, 1243–8. 
 Hardin, G., 1998. Extensions of “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science (80-
. ). 280, 682–683. 
176 
 
 Herbolzheimer, K., 2016. Innovations in the Colombian peace process, 
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center. 
 Hesse-Biber, S., 2010. Emerging Methodologies and Methods Practices in the 
Field of Mixed Methods Research. Qual. Inq. 16, 415–418. 
 Howard, P., 2003. Women and the plant world: an exploration, in: Howard, 
P.L. (Ed.), Women and Glants: Gender Relations in Biodiversity Management and 
Conservation. Zed Books, London, pp. 1–47. 
 Idrissou, L., van Paassen, A., Aarts, N., Vodouhè, S., Leeuwis, C., 2013. Trust 
and hidden conflict in participatory natural resources management: The case of the 
Pendjari national park (PNP) in Benin. For. Policy Econ. 27, 65–74. 
 Igoe, J., 2005. Global indigenism and spaceship earth: convergence, space, and 
re-entry friction. Globalizations 2, 1–13. 
 Jick, T., 1979. Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in 
Action. Adm. Sci. Q. 24, 602–611. 
 Kabra, A., 2009. Conservation-induced displacement: A comparative study of 
two Indian protected areas. Conserv. Soc. 7, 249. 
 Kalamandeen, M., Gillson, L., 2006. Demything “wilderness”: implications 
for protected area designation and management. Biodivers. Conserv. 16, 165–182. 
 Kelly, A., 2011. Conservation practice as primitive accumulation. J. Peasant 
Stud. 38, 683–701. 
 Kepe, T., 2008. Land claims and comanagement of protected areas in South 
Africa: Exploring the challenges. Environ. Manage. 
 Kramer, R., 1999. Trust and distrust in organizations: emerging perspectives, 
enduring questions. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 50, 569–598. 
 Kutner, M., Nachtsheim, C., Neter, J., 2004. Applied Linear Regression 
  
 177 
Models, 4th ed. ed. McGraw-Hill Irwin, New York. 
 Larson, B., Bromley, D., 1990. Property rights, externalities, and resource 
degradation. Locating the tragedy. J. Dev. Econ. 33, 235–262. 
 Larson, L., Conway, A., Hernandez, S., Carroll, J., 2016. Human-wildlife 
conflict, conservation attitudes, and a potential role for citizen science in Sierra Leone, 
Africa. Conserv. Soc. 14, 205. 
 Laurance, W., Useche, D., Rendeiro, J., Kalka, M., Bradshaw, C., Sloan, S., 
Laurance, S., Campbell, M., Abernethy, K., Alvarez, P., et al., 2012. Averting biodiversity 
collapse in tropical forest protected areas. Nature 489, 290–294. 
 Le Billon, P., 2001. The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed 
conflicts. Polit. Geogr. 20, 561–584. 
 Leach, M., Mearns, R., Scoones, I., 1999. Environmental entitlements: 
dynamics and institutions in community-based natural resource management. World Dev. 
27, 225–247. 
 Lele, S., Wilshusen, P., Brockington, D., Seidler, R., Bawa, K., 2010. Beyond 
exclusion: alternative approaches to biodiversity conservation in the developing tropics. 
Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain. 2, 94–100. 
 Lewicki, R., 2006. Trust, trust development, and trust repair., in: Deutsch, M., 
 Coleman, P., Marcus, E. (Eds.), The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory 
and Practice (2nd Ed). Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp. 92–119. 
 Lijeblad, A., Borrie, W., Watson, A., 2009. Determinants of trust for public 
lands: Fire and fuels management on the bitterroot national forest. Environ. Manage. 43, 
571–584. 
 Lincoln, Y., Guba, E., 1985. Naturalistic Enquiry. SAGE Pubications Ltd., 
Beverly Hills. 
178 
 
 Lockwood, M., Worboys, G., Kothari, A., 2006. Managing protected areas : a 
global guide. Earthscan, London. 
 Lustig, D., Kingsbury, B., 2006. Displacement and relocation from protected 
areas : international law perspectives on rights, risks and resistance. Conserv. Soc. 4, 404–
418. 
 Lynam, T., de Jong, W., Sheil, D., Kusumanto, T., Evans, K., 2007. A review 
of tools for incorporating community knowledge, preferences, and values into decision 
making in natural resources management [WWW Document]. Ecol. Soc. URL 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art5/ 
 Madison, D., 2005. Critical Ethnography as Street Performance: Reflections 
of Home, Race, Murder and Justice in Ghana, West Africa., in: Denzin, N.K., Lincoln, Y. 
(Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, California. 
 Marfo, E., Schanz, H., 2009. Managing logging compensation payment 
conflicts in Ghana: Understanding actor-empowerment and implications for policy 
intervention. Land use policy 26, 619–629. 
 Martinez-Alier, J., 2001. Mining conflicts, environmental justice, and 
valuation. J. Hazard. Mater. 86, 153–170. 
 Mason, J., 2002. Qualitative researching, Qualitative researching. London. 
 MAVDT, 1977. Ministerio de Ambiente Vivienda y Desarollo Territorial. 
Decreto 622 de marzo 16 de 1977. “ Por el cual se reglamenta parcialmente: el capitulo V 
titulo II parte XIII del Decreto Ley 2811 de 1974 sobre Sistema de Parques Nacionales y 
la Ley 23 de 1973. 
 MAVDT, 2009. Ministerio de Ambiente Vivienda y Desarollo Territorial. 
Resolución 2079 de octubre 27 de 2009. Por medio de la cual se declara, reserva, delimita 
y alindera el Parque Nacional Natural Yaigojé Apaporis. Colombia. 
  
 179 
 MAVDT, 2010. Ministerio de Ambiente Vivienda y Desarollo Territorial. 
Resolución 1501 de 04 de agosto de 2010. Por medio de la cual se declara, reserva, 
delimita y alindera el Parque Nacional Natural Uramba Bahía Málaga. Colombia. 
 Mehta, J., Heinen, J., 2001. Does Community-Based Conservation Shape 
Favorable Attitudes Among Locals? An Empirical Study from Nepal. Environmental 
Management 28, 165–177. 
 Miles, M., Huberman, A., 1994. Qualitative data analysis: An expanded 
sourcebook (2nd ed.), Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook. Sage 
Pubications, Thousand Oaks, California. 
 Miller, G., Bartos, O., Wehr, P., 2002. Using Conflict Theory, Contemporary 
Sociology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 Naughton-Treves, L., Holland, M., Brandon, K., 2005. The role of protected 
areas in conserving biodiversity and sustaining local livelihoods. Annu. Rev. Environ. 
Resour. 
 Nelder, J., Wedderburn, R., 1972. Generalized linear models. Jorunal R. Stat. 
Soc. Ser. A 135, 370–384. 
 Neumann, R., 2005. Making Political Ecology: Human geography in the 
making. Department of Geography, University of Oregon, Oregon, US. 
 Nightingale, A., 2006. The nature of gender: Work, gender, and environment. 
Environ. Plan. D Soc. Sp. 
 Nolte, C., 2015. Identifying challenges to enforcement in protected areas: 
empirical insights from 15 Colombian parks. Oryx 1–6. 
 Ocampo Duque, D., Chilamack, D., 2012. Manual para determinar la situación 
jurídica de predios al interior del sistema de parques nacionales naturales. Ocampo Duque 
Abogados SAS, Bogota. 
180 
 
 Ojeda, D., 2012. Green pretexts: ecotourism , neoliberal conservation and land 
grabbing in Tayrona National Natural Park, Colombia. J. Peasant Stud. 39, 357–375. 
 Ordway, E., 2015. Political shifts and changing forests: Effects of armed 
conflict on forest conservation in Rwanda. Glob. Ecol. Conserv. 3, 448–460. 
 Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
 Pélissier, P., 1980. L’arbre en Afrique tropical: la fonction et le signe. Cah. 
l’ORSTOM, série Sci. Hum. 17, 127–130. 
 Peluso, N., Vandergeest, P., 2011. Political ecologies of war and forests: 
counterinsurgencies and the making of national natures. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 101, 
587–608. 
 Peluso, N., Watts, M., 2001. Chapter 1: Violent Environments, in: Peluso, 
N.L., Watts, M. (Eds.), Violent Environments. Cornell University Press, New York, pp. 
3–38. 
 Peters, J., 1999. Understanding conflicts between people and parks at 
Ranomafana , Madagascar. Agric. Human Values 16, 65–74. 
 Plummer, R., Fitzgibbon, J., 2004. Co-management of Natural Resources: A 
Proposed Framework. Environ. Manage. 33, 876–885. 
 Pomeroy, R., Berkes, F., 1997. Two to tango : the role of government in 
fisheries. Mar. Policy 21, 465–480. 
 Pomeroy, R., Katon, B., Harkes, I., 2001. Conditions affecting the success of 
fisheries co-management : lessons from Asia. Mar. Policy 25, 197–208. 
 Pomeroy, R., McConney, P., Mahon, R., 2004. Comparative analysis of 
coastal resource co-management in the Caribbean. Ocean Coast. Manag. 47, 429–447. 
 Porter-Bolland, L., Ellis, E., Guariguata, M., Ruiz-Mallén, I., Negrete-
  
 181 
Yankelevich, S., Reyes-García, V., 2012. Community managed forests and forest 
protected areas: An assessment of their conservation effectiveness across the tropics. For. 
Ecol. Manage. 268, 6–17. 
 Posada, A., 2009. Guerreros y campesinos: el despojo de la tierra en Colombia. 
Editorial Norma, Bogota, Colombia. 
 Primack, R., 2014. Essentials of conservation biology., 6th ed. Sunderland. 
 Pruitt, D.G., Rubin, J.Z., Kim, S.H., 2003. Social conflict: Escalation, 
stalemate, and settlement, McGraw-Hill series in social psychology. McGraw-Hill, New 
York. 
 Rangarajan, M., Shahabuddin, G., 2006. Displacement and relocation from 
protected areas: Towards a Biological and Historical Synthesis. Conserv. Soc. 4, 359–
378. 
 Robbins, P, 2012. Political Ecology: a Critical Introduction. John Wiley & 
Sons, Oxford.  
 Rocheleau, D., Thomas-Slayter, B., Wangari, E., 1996. Gender and 
environment. A feminist political ecology perspective, in: Rocheleau, D., Thomas-
Slayter, B., Wangari, E. (Eds.), Feminist Political Ecology. Global Issues and Local 
Experience. Routledge, New York, pp. 3–23. 
 Rodrigues, A., Akcakaya, H., Andelmùan, S., Bakarr, M., Boitani, L., Brooks, 
T., Chanson, J., Fishpool, L., Da Fonseca, G., Gaston, K., et al., 2004. Global gap analysis: 
priority regions for expanding the global protected-area network. Bioscience 54, 1092. 
 Roth, R.J., 2008. “ Fixing ” the Forest : The spatiality of conservation conflict 
in Thailand. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 98, 373–391. 
 Salazar, M., 2013. Effectiveness of Colombia ’ s protected areas in preventing 
evergreen forest loss : A study using Terra-i near real-time monitoring system. Institute 
182 
 
of International Forestry and Forest Products. 
 Schmidt-Soltau, K., 2009. Is the displacement of people from parks only 
′purported′, or is it real? Conserv. Soc. 7, 46. 
 Schroeder, R., 2002. Shady practices: agroforestry and gender politics in the 
Gambia. Polit. Geogr. 21, 845–847. 
 Scott, J., 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. 
Yale University Press, New Haven and London,. 
 Secretaria General Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2011. Sala Cuarta de 
Revision de Tutelas Mineras de la Honorable Constitucional Respecto del Expediente T-
2650067 Junio 2011. 
 Siegel, S., Castellan Jr., N., 1988. Non-parametric statistics for the behavioural 
sciences, 2nd ed, MacGraw Hill Int. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 Silverman, D., 1997. Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, 3rd 
ed. Sage Publications, London. 
 SNR, 2012. Superintendencia de Notariado y Registro. SITUACIÓN 
JURÍDICA ACTUAL DEL PARQUE NACIONAL NATURAL SIERRA NEVADA DE 
SANTA MARTA ZONA LENGUËTA. Bogota. 
 SNR, 2013a. Superintendencia de Notariado y Registro. SITUACIÓN 
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